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Abstract
The goal of this research is to provide an account of transitive inference
which has both psychological and computational justification, and to relate it
to the broader context of inference and information gaining systems in general.
Perhaps the most well known transitive inference task is called the 'N-term series
problem' which has been used, for example, to assess cognitive development in
young children. It is argued that this task taps basic cognitive skills which are
likely to form the building blocks of more complex forms of reasoning.
In a typical five-term series task, subjects are given the information A > B,
B > C, C > D and D > E, where the letters denote arbitrary stimuli and
'>' denotes an ordinal comparison, such as 'longer than'. Subjects are then
able to infer the relationship between 'remote' pairs such as B and D. A typical
phenomenon associated with this, and related tasks, is called the ordinal distance
effect — the time taken to make comparisons between remote pairs is, typically,
faster than the responses to the original training pairs, suggesting that much
inference has taken place during the initial learning process.
Recent evidence from monkeys has been shown to be fully representative of
this class of experiment. Furthermore, the monkey studies are the only ones to
provide a sufficiently rich database to permit a microanalysis based on compu¬
tational modelling. This thesis contains such an analysis, and it is shown how
many aspects of the subjects' behaviour can be accounted for with a surprisingly
simple rule-based model, in which subjects' strategies are represented by highly
constrained rule stacks. The model can account for the major phenomena asso¬
ciated with the five-term series task, and can model individual subject variation
within a principled framework. Finally, an algorithm is proposed for acquiring
appropriate rule stacks, given a random sequence of training examples such as
received by experimental subjects.
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Chapter one explains the motivation for and the contents of this the¬
sis. It can be viewed as being a guide, with each section corresponding
to one of the subsequent chapters. Section numbers in this chapter
thus correspond to chapter numbers in the rest of the thesis. Also,
citations are avoided where the relevant chapter supplies the detail.
1.1 Motivation and Scientific Context
In attempting to construct intelligent software for machines, it makes sense to
try and model biological systems, because these are the only 'proven' working
examples of intelligent, adaptable behaving systems we have. Our current under¬
standing is that nervous systems not only serve transducing functions but also
act as information processing and storage mechanisms. As information proces¬
sors, higher organisms (particularly humans) seem so flexible that it is not clear
what kinds of constraints might be imposed by their physical characteristics.
Indeed, it seems likely that the physical organisation of the brain is subservient
(over the course of evolution) to the dictates of information processing needs.
The question is, what are these dictates? Some of them might be expressed in
engineering terms such as efficiency and robustness, parsimony, modularity etc.
These are constraints on processing algorithms once their function has been de¬
fined. The second source of constraint must be in terms of function, as governed
by the role of the organism in the environment and the information available.
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Our goal is therefore interdisciplinary— to work towards discovering the princi¬
ples that govern information gain and the control of action in behaving systems.
A key idea behind this research is that there exist certain 'primitive' or
'precursor' cognitive skills which cross age and species boundaries and which
form the basis on which more complex skills and strategies are built.
1.1.1 Existing Approaches
The obvious places to look for insights into natural systems would appear to
be Psychology and the Brain Sciences. However, these have not always been
motivated towards reporting characteristics which can be implemented. Such
investigations have tended to produce coarse abstractions of group behaviour,
verbal 'introspective' reports or causal models using the 'brain metaphor'. By
the latter, I mean theories which use discovered or hypothetical physical char¬
acteristics of the brain to provide a metaphor for information processing. For
example, stimulus-response theory and its derivatives originated from physical
analogies. Another example is the 'spreading activation' theories of memory.
Even where such accounts are valid, by appealing to a particular physical ar¬
chitecture, researchers have tended to overlook the epistemological reasons why
information might be organised in a particular way. After all, as has already been
suggested, the architecture most likely evolved to deal with particular kinds of
information processing problems, and not vice versa.
On the other side of the coin, we have the 'pure' information processing
approach of Logic, Computer Science and 'basic' (mainstream) (Bundy, 1986)
Artificial Intelligence (AI). This type of research might be described as formally
specifying information processing problems and constructing algorithms to solve
them. The weak link here is not in the process of constructing algorithms;
AI has a powerful and expanding set of techniques for solving well formalised
problems. The difficulty is in asking the right questions in the first place, as
people's intuitions are often misleading not only about how they solve problems
but also about what problems they solve.
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Working artificial systems still tend to be 'domain limited' and the problem
solving and learning techniques embodied in these programs are (where they have
been abstracted) rather weak methods. Indeed, the weakness of the abstracted
techniques has led some to hypothesise that 'domain knowledge' is all important
and that the main business of AI is to find ways of representing 'world knowl¬
edge'. Whilst this is undoubtably a useful enterprise, and has led to the fields of
Knowledge Engineering and the attempts to formalise 'common sense reasoning',
both the source and the test of the representations are the researchers' own intu¬
itions about what they know. Similar problems exist with problem solving and
other aspects of 'basic' AI; the field is really an engineering discipline aimed at
developing techniques and formal methods. Whilst there is nothing wrong with
this, there is no guarantee that this alone will achieve our goal of understanding
and emulating biological systems. t
To summarise the overall research problem, it is not the case either that
the AI researcher can receive straightforward guidance as to what to implement
or that the role of the psychologist is to simply choose between the algorithms
provided by AI and decide which is most appropriate for describing his/her
data. Rather, there must be a symbiotic relationship between the two disciplines.
Unfortunately such inter-disciplinary research programmes are relatively rare.
The fields do import concepts from one another but there is relatively little
collaboration at the early investigative stages.
On their own, both AI and Psychology have failed to understand the engi¬
neering principles underlying intelligent, adaptable behaving systems. This may
well simply be due to the fact that the class of solutions to the problems of
information gain and management is small, and thus not easy to arrive at. This
would suggest that biological systems, which have evidently solved the problems,
are likely to share common fundamental principles, whether by inheritance or
by convergent evolution. This justifies our interest in comparative psychology.
There are many striking examples of common biological solutions, ranging from
digestive to optical systems. Our first step is to identify a domain which we
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suspect will help us gain insight into the less tangible problem of information
management.
1.1.2 Inference
One aspect of the observed rationality of behaving systems is their ability to
make inferences, and there has been much interest over the years in formalising
various forms of inference. In common usage, to 'infer' means to 'go beyond
the information given' and this word, or its equivalent in other languages, was
certainly used long before the invention of mathematical logic. A huge variety of
mental activities can be classified as 'inference', ranging from the intellectual to
the subconscious. For discussion purposes, I have found it useful to distinguish
between (approximately) three1 levels of inference and these are described below,
although the distinctions do blur into one another. Also, some inferences can
become faster with practice, perhaps even changing category, although there are
limits to this.
• Conscious, or problem solving kinds of inference are perhaps the best un¬
derstood. Firstly, they are open to introspection; people can, for example,
write books about how to calculate what cards your poker opponents are
likely to be holding. Secondly, they have been subject to extensive automa¬
tion, especially in recent years with the advance of computer science and
artificial intelligence (AI). Thirdly, they have been investigated by cogni¬
tive psychologists of the 'state space search' school, as described in section
1.2. This kind of inference is also sometimes referred to as planning and is
the slowest of the three, with time-courses of a few minutes to many hours.
• Inference which is much faster (lasting a few seconds) is not so easily de¬
composed or isolated, and the investigator must resort to creating artificial
JA fourth level, involving low-level perceptual and motor processing (automatic pro¬
cesses) is outside the scope of this paper.
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tasks and using group data or multiple measures to aid building a theory
about the underlying processes. These will be referred to as fundamental
forms of inference (for it seems likely that their basic components form the
building blocks for more complex inferences) and last from a fraction of
a second to a few seconds. Examples of this are linguistic inference, such
as anaphoric resolution, single digit arithmetic, categorical (eg reasoning
about set inclusion) inference and ordinal comparisons.
• Composite forms of inference come midway between the two forms above,
and it is debatable whether they should comprise a separate category. How¬
ever, there do appear to be some kinds of inference which are multi-step
and yet there is only partial (conscious) access to the intermediate results
and the nature of the representations used in solution. Examples of this
are multi-digit arithmetic, understanding spatial descriptions, construct¬
ing a representation of a series, and syllogistic inference. These kinds of
inferences take a few seconds to a few minutes to complete. They have also
been investigated by cognitive psychologists but the state-space approach
is less appropriate and more indirect methods have to be used.
How are the faster types of inference to be explained? Many have been led
to conclude that there is some kind of innate mental logic which mediates such
forms of inference (Inhelder & Piaget, 1958). Johnson-Laird devotes a signif¬
icant proportion of his book Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) to arguing
against the 'doctrine of mental logic'. One of his arguments, is that postulat¬
ing a logic engine in the head is simply inadequate as an explanation. Firstly,
it does nothing to explain learning processes and, secondly control of inference
is left unexplained. A logic engine will only draw correct inferences, but it is
unlikely to draw useful inferences unless directed to do so by some controlling
element. Examination of the cognitive psychology and AI literature leads one to
the conclusion that there is a definite lack of adequate study and (computational)
explanation of, in particular, fundamental forms of inference.
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Deduction and Induction
Another, traditional, classification of inference is into deductive and inductive
forms. In the broadest sense, deduction is inferring specifics from generalities
and induction2 is the converse process, going from specific instances to gener¬
alisations. Most types of reasoning involve both processes at some stage. For
example, think of a rat which has learned to solve some class of maze problems
(finding its way to a food source). In deciding whether to turn left or right
at any particular junction, it can be said to be deducing which way to turn
from the knowledge it has acquired about the maze, the task and from local
information about the junction. On the other hand the process of acquiring
such generalisations must be one of induction, learning from the successes and
failures of previous decisions. Presumably, unless the rat derived a perfectly
satisfactory algorithm for finding its way through the maze, the learning process
would continue indefinitely, and in parallel with the deductive processes.
It seems unfortunate, then that most psychological studies of inference have
concentrated (at least superficially) on deductive inference alone, a point made
by (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1986). However, as the authors also point out, in
the process of trying to isolate a deductive act, many studies have uncovered
interesting phenomena associated with the integration of the information neces¬
sary to perform the tasks. Thus light is thrown on the more general mechanisms
of information management, including induction. Chapter 7 deals with some of
the issues related to deduction in more detail.
1.1.3 The Contribution of AI
Although the traditional Artificial Intelligence (AI) methods of using intuition
and introspection to uncover the nature of inference are of limited use (worse,
they can be misleading), AI and computer science do provide a body of work-
induction in the common and philosophical senses, not mathematical induction.
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ing behaving systems which can form a rich source for analogies and models,
together with an understanding of their formal properties. On the other hand,
new techniques in psychology involve a microanalysis of performance with re¬
peated measures of more than one kind. This is explained more fully later on,
the point for the moment being that it is possible, as in Physics, to obtain mul¬
tiple measures on an unseen object and to build up a picture of it by indirect
methods. The difference between the kinds of models sought here and the math¬
ematical models of Physics is that a cognitive model should be similar in kind
to its subject material, which we assume is also a computational process. Our
challenge, then, is to construct process models of fundamental forms of inference
informed by and (in turn) informing a multiple level empirical analysis. Psychol¬
ogy contributes by providing techniques for catching and observing the inference
occurring in vivo and AI can offer new ways of formalising theories of process
and representation.
1.1.4 Transitive Inference
Transitive inference is, in general, a form of reasoning about rankings. Formally,
it can be specified by an inference rule: 'if x is more than y and y is more than z
then x is more than z\ The word 'more' has been used here to stand as proxy for
any kind of comparison along a scale. In logic, this is referred to as transitivity of
inequality as distinct from symmetrical or 'associative transitivity'. This latter
type of inference involves reasoning about equivalence and it will be mentioned
again later in the context of related psychological research. Transitive inference
can occur without applying an inference rule of the kind above. In general, we
can say that it occurs wherever the 'given' information relates pairs of items and
the 'inferred' information relates novel combinations of items as i/they were part
of an overall order. Transitive inference is a suitable candidate for investigation
(ideally as part of a coordinated programme of research into fundamental forms
of inference) for a number of reasons:
7
1. It is fast. Ordinal comparisons can be made in one or two seconds and this
is too fast for introspection into the sub-processes involved.
2. It is abstract. Transitive inference is one of the simplest forms of reasoning
about relations between symbols. The inference is thus one level removed
from the perception or mental representation of the objects themselves.
This means that our findings will not be domain limited and that we can
reasonably hope that the concepts evolved will be extensible to other forms
of inference.
3. It has an important place in theoretical psychology. Transitive reason¬
ing was initially studied in the context of child development. Piaget
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), for example, was interested in the emergence
of 'formal' reasoning. There is also a group of related kinds of inference
which have been studied to various extents, for example, seriation, com¬
parison of items in long-term memory, learning of temporal sequences and
linguistic comprehension of comparatives.
4. Empirical data is available. This is related to the last point in that there are
a number of well documented phenomena that have emerged from studies
in transitive inference. More importantly for this study, however, there is a
large body of data on monkeys' performance of the transitivity task which
has been made available for this investigation (see section/chapter 3), the
use of which will be justified further on.
5. It is ubiquitous. Transitive inference is likely to arise in any system which
reasons about items which differ from each other with respect to some
dimension. A metrical representation (associating a quantity with each el¬
ement to be compared) may be inappropriate or impractical if information
about the items is relative or uncertain and so an ordinal representation
(ranking) is likely to be used. Examples are reasoning about preferences,
relative positions of objects in space or time, social orderings, size orderings
etc. Of these perhaps preference orders are the most general and could be
8
regarded as more 'primitive' than the others. For example, even the sim¬
plest organisms discriminate between situations which are better or worse
for obtaining food.
6. Controlling transitive inference is an important problem in AI. Transitive
inference is ubiquitous in AI for the same reasons as given above. The
obvious examples involve reasoning about physical systems (size, length,
mass etc). There are also 'meta-level' inferences which need to be made,
for example, heuristic search involves imposing a preference order onto the
problem space, planning involves reasoning about sequences of actions, etc.
Use of a transitive inference rule in an unconstrained way can lead to very
large search spaces being generated and so anything that can be learned
about the control of transitive inference is likely to be useful.
7. Although it is traditionally thought of as a deductive form of inference,
the task can also be thought of as involving the integration of information.
This means we can potentially learn something about the principles of
information management employed by subjects.
It should be pointed out at this point that there are really two levels to
transitive inference as it occurs in the typical transitive inference task. The first
is a slow problem solving or composite type of inference during which the subject
learns about a series and the second is the ordinal comparison, which is fast.
Discussion of the slower aspect, which can be regarded as subsuming the second
(and is thus a harder problem), will be deferred until chapter 7 (section 1.7).
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1.2 Background: Methods and Models
Meanwhile, chapter 2 describes some previous psychological and computational
approaches to inference, with the emphasis on relating the kinds of model ob¬
tained to the kinds of data and methods used. This provides a context for our
own methodology. In particular, studies of potential relevance to transitive in¬
ference are reviewed.
1.2.1 The Transitive Inference Paradigm
A typical three term series problem, as used by Piaget in developmental studies
of children, is shown below:
'Edith is fairer than Suzanne and Edith is darker than Lilly. Who
is the fairest, Edith, Suzanne or Lilly?'
Some early models of how children perform such reasoning were based on the idea
of language-like categories. For example, 'Edith is fairer than Suzanne' could
be naively represented by slotting each person into one of the two categories
suggested by the comparative. Thus Edith is fair and Lilly is dark. If the
latter half of the conjunction is similarly represented, then only one name is
unambiguously categorised as fair (Lilly). Suzanne is labeled as dark and Edith
is neither dark nor light. More sophisticated models were proposed for adults
which, nevertheless, also worked on the the same basic principle of decomposing
comparatives into 'primitives'.
At the same time, another school of thought was that such problems were
solved by employing mental imagery. It was argued that the comparatives were
used to order terms into a 'mental line' which could be inspected (in the mind's
eye) for the purpose of drawing conclusions. Thus, in the previous example,
the line 'Suzanne-Edith-Lilly' might be constructed. Obviously there is also the









Table 1—1: A 5-term series problem
Although the 'imagist' type models are less parsimonious, they gained ground
with the generalisation of the three-term problem to N terms. A five-term series
problem is illustrated schematically in table 1-1. A series containing five or
more terms contains at least one pair containing items which cannot be uniquely
categorised. In the example, this is the pair marked with an asterix. If the
continuum is size, for example, neither B nor D can be uniquely categorised as
'big' or 'small'. Studies of five term, and longer, versions of the N-term series
problem are therefore crucial.
Bryant and Trabasso developed a version of the N-Term series task which
involved the subject comparing the relative lengths of rods referred to only by
colour. One of the main motivations was to show that children could perform
transitive inference at a much earlier stage than previously thought if they were
given appropriate non-linguistic stimuli.
However, Trabasso went on to become interested in the process by which
knowledge of a series was acquired and by the nature of the representation of
the series itself. To this end he used two important techniques. The first was to
monitor subjects' performances when they had only partially learned the series
and the second was to take multiple measures of responses in the same task using
both reaction time and error rate indices. A major phenomenon to emerge was
the ordinal distance effect, which is that the speed of comparison of two items
in a series is, on average, proportional to their separation. For example, judging
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the relative position of adjacent items is slower than comparing items which are
separated by intervening elements of the series.
Trabasso et al thought that (what we call) the ordinal distance effect was
a version of an analogous kind of distance effect which is found in a different
paradigm. The latter is called the symbolic distance effect (SDE), and there
are grounds for thinking that it should be treated separately. The 'comparisons'
involved in the SDE were, in the first studies, size comparisons of familiar objects
referred to only by name. The effect obtained was that the discriminations were
faster the bigger the difference in size between the (imaginary) objects. The SDE
has since been found to be ubiquitous in memorial comparisons along virtually
any kind of perceivable or imaginable dimension.
In fact, the SDE is not a single phenomenon but a compound of related
effects. It is much more complex than the ordinal distance effect, involving lin¬
guistic and world knowledge, rather than abstract representations constructed
at the time of the task. Due to this complexity, and motivational and method¬
ological differences between researchers, there is a lack of a solid corpus of data
suitable for microanalysis. Whilst the possibility is not precluded that similar
mechanisms underly problem solving in the N-term series problem and the SDE
paradigm, this thesis concentrates on the former.
Bryant and Trabasso's 'non-linguistic' version of the N-term series task
opened the door for a new representation oriented approach to transitive in¬
ference which clearly separated linguistic from other reasoning abilities. If very
young children can reason about 'order' information, combining separately pre¬
sented chunks of information in a logical fashion, this would appear to indicate
that linguistic competence does not necessarily form the basis of abstract rea¬
soning abilities. The task is clearly tapping some basic mechanism for organising
information, and our goal is to find out what this mechanism is.
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Objects are always presented in these pairs
with the left-right position of the rewarded
item varied. Subjects are then tested to see
if they spontaneously choose between novel
pairs according to the implied series 'yellow,
blue, white, green, red' (actual colours vary
between subjects).
Table 1—2: Example training scheme for five-term series.
1.3 Non-verbal Transitive Inference
Five and six series experiments have now been carried out under a wide variety
of conditions, with different subjects, species and materials. It has now been
established beyond reasonable doubt that subjects can perform crucial 'internal'
comparisons (BD in the previous example) and that the ordinal distance effect
is a robust phenomenon. Chapter 3 reviews some of this work, including exper¬
iments with children, monkeys and, recently, pigeons. The fact that analogous
behaviour arises in different species reinforces the idea that there are limited
solutions to the information management problems involved. However, there is
only one study which has produced detailed enough data to enable the micro¬
analysis of individual subjects, and this provides the main focus of this chapter,
and for the remainder of this thesis.
McGonigle and Chalmers adapted Bryant and Trabasso's task for use with
monkeys. This was done for a number of reasons, some of them already men¬
tioned, but the main point here is that, non-human subjects could be tested more
intensively and over a longer period, allowing high density data to be collected,
with the potential for follow-up studies on the same subjects. Children, on the








It was found that monkeys could perform this task, and produced a perfor¬
mance profile remarkably similar to that of children. Table 1-2 shows the basic
training scheme. Subjects were repeatedly presented with the training pairs un¬
til they could reliably pick the rewarded colour and were then tested. As well
as testing the subjects on novel pairs from the series [eg blue and green in the
example), 'triadic' tests were introduced, which involved the subjects choosing
from a three element subset of the series.
Chapter 3 describes the obtained phenomena in more detail, but the key
features are that the spontaneous bias on all the pairs was highly transitive (after
the adjacent pairs had been learned) and that every individual subject showed
an ordinal distance effect. Previously, these effects had only been statistically
significant for groups of subjects. The demonstration of the ordinal distance
effect in individuals effectively proves that the monkey subjects do not make
remote comparisons on the basis of stored training pairs.
Performance on the triadic tests was significantly worse, however. When
subjects transferred to this second task they had a tendency to sometimes choose
'second best'. In other words, although each three element subset could, in
principle, be totally ordered according to the implied series, in practice, subjects
would often take the middle item (from the ordered subset).
For example, given the series A, B, C, D and E, where the 'correct' choice
from any pair is the one near the E end, then the 'transitive' choice from the
triad ABD is D. However, B would be chosen on many trials. If the task seems
trivial using this notation, remember that the left-right order of the choice stimuli
(colours) are scrambled. Finally, a surprising additional result was that subjects
showed a spontaneous improvement on the triadic tests when they were given
an extra intensive testing session. This was without any intervening retraining
and without selective feedback on their responses.
Some of the features of this data which make it attractive as the basis for
computational modelling are its regularity, the large quantity of data on each
individual subject and the availability of both reaction time and choice (error)
measures. From the theoretical perspective, the experiments also have an advan-
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tage in that there are two basic tasks which were given to subjects after training,
giving two windows onto the underlying processes.
1.4 The Stack Model
It was decided to use the monkey data to inform a modelling attempt of the N-
term series task. Existing models, such as Trabasso's and Breslow's (discussed in
chapter 6), concentrated on accounting for the ordinal distance effect, and made
no predictions about triadic choice patterns. The mechanism described below 3
was a fresh start. As well as being an efficient way of representing a series, the
mechanism appeared simple enough to be plausibly employed by monkeys and
made some interesting predictions about triadic choices. In outline, it is based
around the concept of avoidance and selection rules. Each rule is a conditional,
with the the left hand side stating where the rule is relevant and the right side
stating a 'choice tactic'. A strategy for performing the task consists of having
a small stack of rules (four), each one of which is an instruction to either avoid
or select a particular feature, in along with a 'control strategy' which tests the
condition of each rule in turn, and applies the first relevant one it comes across.
For example, the series Yellow, Blue, White, Green, Red can be represented
by the rules below. This strategy lends itself to a production system notation,
and is explained formally in chapter 4.
1) If Red is present then select Red.
2) If Yellow is present then avoid Yellow
3) If Green is present then select Green.
4) If Blue is present then avoid Blue.
Briefly, this mechanism (henceforth referred to as the stack model) was se¬
lected as a candidate for further investigation for the following main reasons:
3First proposed in (Harris, 1985).
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1. It is simple, and therefore ought to be tested on the Occam's razor princi¬
ple, as well as being plausible for monkeys.
2. It can be extended to make predictions about the three choice situation
in the triadic task. Choices to the 'middle' item can be explained by
unsuccessful application of an avoidance rule which only provides an un¬
ambiguous choice in the binary situation. The assumption was made that
where the choice specified by the rules was ambiguous, a random choice
would be made.
3. A number of different combinations and orders of rules can successfully
perform the task, thus there is some potential for accounting for variation
between subjects.
v.
Chapter 4 goes on to describe how the stack model satisfies (qualitatively)
some of the constraints implied by the phenomena characteristic of the five-term
series task, such as the ordinal distance effect.
1.5 Evaluating the Stack Model
Chapter 5 deals with the quantitative evaluation of the stack model. The ap¬
proach is to assess the 'fit' at coarse levels of description and then to progressively
chunk the data more finely until the inadequacies of the model become apparent.
The analysis begins with triadic error patterns and goes on to look at reaction
times during binary tests.
Given that the stack model is the only one to make clear predictions about
triadic tests, the first step was to re-examine the monkey triadic data to see if
the patterns of errors could be accounted for. A novel feature of the approach
taken was to map out a space of possible triadic choice profiles based on the
variations of rules allowed in the stack model. These projected profiles were then
compared with summaries of the actual data obtained for individual subjects.
The net result was that individual monkeys' choice patterns could be better
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characterised by the operation of individual rule stacks than by previous 'group'
types of models. It is interesting to compare the approach taken here with
the 'state-space' methodology described in section 1.2. Both approaches rely
on the idea of a behaviour space, but whereas the latter compares projected
and obtained sequences of actions, we compare choice profiles, as a necessary
consequence of the type of data we are dealing with.
The intensive additional triadic tests were analysed and it was found that
the improvement could be modelled by a change in subjects' control strategies,
whilst each individual maintained the same stack of rules.
Up to this point, no use had been made of the reaction time (RT) data
except for the original acceptance criterion of the model that it should account
for the ordinal distance effect. The stack model makes a clear prediction about
RT patterns for individuals, which is that the time to respond should increase
with the depth of the rule which determined the choice outcome. The binary
RTs were therefore plotted accordingly, and it was found that, for five out of
six subjects, there was a significant linear correlation between reaction time and
depth of rule. For two of the subjects, nearly all of the variation in RTs could
be accounted for in this fashion. This is called the depth effect.
The net conclusion from the evaluation is that the stack model is a good
approximation of monkeys' decision procedures during the five-term series task,
although one subject may be employing a deviant strategy. However, the as¬
sumption that subjects are using a rigidly ordered set of rules may be partially
incorrect. Rule order may change slightly, over the course of time or it may have
a stochastic component to it.
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1.6 Deductive Processes in Transitive Inference
Having presented an account of how monkeys solve the N-term series problem,
chapter 6 compares the stack model with the alternatives. The stack model
is shown to be the most parsimonious model which adequately characterises
the published phenomena. The relationship between models is pointed out by
representing the different mechanisms in a common formalism.
It is argued that most rely, at some level, on hypothesising the existence of
a transitive inference rule and deductive reasoning. In short, the stack model
is the most parsimonious model which adequately characterises the published
phenomena. As Trabasso's and Breslow's models are the main rivals to the
stack model, some of the theoretical objections to them are summarised below.
Trabasso et a/'s model of transitive inference was based around the idea that
subjects explicitly constructed a series or associated objects with a pre-existing
series. The retrieval and comparison process he proposed was analogous to visual
discrimination (as studied in psychophysics) where items close together are more
easily confused.
Breslow models Trabasso's data in a more parsimonious way and his ac¬
count is computationally complete. The basic idea is that subjects construct
two associative chains, each starting from one end of the series. Staying with
our size example, the subject would start by identifying the objects that were
unambiguously big or small (the end points) and chain from these items using
the contiguity information in the training pairs. The chain used for information
retrieval would depend on the direction of the comparative used in the question,
and works by scanning the chain until one of the items to be compared is located.
Breslow had a number of misconceptions about the nature of his model,
which he thought showed that subjects could perform the task in a 'non logical'
manner. For example, he thought of the 'chains' as being purely associative but
they are in fact clearly directional both in construction and retrieval and so the
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subject is using more than purely the contiguity relationship from the training
examples. Ironically, however, it turns out that Breslow's model can be captured
by a set of logical rules, and it is shown that the model belongs to a family of
similar representations.
Bundy proposed a model in which a series is represented by a discrimination
tree. Although the 'default' form of this model is not compatible with the phe¬
nomena, it is shown that both Breslow's mechanism and the stack model can be
thought of as employing tree-like representations.
Finally, many of the models conflate the N-term series and SDE phenomena;
to some, extent, they try to model them both. The remainder of chapter 6 ex¬
amines the models with respect to the marking and congruity effects. It is found
that it is very difficult for simple representations to show both of these effects at
the same time, without assumptions being made extrinsic to the computational
needs of the decision process. A very simple mechanism is described which does
show both of these effects, but it cannot simultaneously account for the phenom¬
ena of the N-term series task other than the gross distance effect. It is concluded'
that Trabasso may have been wrong in his assumption that the N-term series
task tapped the same mechanisms as employed to make the pseudo-perceptual
comparisons in the SDE effect. However, more research needs to be done before
the connection (or lack of it) between the SDE and N-term series effects can be
fully established.
1.7 Transitive Inference as Induction
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that the stack model has descriptive power with
respect to the monkey data. Although evaluation of this kind of performance
model could be taken further, this should not be done at the expense of asking
why subjects in the N-term series task make transitive choices at all, when they
could simply store the four adjacent pairs? During testing, the monkey subjects
were rewarded indiscriminately, so the reason must be entirely to do with repre-
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sentation. Part of the answer may be that the stack model is, computationally,
cheap enough to be a sensible representation of four pairwise relations. How¬
ever, this still leaves the problem of how the representation is learned and why
it varies from subject to subject.
We cannot assume either that the subjects have a ready made transitive
inference rule or that, even if they had, that they would know to apply it in
this context. Without such a rule being added to the axioms representing the
task, the transitive relationships between remote pairs simply do not follow de¬
ductively from the original pairs. Even with a transitive inference rule, there
still remain parts of the task which are essentially inductive in character. For
example, subjects would have to infer what the finite set of training examples is.
Furthermore, the simple stack model can only go so far in modelling the
subtleties of subjects' behaviour. A possible rationale for its limitations is that
they are due to the restrictive framework imposed by the deductive inference
paradigm. Working within such a framework, there is a tendency to try and
justify any proposed mechanism solely on the grounds of parsimony and com¬
putational efficiency. When the observed mechanism appears to violate these
constraints, we are at a loss as to what additional complexity to import. It
was decided to try out the idea that the mechanism which learns and performs
the transitive inference task derives from one which deals with a generic kind of
multiple choice situation.
It was decided to approach these problems by asking what kind of basic
cognitive tools would be needed to deal with the problem of learning how to
identify and deal with an unclearly defined set of choice situations? The model
which emerged uses components of the stack model, such as the concept of
'avoidance' and 'selection' as primitives but casts them in a broader role of
choice tactics which could be employed in a wide variety of choice situations.
Similarly, the rules change status to being considered as hypotheses about the
set of choice situations faced by the subject.
A program has been written which implements some basic principles of this
theory. It can be shown that this inductive learning algorithm appears to learn
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about the series in an 'end-inwards' fashion as found by Trabasso in his subjects
and by McGonigle and Chalmers with the monkeys. The stacks that are gen¬
erated depends on the history of previous choices that the program has made,
and this is used to explain why different subjects employ different stacks. This
model has not been empirically tested against individuals' training data but it
is offered as lending plausibility to the stack account and providing a possible
framework for future work.
1.8 Conclusions
Chapter 8 draws together the conclusions from the modelling work and suggests
further tests and possible extensions of the model. Finally, the significance of
the modelling work is discussed with respect to wider issues in development and
learning.
1. The motivation of this research is to identify and model basic cognitive
skills which cross age and species boundaries and which could form the
building blocks of more complex skills in biological or synthetic behaving
systems.
2. Transitive inference, as found in the in the N-term series task, appears to
be such a basic form of reasoning.
(a) It is sub-linguistic and cross-species.
(b) It is fast, and closed to introspection.
(c) It is abstract and thus not domain limited.
In general, transitive inference is also interesting from the point of view of
synthesis, as it is ubiquitous in formal systems.
3. A model of (this kind of) transitive inference was developed based on a mi¬
croanalysis of monkey data. The microanalysis breaks down into approx-
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imately two stages, though the development of the model was inevitably
partially an iterative process.
(a) A computational mechanism, the stack model, was proposed as can¬
didate for modelling subjects' decision processes during the N-term
series task. The mechanism is simple enough to be plausibly employed
by animals and can be justified on the grounds of computational effi¬
ciency and parsimony.
(b) As well as qualitatively satisfying the criteria of the published N-
term series phenomena, the model stood up to detailed quantitative
evaluation against data from seven monkey subjects.
4. A mechanism which subsumes the stack model was proposed, by which
subjects could learn to perform the N-term series task. This was imple¬
mented as a computer program, and found to have the right gross learning
characteristics. Although this model has not been evaluated in detail, it
lends further plausibility to the stack model account.
5. The role of transitive inference as a 'pre-logicaP primitive is discussed, with
respect to information management and human development.
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Chapter 2
Background: Methods and Models
This chapter gives some of the background of previous attempts to
model various kinds of inference. The purpose of this is to illustrate
how psychological and AI approaches have previously been combined
and to help to provide a context for our own methodology. The mod¬
elling attempts selected from the literature have largely been chosen
for their relevance to the transitive inference paradigm or for their
historical significance. The more psychological approaches are dealt
with first, followed by those with a computational emphasis. A criti¬
cal comparison of of models of transitive inference is postponed until
chapter 6.
2.1 Characterising Inference
From a psychologist's point of view, the main motivation in studying inference
is to understand how and why a behaving system can appropriately 'go beyond
the information given'. From the AI perspective, the goal is to actually create
behaving systems. Both disciplines face the problem of understanding, for exam¬
ple, the effects of incomplete information and the role ofworld knowledge. So we
see that, at this level, the aims of AI and psychology are perfectly compatible;
systematic observation of the behaving systems can reveal constraints in their
information processing and creating information processing systems can give rise
to guidance as to what observations to make.
If we assume, as was posited in chapter 1, that there exist general cogni¬
tive structures (which exist regardless of an individual's state of learning), and
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that these structures can be described in computational terms, then two lines
of investigation are needed. One is to try and discover things about the cog¬
nitive structures themselves, and the second is to explain how situation-specific
information processing strategies are generated from these general structures.
Perhaps inevitably, most psychological and AI studies of reasoning have tended
to concentrate on discovering what strategies can be employed in specific situ¬
ations. It is difficult to work backwards from such task specific descriptions of
process to find the basic cognitive skills. Nevertheless, it is worth bearing in
mind as a top level goal.
This brings us onto the question of the relationship between formal and
behavioural characterisations of inference. Mathematical logic and computer
science provide us with convenient formalisms for describing behaving systems
and, in particular, decision making and inference systems. There is no a priori
prescription as to how this should be done or for how such systems
should be compared with humans. However, there are certain existing
inference systems (both computational and logical) created to perform in par¬
ticular task situations where they are used as a tool. With these systems there
is precedent: many people have already drawn the analogy between the steps
of logical inference that a logician makes and the corresponding steps (or series
of sub-steps) in a formal proof. As this fit seems quite good, this leads onto
the question of whether there is a one to one correspondence between all human
inference and logical inference by rule? Do we need to characterise human infer¬
ence any further or can we just look for the appropriate rules (albeit a difficult
task) and let these act as our model?
Before considering these questions further, let us observe that the correspon¬
dence between a logician's chain of inference and the corresponding proof of a
formal system is not particularly surprising since the formal system was created
to perform the same task. Imagine any machine producing an act which could
also be performed by humans: the mechanism of the machine could be posited
as a model for the mechanism employed by the human. However, there will
certainly be tasks which the human mechanism will find 'equivalent' or adapt-
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able to, but which the machine mechanism will find impossible. For example, a
food processor is fine for stirring soup but shows no transferral whatsoever to
serving it. So it has a failing as a model of the human arm holding a spoon.
Even a chess machine is similarly dedicated to an exact task specification. The
inferences it makes are quite useless if the rules of the game are changed slightly,
whereas humans typically show adaption and transfer. Similarly, a simple au¬
tomatic theorem prover is quite likely to disappear into an endless search if it
is given certain types of input, a behaviour which would cause the unfortunate
demise of a human logician.
Measuring the degree of transferral between different tasks is a useful psycho¬
logical probe for finding salient or relevant task features and thus establishing a
'task ecology' — a domain of related tasks. For example, in early experiments
on the animal learning, it was discovered that rats could be trained to choose a
grey square in preference to a black one, thus demonstrating that they can dis¬
criminate between different light intensities. But it is not immediately obvious
what is being learned:
(i) Grey ==*► Reward
(ii) darker(STIMULUSl, STIMULUS2) ==► Reward
In (i) a very simple association of a property with reward is learned but in (ii) a
comparison between two stimuli is necessary. Which is learned can be tested by
measuring transferral to a related task in which the animal has to choose between
a grey and white square. Similarly, we can investigate what happens when the
shape of the stimulus is changed etc. In this simple example, the possibilities
for different mechanisms facilitating the same performance profile are somewhat
restricted but with more complex tasks, and with more complex animals, it can
be all too difficult to know just what has been learned. Also, in more complex
cases, learning need not just be affected by the way the input is 'coded' but
also by the strategy adopted by the subject as affected by the task in hand or
anticipation of the kind of information it will receive. There is a danger of the
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researcher assuming that, because the subject responds 'correctly', the subject
has learned the very concept that the experimenter used to judge correctness.
To return to the previous theme, if we want computers to be able to make
inferences in the same way as humans (because humans are good at it) then,
even within a very restricted domain, we should not expect a program to behave
bizzarely with new tasks which humans often cope with using, essentially (and
subjectively), the same strategy as they started with.
For this to be possible, a new methodology is necessary. It is unlikely to
be fruitful, without guidance, to generate and test mechanisms for possible psy¬
chological validity. Rather we must look to human behaviour itself in the first
instance and discover, by subjective and empirical means (aided by theory and
models), what types of behaviour appear to fit together in a descriptive tax¬
onomy. For example, it is unlikely to be fruitful to posit the same mechanism
for two behaviours which can clearly be distinguished on psychological grounds
(for example, if there is an order of magnitude difference in their time-courses).
Also, two superficially different behaviours may -turn out to have analogous be¬
havioural profiles.
Bearing these general issues in mind, let us look at some actual examples.
2.2 Johnson-Laird's Constructivist Account of
Inference
In his ambitious work Mental Models (Johnson-Laird, 1983), Johnson-Laird of¬
fers a comprehensive framework for understanding inference. He falls approx¬
imately into the psycholinguistic category of Clark and Banks (see below), in
that he was interested in inference and representation from the viewpoint of
comprehension of text. His main theoretical paradigm was that of constructive
semantics as opposed to interpretive semantics. The basic dichotomy can be
characterised by asking the question whether a piece of text is 'understood' with
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the use of forwards or backwards inference. In this context, a subject is said to
understand a piece of text if he can answer questions about it and 'go beyond
the information given', that is, make textual inferences. The question is, do we
store the premises contained in the text in a 'superficial' (near linguistic) form
and then perform deductions on them as required, or do we make deductions as
part of the comprehension process, storing the results in some kind of integrated
representation?
Johnson-Laird's major emphasis is on how the syntactic and logical form of
textual premises could affect the form of mental representation. He used two
main domains in his investigations. The first was syllogisms and the second
was spatial descriptions. These fall approximately into the composite category
oof inferences, as described in section 1.1.2. The basic experimental framework
was the same for both domains: the subject was given a number of premises
(sentences) and asked to perform a task afterwards, which could be to draw a
'spontaneous'' conclusion, verify an inference or to remember the original text.
In the spatial description domain, the initial 'verification' was done pictorially,
but this does not alter the general framework. The type of data he collected was
basically similar to that of Clark's paradigm, in that he varied the syntactic and
logical form of the text and measured the effect on error rates (and sometimes
the average reaction time to respond). He also used a 'confusion' measure in
which subjects had to judge similarity of various mutated forms of a text to
their memory of the original. No longitudinal studies of subjects' changes in
performance or detailed reaction time analysis was done. Also, he did not mea¬
sure reading times when subjects were given text, either for the entire text or for
individual premises. This was probably partly due to technological limitations
at the time of the experiment.
The type of model Johnson-Laird developed was determined by the combina¬
tion of the constructivist theoretical position and the kind of data he collected.
In the case of the spatial description domain, the model involved translating
text into logical premises (at a local sentential level) and constructing an array
representing the two dimensional layout of the objects in the description. The
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statements are dealt with one by one, each being combined with the array con¬
structed so far. If a statement cannot be incorporated into the array then it will
have to be stored on one side, pending relevance. If this happens too much a
memory overload will be created and the subject gives up the array and simply
stores the set of premises. This is similar to the kind of thing that can happen
with the 'working memory' of production system models.
The other example was syllogistic reasoning. How do subjects draw a 'spon¬
taneous' conclusion from a pairs of premises such as the ones below?
Some of the artists are beekeepers.
All the beekeepers are chemists.
Conclude: Some of the artists are chemists.
This is example from the space of possible syllogisms formed by varying the
quantifiers, which may be any of all, some, some not and none. Some combi¬
nations of premises are much more difficult to reason about than others (taking
minutes, rather than seconds, for a naive subject), and are also prone to error.
Part of the effect is syntactic, due to the order in which the premises appear, and
Johnson-Laird calls this the 'figural effect'. However, some syllogisms are gen¬
uinely more difficult than others, even discounting this factor. Newell, amongst
others, tried to model the reasoning processes involved but, as Johnson-Laird
points out, he is unable to make specific predictions about errors. Although he
used production systems for modelling, he was unable to use protocol analysis.
Although subjects are able to report some aspects of their reasoning processes,
such as the mental images they use, it seems that no one can give a step-by-step
rationale.
Johnson-Laird's model involved subjects constructing and manipulating a
kind of iconic 'tableau' as a result of reading the premises. The tableau would
contain 'tokens' representing components of the problem, in this case, individual
beekeepers or artists, or whatever. The idea is that, at any given stage, the
tableau should be representative of the problem description, rather than nec¬
essarily following from it. A tentative conclusion is 'read off' the tableau and
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then tested by manipulating the tableau, within the constraints specified by the
premises, to see if it can be falsified. The tableaus constructed for some forms
of syllogism tend to suggest erroneous conclusions which might not be spotted
if the subject runs out of 'working memory space' whilst trying out alternative
representations of the premises. This factor is used to account for subjects'
errors.
For the spatial descriptions example, the spatial properties of the tableau (an
array, in this case) are used to represent spatial relationships specified in a de¬
scription. For example, the premise 'the spoon is to the left of the fork' would be
provisionally represented by two tokens in adjacent cells in the array. Additional
tokens are introduced into the array as further premises are encountered, with
the array being rearranged, as necessary, to deal with inconsistencies. Questions
about the description are answered by interrogating the array, to find the relative
positions of the objects in question. If too many inconsistencies arise, however,
(the description is ambiguous) subjects supposedly run out of working memory
space and resort to remembering the descriptions 'verbatim'.
This account of understanding descriptions contains an implicit model of
transitive inference. Formally, the reasoning involved in ordering objects in space
is the same as involved in making the inference.
x>y&z.y>z-+x>z
Yet Johnson-Laird is not concerned with the details of the inference mechanism.
He does not specify how the tableau is 'read' and takes no account of the phe¬
nomena associated with transitive inference, discussed below. The same applies
to Hagert (Hagert, 1984), who attempted to formalise Johnson-Laird's model.
This shortcoming should not distract us from the value of Johnson-Laird's work.
He is trying to set up a general framework, or metaphor, for understanding prob¬
lem solving, not just a specific account of spatial or syllogistic reasoning. This,
naturally, is a major undertaking, and consequently the mechanisms he proposes
are bound to be under-specified with respect to the basic forms of inference.
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2.3 Transitive Inference in Adults and in Chil¬
dren
The case was made in chapter 1 that transitive inference is a suitable domain of
investigation. Transitive inference itself is an established sub-field of cognitive
psychology and there are a number of robust phenomena associated with the
field which are described below. However, the earlier studies do not provide
us with a cohesive corpus of theory or data. This is because of (a) diversity
in the motivation and theoretical approach of researchers and (b) diversity in
methodology. For this reason, a historical perspective is adopted, initially.
2.3.1 The Three Term Series Problem
One of the difficulties is that there is a fundamental methodological problem in
trying to assess whether subjects possess a conceptual understanding of transi¬
tivity. Piaget's initial work concentrated on obtaining verbal justifications for
subjects' solutions to transitivity problems but, of course, verbal inability does
not preclude a conceptual understanding or procedural type knowledge. All we
have to go on is behaviour in tasks which appear to require the coordination of
relational information.
The three term series problem, or 'linear syllogism' consists of two conjoined
premises describing a ranking of three objects with respect to some scale. These
are preceded or followed by a question about the ranking or a statement relat¬
ing the end terms of the ranking to be verified or falsified. Early investigators
of human performance on this kind of problem were Burt(l919), Piaget(1921,
1928), Hunter(l957), deSoto et a/(l965), Huttenlocher(l968) and Clark(l969).
Although the research interests behind the various research groups were very
different, ranging from cognitive development to psycholinguistics, a major com¬
mon finding emerged. This was that different wordings of the premises produced
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radically different performances even though they appeared to contain, logically
speaking, exactly the same information about a three term series. For example:
'If John is better than Pete and John is worse than Bill then who
is best?'
Produces many more errors than
'If Bill is better than John and John is better than Pete then who
is best?'
These examples are, subjectively, obviously different but there are also a range
of intermediate cases which need explaining. The effect is entirely analogous to
the 'figural effect' obtained with ordinary syllogisms, so it is referred to as that,
hereafter.
Being syllogistic in form, these problems are immediately recognisable as
examples of formal reasoning in the logical sense but are much easier (and faster),
and so are suitable for younger subjects. The three-term series problem was later
studied by Clark (Clark, 1969) who was a psycholinguist interested in how the
meanings of the comparatives were represented and understood. As for the
conventional syllogisms, the main form of data was the error rates for different
forms of the problem. Clark wanted to know such things as whether 'bigger' is
easier to understand than 'smaller'. Hunter (Hunter, 1957) on the other hand,
was perhaps the first to worry about how the inference was 'done'. Although
using similar data, he came up with the first theory that was applicable to series
of more than three terms, and came closest to postulating some kind of internal
representation of the series as opposed to the linguistic terms. Huttenlocher
(Huttenlocher, 1968), Foos (Foos, 1980) etc extended the idea of a representation
of a series further, postulating that the inference was mediated by a mental line
or image or map.
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2.3.2 The N-term Series Problem
The three term series paradigm is problematic in that although it is a rich source
of phenomena, the various effects are easily confounded due to the limited nature
of the task. The phenomena began to be factored out, and new ones discovered,
when the paradigm was extended to 'N' term series, usually four, five or six terms
long. The procedure is essentially the same as before: the subject is presented
with a set of premises relating items adjacent in the series and is subsequently
asked questions about remote pairs. This has a number of advantages over the
three term series. Given the series A>B>C>D>E, there are not
just one, but a whole set of possible inferences relating non-adjacent pairs, thus
generating a much richer data set. Furthermore, in series longer than four items,
it is possible to test subjects on pairs such as 'B-D' where neither is an end item
of the series. This turns out to be important for eliminating possible 'non-logical'
reasoning strategies involving labeling the end terms.
There are a number of ways the task can be presented. Usually the premises
are presented individually, in randomised or particular orders, followed by a
testing phase. Alternatively, the training phase can be like a task itself with
the subject given forced choices between a pair of stimuli, immediately followed
by feedback as to whether the choice is correct or incorrect. Testing on novel
pairs starts once a criterion of so many 'correct' responses has been attained.
This latter procedure has the advantage that it can be used to give a non-
linguistic presentation suitable for experiments with young children or animals,
as described in the following chapter.
2.3.3 Phenomena Associated with N-term Series Prob¬
lem
This section describes some of the varied phenomena which have been associated
with various forms of transitivity task. This summary collapses many versions of
the task, linguistic and non-linguistic, child and adult, and covering widely dif¬
fering experimental procedures. It is therefore unlikely that a single mechanism
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is responsible for all the phenomena. However, there is a more uniform corpus of
experiments employing more or less the same procedure, and these experiments
are reviewed in the next chapter, under the heading of the N-term series task.
Notation
Before introducing the phenomena, it will be helpful to introduce some termi¬
nology. Given a series of symbols, for example, ABCDE, the items at the end
of the series are sometimes referred to as end-anchors. The 'training pairs' are
adjacent items in the series [eg BC) and 'remote pairs' consist of non-adjacent
items (eg BE). The 'ordinal separation' of a pair is the 'distance' between two
items with respect to an imaginary linear ordering, where the separation of ad¬
jacent pairs is 1. For example, the ordinal separation of BE is 3. The ordinal
position of an item or a pair is its overall position with respect to the linear order
(and a preferred or arbitrary direction). For example, the adjacent pairs can be
ordered AB, BC, CD, DE.
Measures
The staple measures of the experimental psychologist are 'error rates' and 'reac¬
tion times' (RTs), although these are by no means the only possible measures.
Studies in cognitive science usually make the assumption that differences in the
reaction time involved in making a response reflect differences in amount of pro¬
cessing and hence the 'psychological complexity' of the problem. This is only true
if the processing is serial (as with conventional digital computers) and if there is
no 'speed-accuracy trade-off' affecting the reaction times for difficult problems.
Nevertheless, the assumption is a useful one to make, especially if it is backed
up by error rates data showing the same kind of pattern across problems.
Linear Spatial Images — evidence from protocols
When subjects are asked how they perform N-term series problems, they typi¬
cally report forming some kind of image of the linear order with a spatial ex-
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tent (deSoto et al, 1965; Huttenlocher, 1968; Foos, 1980). These images, mental
lines, integrated representations, analogue devices or mental models, as different
theorists have called them, have a number of properties, or constraints, not all
of which are agreed upon. However, it appears that they are usually constructed
either from left to right1 or from top to bottom and that only one vector is
used. In addition to questioning subjects, Huttenlocher gave subjects pen and
paper for the duration of the task, finding additional evidence that subjects were
compiling a linear order with a preferred direction of working. It has not been
established whether or not such images perform a mediating role, as Kosslyn
and others suggest, or whether they are an 'attendant' phenomenon without a
functional role.
Ordinal Distance Effect
The most robust finding is that the reaction time to make a particular
comparison2 is linearly related to the ordinal separation of the two items being
compared. The further apart the items are in the overall ranking, the shorter
the reaction time is (Potts, 1972; Potts, 1974; Trabasso &: Riley, 1975). Super¬
imposed on this effect, is a time advantage to comparisons involving an end item
(end anchor) but, significantly, there is a distance effect with the 'internal' items.
This shows that the distance effect cannot be attributed to a statistical effect
whereby remote pairs contain more end anchors (Sholz & Potts, 1974).
Trabasso and his colleagues attributed this distance effect to the properties
of the 'mental line' hypothesised by the 'image' theorists. The main idea is that
points on the line must first be located, and then 'discriminated'. The closer
two points are the more 'confuseable' they are, and hence the longer it takes to
decide which comes first or second. However, it does seem to be agreed that
ordinal information is integrated by the subject and not stored as adjacent pairs
1For Western subjects, presumably.
2averaged across subjects and question types
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(which would mean that a transitive inference rule would have to be used for
queries about remote pairs).
The Acquisition Curve
During the training phase of the N-term series task (when subjects are re¬
sponding to the adjacent pairs) the error rates and reaction times for each pair
show an 'end anchor' effect. That is, to start with, performance is better on
pairs which have been recently presented (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1984a), but
as performance improves with further training, the profile changes such that
pairs towards either end of the series have lower error rates and reaction times.
Trabasso describes this as the series being learned 'end-inwards'. A graph of
error rate against ordinal position thus typically shows an inverted 'U' shaped
curve (Trabasso & Riley, 1975). Strong serial position effects, such as the ac¬
quisition curve, are symptomatic of the typical transitive inference task and
it is sometimes difficult to disambiguate these and distance effects. Woocher
(Woocher et al, 1978) has argued that nearly all of the variance in his data could
be explained by serial position effects alone. However, the general consensus is
that both types of effect exist.
The Bypass Effect
Polich and Potts (Polich &: Potts, 1977) found another end-anchor effect whereby
the distance effect appeared to be short-circuited when end anchors were in¬
volved. For example, given the sequence A to E, any comparison involving A
would be equally fast, regardless of how widely separated the pair is. This could
be explained if the subject aborted any further manipulation of his/her mental
representation of the series once it was discovered that finding A effectively de¬
fines the choice. Polich and Potts noted that some of Trabasso's data showed
the bypass effect (Polich & Potts, 1977).
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Congruity Effects
Trabasso and his colleagues, working with children comparing coloured sticks
of different lengths, found a kind of congruity effect (Trabasso &; Riley, 1975)
which may be related to the congruity effect found with memorial comparisons
(section 2.3.5).
For comparisons including an end-anchor, there is an interaction between the
comparative employed in the question (ie: 'choose longer' or 'choose shorter')
and the end-anchor in the pair (the longest or the shortest item). In terms of the
comparatives employed, the instruction 'choose longer' is 'congruent' with the
'long' end-anchor being involved, and the resulting reaction time is faster than if
the anchor involved had been 'short' and the instruction therefore incongruent.
The same principle predicts the interaction of the 'choose shorter' instruction
with the presence or absence of the 'short' end anchor. From later work, it
seems that congruity effects may not be limited to pairs involving end anchors
(Woocher et al, 1978).
Marking
The marking effect has been given relatively little attention in the context of
the N-term series task. It is an overall asymmetry in the speed with which
questions involving one comparative are answered as opposed to its converse.
For example, Trabasso found that, overall, 'choose longer' comparisons were
faster than 'choose shorter'3. Marking is often associated with lexical marking
(described below) which is a linguistic phenomena. However, marking effects
can obtained even with non-linguistic mode of presentation of materials and
questioning, which raises the possibility that marking is due to an attribute of a
subject's representation itself and is not due to differences in processing time of
the instructions per se (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1984b).
3As with the congruity effect, Trabasso unfortunately limits his description of the
effect to pairs including end-anchors
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If marking is due to a property of representation then it may be connected
with an asymmetry noted in the protocols and in the experiments on imagery
(Huttenlocher, 1968; Foos, 1980), which is in the direction of working when sub¬
jects mentally construct a series. This is in contradistinction to Trabasso's claim
that subjects construct series 'ends-inwards', which he supports with the serial
position effect. If our 'mental lines' are directional in some sense then the mark¬
ing effect could be explained in a similar way to the congruity effect: instructions
which match the overall direction of the series are processed more quickly. How¬
ever, this apparently leaves us at a loss as to how to explain the cross-over effect.
Further investigation of the causes of marking are hampered in the transitive
inference paradigm due to the difficulty of dissociating possible asymmetries in
subjects' internal representations due to training-specific effects, more general
asymmetries, and effects due to processing of comparatives. For example, task
specific effects could occur in experiments where the premises are presented
sequentially in an order reflecting the series being represented:
A is bigger than B, B is bigger than C, C is bigger than D etc.
Additionally, an asymmetry could arise if only one comparative is used in
the training phase (McGonigle Sz Chalmers, 1984a). The assembly process
is assumed to be directional either due to properties of the image itself
(deSoto et al, 1965) or to properties of the comparative terms, for example, the
subject-object relationship (Huttenlocher, 1968) or due to limitations of the as¬
sembly process (Hunter, 1957; Foos, 1980). Another possibility is that, even
if both comparatives are used, subjects may tend to use a common direction
of working due to linguistic or pre-linguistic conventions such as working from
biggest to smallest, tallest to shortest, fastest to slowest etc. It is difficult to
disambiguate these various possibilities from the transitive inference literature




Although they may be psychologically distinct, SDE phenomena have (histor¬
ically) been closely linked to those of the N-term series, and this is the main
reason for their inclusion.
Analogue and Propositional
Naturally, workers in the N-term series paradigm have tended to look to related
fields in psychology for sources of theoretical insight. Most of the terminology
arises from a mixture of related areas, and various researchers have turned to
different areas for sources of analogy and explanation, depending on their theo¬
retical predispositions.
Broadly speaking, theorists split into two camps, 'analogue' (imagery) theo¬
rists and psycholinguists or propositionalists. These camps approximately cor¬
respond to two sides of a long standing (sterile) debate in cognitive psychology
over the role of 'analogue' devices or 'images' in mental representation. For
a review of relevant literature see (Kosslyn, 1981) as example of an analogue
theorist and (Pylyshyn, 1981) as an example of a 'propositionalist' who argues
that all image-like phenomena can be explained by propositional (language-like
or sub-linguistic) encoding that forms the basis of both verbal and non-verbal
semantics.
The N-term series researchers have tended to be influenced by the 'imagist'
way of thinking, particularly in their explanations of the distance effect which
was the phenomenon which dominated early research. Interestingly, however,
Trabasso cites Clark, a psycholinguist who did early work on the three term
series, when referring to the congruity effect. Also the term 'marking' derives




Symbolic comparison tasks involve use of 'transitive' comparatives in a different
paradigm from the N-term series task. Here, understanding a comparative in¬
volves relating it to previously encoded information in long-term memory. Such
tasks therefore, may not initially seem relevant to researchers interested in how
transitive inferences are made or how a set of comparatives are integrated. This
class of experiments must be considered however, as it potentially enables us
to dissociate retrieval from encoding phenomena (in the sense of task-specific
encoding). An example of such a retrieval operation is answering the question
'Which is bigger, a cow or a dog?'. 'Cow' and 'dog' are thus symbols, presum¬
ing that you know what they are, referring to an internal representation of the
properties of cows and dogs. The comparative 'bigger' must somehow key into a
particular aspect of the representation. This is distinct from perceptual compar¬
ison where attributes like size or speed can, loosely speaking, be observed and
compared directly without recourse to long term memory.
Perceptual Distance Effect
This is a well established (eg Cattel, 1902) psychophysical phenomenon whereby
the time taken to discriminate two objects with respect to some perceivable
dimension is inversely proportional to the perceived difference between them (a
logarithmic function of the physical difference). For example, the time taken
to judge which of two objects is heavier is longer the more similar they are in
weight.
The Symbolic Distance Effect
Moyer (Moyer, 1973) wrote a paper entitled 'Comparing objects in memory:
Evidence suggesting an internal psychophysics'. The 'comparisons' involved were
size comparisons of objects referred to only by name and the psychophysical effect
obtained was that the discriminations were faster the bigger the difference in size
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between the (imaginary) objects. This referred to as the symbolic distance effect
or SDE.
The SDE has been found to be ubiquitous in memorial comparisons along
virtually any kind of perceivable or imaginable dimension. Where the dimension
is metrical (as opposed to ordinal) such as size, it seems that decision times are
inversely proportional to the difference in subjects' subjective impression of size
(or whatever) of the objects to be compared (Moyer, 1973; Banks et al, 1983).
In other words, the bigger the difference in a subject's impressions of the sizes
of two objects, the faster their decision as to which is bigger. Also, this metrical
difference is a better predictor of reaction time than the ordinal separation (the
difference in ranking of the objects with respect to the ranking of all the objects
used in the experiment). For example, deciding which is bigger, a refrigerator or
a walnut would be faster (on average) than comparing (say) a banana with a foot¬
ball. SDEs have been found with abstract scales such as 'pleasantness' and 'value'
(money) (Pavio, 1975) and also with 'semantic' orderings such as the ranking of
the words 'second', 'minute', 'hour'... 'century' (Holyoak & Walker, 1976).
2.3.5 Semantic Codes and the Linguistic Account of the
Phenomena
Linguists became drawn into the transitivity task paradigm by way of the early
three term series experiments alluded to at the beginning of this section. We
now return to this, as an introduction to the linguistic viewpoint, which asks the
question, 'How are comparatives understood?'.
As Johnson-Laird points out (Johnson-Laird, 1972), in a review of work
on the three term series problem, these are not logically valid deductions
without additional assumptions, or knowledge, about the properties of tran¬
sitive relations. This knowledge can either be regarded as entirely part of
our knowledge of language and the process of comprehension, as with Clark
(Clark, 1969) and Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird, 1972), or as based on prelin-
guistic spatial knowledge (or other paralogical devices) onto which the terms
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from our language map (deSoto et al, 1965; Huttenlocher, 1968; Foos, 1980;
McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1986). In either case, the linguistic component must
include knowledge about which comparatives correspond to quantity differences
and are therefore transitive, and what their converses are. As far as I know there
has been no work on comparatives which are transitive and yet do not always
map onto simple linear orders. Examples of these are 'inside of' and 'ancestor
of', but further discussion of these is postponed until later.
Clark's Linguistic Account of the Figural Effects
With his linguistic account (Clark, 1969) argued that he could explain the figural
effect with the aid of three psycholinguistic principles: the primacy of functional
relations, lexical marking and congruence. These in turn rely implicitly on the¬
ories of decompositionality — the idea that complex terms can be broken down
into linguistic primitives or 'base strings' (eg, Chomsky 1965). For example,
'John is worse than Pete' breaks down into two strings (the functional relations)
'John is bad' and 'Pete is bad' conjoined in a comparative construction. The
primacy of function relations principle states that these underlying base strings
are more 'available' after comprehension than the comparative construction. In
other words, it is easier to remember that John and Pete are bad than to recall
that John is more bad than Pete.
The Lexical Marking principle deals with the asymmetry of opposites like
good and bad. The idea is that one term is more complex and is in some sense
a derivative of the other. The more complex term is considered 'marked' with
respect to another if its meaning is represented in terms of the simpler 'unmarked'
word. For example, 'birds' might be encoded as the base string 'bird' with a
qualifying primitive indicating plurality. Comparatives involving unmarked base
strings, hereafter known as unmarked comparatives, are supposed to be easier
to store and retrieve than their marked counterparts.
It has been observed that most pairs of comparative and converse appear
to be asymmetrical; the unmarked one tends to be neutral with respect to the
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absolute properties of the objects with respect to the scale, whereas use of the
marked comparatives tend to have the implicature that both of the items are
ranked towards the marked end of the scale. The following real life example is
from deSoto et aVs paper: A disappointed spectator at a baseball match says,
'I came to see which of you two guys is better- instead I'm seeing
who is worse.'
(deSoto et al, 1965)
Similarly, 'taller than' is neutral but 'Henry is shorter than Simon' suggests
that both parties are on the short side An obvious criticism of this is that the
chosen comparative also depends, pragmatically, on who or what the sentence
is about. For example, if Henry and Simon are both tall but Henry is the topic
of conversation then the statement 'Henry is shorter than Simon' is not at all
unnatural. In this instance Henry is the topic and Simon is the referent for
the comparison. However, this complication does not detract from the finding
that, in general, unmarked comparatives such as bigger, better and faster are
responded to more quickly than their marked counterparts and that it seems that,
in natural usage, it is often the case that comparatives tend to be appropriate
to the end of the scale that the compared items are located in.
Further evidence for lexical marking comes from developmental studies
(Donaldson &; Wales, 1970) which show that children learn to use unmarked
terms before marked ones. For example, 'big' and 'not big' are acquired before
'small'. Also, the name for a scale is usually derived from the unmarked com¬
parative, for example, length, width, depth, height etc (Johnson-Laird, 1972).
Congruency, in Clark's sense, is a principle governing the retrieval of in¬
formation from memory. A piece of information can only be retrieved if it is
congruent with the unknown being sought in terms of the underlying functional
relations. For example, the question 'Who is best?' requires an X such that
X is good. The question would thus not be congruent with a memorisation
of the statement 'John is worse than Pete'. To answer correctly, in this case,
requires an implicit reformulation of the question to 'Who is least bad' which
matches the base strings of the stored information. This notion of congruence
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is used to explain why questions which use a comparative opposite to the ones
in the premises take longer and are more prone to produce errors. The analo¬
gous explanation for the 'image' theorists is that such questions have a direction
opposite to that of the encoded representation so that, for example, if the 'direc¬
tion' of the assembled series is best to worst (X is worse than Y and Y is worse
than Z) then this not congruent with questions of the form 'Which is better?'
(McGonigle & Chalmers, 1984a).
The relative difficulties of different wordings of the three term series problems
can then be accounted for by mismatches between the directions of comparatives
in the premises and the direction of working in assembling the series.
A Comparison of Imagistic and Linguistic Approaches
The advantage that the imagists have over simple linguistic coding models is
that the latter does not even begin to explain how the inferences are made. As
soon as the limited domain of the three term series is expanded to include more
terms, it becomes particularly unclear how comparisons between items in the
middle of the sequence (other than end items) can be made. For this reason,
BD comparisons in the five-term series problem are regarded as crucial as they
cannot be mediated by simple linguistic codes. The imagists, on the other hand
were already treating the three term series as a special case of a more general
type of problem. However, Clark's theory was able to correctly predict the
results from negative forms of the premises such as 'John isn't as good as Pete',
as well as having independent support for the lexical marking principle. The
two approaches can be reconciled to a certain extent by taking a procedural or
'information processing' perspective and also taking into account differences in
the tasks used by different researchers, such as whether the question is given
before or after the premises are presented. For a more detailed treatment, the
reader is referred to Johnson-Laird's review (Johnson-Laird, 1972). The three
term series problem is not reviewed in more detail here as it is now considered
too limited and prone to task specific routes to expertise, such as scanning the
premises syntactically to find an end item matching the required answer.
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Trabasso supposed that the distance effect he found was related to the sym¬
bolic distance effect, but this requires the assumption that ordinal comparisons
are also mediated by a mental line. This has the attraction of bringing together
perceptual, symbolic and ordinal comparisons into one framework with the 'men¬
tal line' as the unifying feature. However, this does not take into account the
directional effects of marking or congruity mentioned in association with the
three term series work and, of course, it does not address the problems of how or
why a series is assembled in the first instance. Furthermore, it appears that there
are important differences between perceptual and symbolic comparisons which
strongly suggest that there is more to symbolic comparisons than an 'internal
psychophysics' (Moyer, 1973). These findings are described below.
The Semantic Congruity Effect
This is an extension of Clark's concept of congruity described above. The phe¬
nomenon can be summarised as being an interaction between the overall (mean)
position of a pair of items on a scale and the form of comparative used in a sym¬
bolic judgement. For example, (Shipley et al, 1945) found that subjects were
faster at choosing the 'more preferred' of two colours when the colours had rela¬
tively highly rated preferences and were faster at choosing the less preferred when
the colours had a low preference. The effect appears graphically as a cross-over
if the reaction times for adjacent pairs are plotted against their positions in the
scale. The 'congruity' then, is between the comparative and the location of the
referrents on the continuum. Figure 2-1 shows a typical cross-over due to the
congruity effect, such as obtained by (Banks & Flora, 1977).
The congruity phenomenon has been replicated by a number of experimenters
with different types of comparative, including age, size, etc (see
(Marschark &z Paivio, 1981; Banks et al, 1983; McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1984b)
for reviews and recent experiments). There now appears to be a consensus
among these researchers that the effect only occurs with 'symbolic' comparisons
and not with perceptual ones (Marschark &z Paivio, 1981). It seems that the







Figure 2—1: Stereotypical cross-over effect.
either by virtue of pre-existing knowledge of the stimuli involved or by knowledge
gained through the course of the task — for example if only a small set of stimuli
are involved and they are individually recognised.
As with the work on the N-term series, described in section 2.3.3, the kind
of data and model generated in this paradigm has depended on whether a re¬
searcher been thinking in terms of (linguistic) comprehension of comparatives or
in terms of analogical representations such as the mental line. Broadly speaking,
each camp is able to explain different aspects of the phenomena but neither can
give a full account inclusive of the other's paradigm. This situation is epito¬
mised in the debate between Banks et al on the linguistic side, and Marschark
and Pavio (Marschark &: Paivio, 1981) on the analogical side. The main area
of disagreement is over a phenomenon of asymmetry in the processing of com¬
paratives: comparison is faster when the 'direction' of the comparative in the
question (eg 'which is bigger?' vs 'which is smaller?') is in tune with the overall
position of the items along the continuum (eg their overall size). This is called
the semantic congruity effect.
Banks et al have typically done experiments involving their subjects getting
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small numbers of items from a continuum (analogous to having a short series).
On the basis of these they have argued that continua are effectively divided up so
that sizes (or whatever) have a category coding, and it is this that is accessed (at
least initially) with linguistic or abstract input. Thus there can be a congruency,
in the sense of Clark, between the form of the comparative and the form in which
the data is stored. Marschark and Pavio, on the other hand, have typically used
a bigger set of sizes for each subject. Their account of semantic congruity is
based on expectancy or priming in which the form of a comparative gives rise
to a facilitation of dealing with a particular portion of the range (or mental
line). Thus the question 'Who is better player, Fred or Jim?' would lead to an
expectancy that both players will be at the good end of the range of players,
and response will be slower if this is not the case.
A way of generalising the emergence of the congruity effect is that it increases
with reduced response uncertainty due to knowledge about how the stimulus
variation is constrained. For example, Marschark and Pavio suggested that
Audly and Wallice obtained a congruity effect with .brightness discriminations
(which would normally count as perceptual discrimination) due to the fact that
they used only two different stimulus pairs with a highly repetitious task. In
this instance, the emergence of a congruity effect could be taken as indicative
of expertise in the task. A different type of knowledge was important in a task
originally invented by Banks et al but replicated by Marschark and Pavio with
an interesting variation. The task was to choose the higher or lower of two
circles above a line. However, some subjects were additionally told that these
represented helium filled balloons floating on strings (tied to the line). Not only
was this group relatively faster, but it showed a significant cross-over (congruity)
effect which the other 'perceptual' group did not. Presumably, the effect of the
world knowledge brought to bear by these subjects was to highly constrain the
expected stimulus variation, thus making the task easier.
Banks et aPs interpretation of semantic congruity is that the internal repre¬
sentation of stimuli is not merely analogue but contains a categorical element in
the form of semantic codes (as with Clark's model). According to Banks posi-
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tion, there is no other way to explain the cross-over effect; and lexical marking
and semantic congruity go hand in hand — congruity due to matching (response
stage), distance due to discrimination stage.
Marschark and Pavio, on the other hand, argued that marking and congruity
effects are mutually exclusive, congruity effects only being obtained when com¬
paratives precede stimuli in the subjects' task. Their model of congruity is that
of an expectancy being set up by the comparative (eg. choose bigger) for a par¬
ticular part of the range of stimuli (eg. the larger objects in the set of stimuli).
There are a number of problems with this research which we will only touch
on briefly here. Firstly, neither side deals effectively with the crucial issue of
how a range of values is established by the subject as being relevant to the task.
Presumably, without a range being established then the semantic congruity effect
could not occur. Secondly, neither side has really gone into the information
processing aspects of information retrieval and the comparison process, their
models being essentially psychological (descriptive) in character. Finally, there
is some difficulty relating the SDE findings with the N-term series task because
of the extra layers of complexity introduced by the fact that information must be
retrieved from long-term memory and because of the variety of testing procedures
used. In many ways the N-term series task is a more suitable for modelling
purposes, but providing a comprehensive account of various forms of distance
effect is an important topic for future research.
2.3.6 Symbolic Comparisons: Conclusions
In both the N-term series and the SDE paradigm, the kind of data and model
generated has tended to depend on whether the researcher has been thinking
in terms of (linguistic) comprehension of comparatives or in terms of analogical
representations such as the mental line. Because of these differing motives, the
design of experiments has also varied, to such an extent that it is difficult to sort
out which phenomena are associated with the representation of order, which are
associated with linguistic access or encoding, and which are due to the effects
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of contextual knowledge. It would seem that the SDE and related phenomena
are not likely to succumb to a simple kind of model, especially as the literature
seems so confused. First, the modeller would have to decide whether to tackle the
representations of magnitudes in long-term memory or just a 'working memory'
representation sufficient for the task demands. Many of the researchers, appear
to assume that their tasks are performed by accessing long-term memory directly,
but this seems unlikely where many comparisons are made involving the same set
of stimuli. The processes which it might be necessary to consider are therefore:
1. The representation of sizes (or whatever) in long-term memory.
2. The affects of query form on retrieval from long-term memory.
3. The effect of the task context on the transfer of information from long-term
memory to working memory.
4. The form of representation of sizes in working memory.
5. The affects of query form on retrieval from working memory.
Given the large number of factors at work, the lack of consensus in the SDE
field is not too surprising. However, the N-term series problem seems more
tractable. The N-term series problem also appears to lie at an interesting in¬
tersection between two disciplines. On one hand there is a set of theories and
experimental data which conceptualises the act of making comparisons as a kind
of symbolic extension to perceptual comparisons. On the other hand we have a
body of literature treating comparatives as composite linguistic objects which are
matched against similar objects stored in semantic memory. Neither approach
gives a satisfactory account of all the phenomena. Further lacking, is an explana¬
tion of how comparatives are dealt with in terms of process. This paradigm seems
ripe for the application of AI techniques, both for analysis and as a source of new
metaphors, but what methodology should be employed? Johnson-Laird's work,
described previously, employs some computational metaphors but his approach
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is essentially psychological in character. Protocol analysis, described below, in¬
tegrates computational and psychological methodology in a more intimate way.
2.4 Protocols and State Space Search Models
This approach stems from the work of Newell and Simon (Newell, 1977) who at¬
tempted to provide a general computational account of human problem solving
using the concepts of state space search and means-end analysis. They started
with the domain of 'crypt-arithmetic' in which adult subjects were given complex
puzzles where they had to crack a cipher in which letters of the alphabet stood
for digits in an arithmetic sum. They analysed the task in terms of sub-problems
in association with getting the subjects to give detailed verbal accounts of their
steps towards a solution and recording all the partial solution states. Armed
with the concept of 'state space search', from computer science, they were able
to think of subjects' strategies in terms of paths through a space of possible
partial solution states. The states were linked by 'operators' such as processing
a particular column or hypothesising a particular number for a letter. It is not
clear how Newell and Simon arrived at the set of operators that they used to
represent subjects problem spaces. Presumably it was a mixture of a program¬
mer's intuition about how to solve the problem and examination of the verbal
protocols. Newell simply states: 'The problem space is a hypothesis about the
subject's behaviour'.
Following this stage, called a task analysis, an individual subject's path
through the problem space would be mapped. The next step is to try and
capture any regularities in these graphs in a production system, a high level
computer language (explained below).
A major problem with this and subsequent work in this vein (eg the work
on the 'Towers of Hanoi' problem) is that there is a lack of understanding as
to how subjects actually create the search space for themselves. Although the
experimenter can think of the subject as exploring a pre-existing space of pos-
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sibilities, in reality the space must be discovered dynamically. A more serious
limitation for our purposes, as already indicated, is that the technique is not
readily applicable to fundamental forms of inference.
Production Systems
A 'production', or 'production rule' (Newell, 1973) is simply a condition-action
pair which can be read as an then... else...' statement:
//(stimulus) then do (action) else (return control).
Which can be denoted by the shorthand: 'Stimulus =$>• Action'. Therefore, if
procedures are seen as consisting of sequences of 'if... then... else...' decisions,
then production rules are a convenient notation. Notice that the else part of the
statement contains the instruction to 'return control'. What happens in working
production systems is that at this point control is returned to the system, which
needs (itself) to have a decision procedure for selecting the next rule to try. For
example, the simplest type of control is to order the set of rules in a stack and,
starting at the top, test the condition of each rule in turn until one matches
the stimuli. When this happens we say that the rule 'fires'. The other aspect
of control is what happens after an action is carried out, for example, whether
the control process stops, continues where it left off or starts again. This aspect
turns out to be important and is returned to again in chapter 4.
In more complex production systems the conditions and actions of production
systems can refer to and manipulate a global database. Such systems have full
Turing power (they can mimic any process that a serial computer can carry out)
and thus, in themselves, constitute no more than a notational system, in the
same way that any programming language is a notation for procedures. They
become psychologically interesting only when sufficiently constrained to make
clear predictions. For example, the nature of the stimulus and/or the action can
be restricted.
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It should also be noted that there exists another aspect of production sys¬
tems work which is more to do with modelling human memory than with problem
solving behaviour. An analogy is often drawn between human short-term mem¬
ory (as discussed by psychologists) and working memory in production systems.
Long-term memory is a more permanent record of world knowledge and this is
a whole topic of study in itself. This work is not relevant to this thesis, al¬
though ideas about working memory are important for some models of relatively
complex forms of problem solving, such as described by (Johnson-Laird, 1983).
2.4.1 Seriation
Young's work on seriation (Young, 1976) is an example of a production systems
approach to a simple Piagetian task. It is explored in some detail because of its
relevance to transitivity and because it typifies the methodology. In a typical
version of the task a child must form a line of wooden blocks of descending size by
repositioning them from a scrambled 'pool' at a separate location. The overall
search space for this task is surprisingly large and messy when one considers
each operation at a fine grain of analysis and the redundancy in the possible
operators which may be applied at any stage (think of the number of sorting
algorithms in common use in programming).
Previous analysis of the task had been according to Piagetian stages
on the way to fully operational problem solving. Piaget's observations
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969) were motivated by a coarsely descriptive theory so
he necessarily overlooked many of the subtler (though important) variations in
behaviour. In contrast, Young, with his finer grained analysis of the processes
involved in seriation, was able to see that Piaget's stages are inadequate as a
means of chunking the behaviour.
Piaget's Phases
Piaget's 'genetic epistemology' categorises children's intellectual development
into discrete phases. Performance on tasks involving 'concrete-operational' skills
(direct operations on the world as opposed to entirely abstract or 'internalised'
reasoning) can be further subdivided into three stages of competence. A child at
stage I can perform some of the required individual operations (having the re¬
quired physical skills) but not the full task. At stage //problem solving behaviour
is empirical. This essentially means that the solution of a task is recognised but
the operations needed to bring about the required state must be arrived at by
trial and error. At stage III performance becomes operational, the child is capa¬
ble of constructing an algorithm for doing the task.
The seriation task was one of those used by Piaget to help define and test his
categorisation described above. The subject must physically sort a jumbled set
of blocks of different sizes. The child is instructed to take blocks from the pool
and assemble them in a line of decreasing size at a nearby, but distinct location
on the table. Young's detailed analysis of a number of children's performances
on this task showed that Piaget's crude characterisation of stages overlooks a
rich variety of problem solving behaviour.
Methodology
The components of Young's analysis were as follows:
1. A task analysis (finding what processes will lead to a solution).
2. An analysis of subjects' behaviour (finding how a subject's strategy decom¬
poses). This may be tested by experimentation.
These analyses are not independent, of course. The description of subjects'
behaviour is in terms of the task analysis, and the task analysis draws on the
description of subjects behaviour. This process results in a procedural model of
a subject's problem solving strategy. Young refers to the interactive process as
adaptive experimentation, and regarded production systems as '... an essential
complement to the technique of adaptive experimentation...'. There is no doubt
that production systems provide a useful notational medium for this kind of
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model development, but the use of alternative procedural representations should
not be precluded, as is discussed in a later section.
There is a danger that the power of'adaptive experimentation' in developing
procedural models may be abused. The technique, in itself, does not enforce
the distinction between the evaluation of a model and its development. That is,
it may become unclear where the model is being informed by observations as
opposed to being tested, in which case the model might not be falsifiable. Young
counters this problem by working out predictions of the models in advance of
collecting new data.
Preliminary Task Analysis
The iterative process of developing a model starts with a 'preliminary task anal¬
ysis' which decomposes the task according to a combination of intuition, prelim¬
inary observation and logical analysis of the steps necessary to allow successful
performance. At this stage, Young hypothesises that the locations of blocks
can be chunked into the pool and the line and that the seriation process can be
meaningfully chunked into episodes consisting of the transfer of a block from one
location to the other. Now the behaviour can begin to be described. An episode
(usually) involves scanning the pool, reaching towards a block, grasping it, plac¬
ing it on the right of the growing line, examining the line, possibly switching
blocks round, etc..
It may seem that the basic categories (italicised above) are obvious and that
it is difficult to imagine any other chunking, but even this stage introduces
assumptions into the theory. An example of this is that the episodes consist of
the selection, evaluation and final placement of a block:
Selection: the choice of which block to work with next. The basis for this may
be the convenience of its location in the pool or having a particular block
'in mind' because it has been dealt with recently.
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Evaluation: the decision whether or not to accept a block as suitable for inclu¬
sion in the line (at its current stage). Possible evaluation criteria are:
• similarity in size to last block in line (with some threshold)
• overall bigness
• nil evaluation (accept any selected block)
An evaluated block may be referred to as oversize or undersize.
Placement: whereabouts in the line growing line a block should be put. The
default placement is at the right of the line, but this may be corrected by
switching a block with its left hand neighbour. Insertion is a special form
of placement where a block is directly inserted in its appropriate position.
Evaluation and placement are themselves complex processes. Evaluation may
involve rejection of a block (if it fails some criterion), and reselection. Placement
involves assessment and possible repositioning. The process of chunking is in¬
formed by observation but is not straight-forward. The categorisations above
nevertheless form viable working assumptions.
To illustrate the point that alternative chunkings are possible, an alternative
episode would be one beginning with the selection of a block to work with, and
ending with putting the block down in one of the possible locations. This allows
for the possibility of an episode ending in rejection of the block and its return
to the pool. It could also be argued that there is a case for identifying an extra
location of the table in which rejected blocks are placed (as distinct from the
pool). This would also have been consistent with the preliminary observations.
However, minor problems with the preliminary analysis can be corrected during
the subsequent process of 'adaptive experimentation'.
Protocols
Once a descriptive language has been developed, videotapes of subjects' perfor¬
mances can be transcribed onto paper in the form of a 'blow by blow account'.
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Episode Summary Line
1. Add F Scan Pool
Reach towards E
Get F, Put at left F
2. Add C Get C, put next to F
Examine
F C






4. Add B Get B, put next to C
Examine
F E C B
etc
Table 2—1: Sample from a protocol of a child seriating (from Young).
Protocols are often described as the starting point of the modelling exercise, but
the preceding observations should make it apparent that this is not strictly the
case. Table 2-1 contains a sample from a protocol, showing the level of detail
involved.
A production System for Seriating
Young claims to capture the essential features of this behaviour in a simple
production system. This contains rules like the following:
Goal=Seriate =£• Set.goal[ADD.ONE]
Goal=ADD.ONE =>• Get.block[next nearest]
Goal=ADD.ONE and have.just [Get.block'd] => Change.goal.to[PLACE]
Goal=PLACE => Put.block.at[right]
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Goal=PLACE and have.new.configuration => Examine
Unfortunately, Young does not give a full description of the action of the
interpreter except to say that the conflict resolution rule is to pick the rule with
the 'most restrictive' preconditions. This appears to mean that the rule with
the most (true) preconditions is the one that fires. The notation for the rules is
clearly fairly informal. For example, he does not explain how the preconditions
"have.just" and "have.new.configuration" operate. Clearly, they refer to internal
states and not to perceivable features of the task, but how and when is the
appropriate information stored? Does the system have access to previous states
arbitrarily (psychologically and computationally implausible) or is it the case
that only operations or outcomes that are known to be needed in the future are
stored? Also, the treatment of sub-goaling is confusing, as it is not clear what
happens when goals fail.
Yet, informal as the procedural notation was, it clearly assisted' Young in
gaining insights into the strategies employed by his subjects. The modularity of
the representation was, in part, successfully matched up to the modularity of the
behaviour, enabling commonalities and differences between subjects of different
ages to be described.
In summary, whereas Piaget was drawn to the repetitive or algorithmic as¬
pects of able subjects' behaviour, Young noted the flexibility of subjects' re¬
sponses in the way they adapted to local conditions during the problem solving
process. He captured some of this flexibility by representing subjects strate¬
gies as production systems with some redundancy (overlap) in the conditions of
different rules. The group problem space was represented by a 'kit', or super¬
set, of production rules out of which subsets were selected to model individuals,
including 'non-seriators'. He was thus able to create hypotheses about what pro¬
cedures subjects held in common and to account for differences in style between
subjects of the same ability. Whilst he was not able to provide an account of
how subjects might come to acquire rules of the type in his model, he did show
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how a progression through different stages of ability could be modelled by the
addition of extra rules onto a core set.
2.4.2 Protocol Analysis: Conclusions
The previous examples serve to illustrate how a combination of task analysis in
terms of a state space search, protocol taking and production systems can lead
to a particular kind of model of problem solving which is, in many ways, more
satisfactory than earlier descriptive psychological accounts. The main limitations
of this methodology are as follows:
1. It may not be clear what the appropriate task analysis is.
2. There may be difficulties in matching the level of descriptions in protocols
with the level of the task analysis.
3. There is no way of modelling dynamic changes in the search space due to
the learning of new operators or alterations to existing operators.
>
However, there are a number of useful lessons to be learned:
1. The psychological evidence must be collected with microanalysis and pro¬
cedural modelling in mind. For example, Young had to collect his own
data based on in-depth 'longitudinal' studies on a few subjects. This was
despite many previous experiments having been carried out on seriation.
The Piagetian school have tended to use group data for analysis, for the
purpose of descriptive classification of behaviour.
2. The assumptions behind the task analysis need to be made explicit, in case
it has to be revised.
3. The procedural implications of a model need to be made as explicit as
possible.
4. There is a need to separate out the iterative stages of model development
and evaluation.
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2.4.3 Selecting a representational form
If subjects' procedures are modelled by a rule based system of some kind, this
amounts to assuming that it is possible to represent the underlying reasoning
processes by the logical manipulation of discrete symbols. This assumption is
rarely made explicit. A legitimate alternative approach would be to try and use a
parallel-distributed processing (PDP) model. The advantage rule based systems
have is that they are relatively well understood in AI (more research effort has
been invested in them than PDP systems) and there are a host of techniques
available for representing determinate, sequential symbolic processes. The cost
of making this simplifying assumption is that whilst we may be able to reflect
the logic of what is going on inside subjects' heads, the actual implementation
of the decision processes may involve parallel distributed processes. If this is
the case theft predictions about the process (eg reaction time) are likely to have
limited success, as complexity does not bear the same relationship to processing
time in sequential and PDP systems.
The next step is to select a suitable formalism for symbolic manipulation.
Mathematical logic (the theorem proving metaphor) would appear to be the ob¬
vious choice as it is the only currently available 'common currency' for comparing
different representational forms and is completely general. However, providing
a procedural interpretation for a set of logical formulae is not always straight¬
forward. Moreover, logical notation is not yet generally adopted by the psycho¬
logical and cognitive modelling communities so there is an advantage in using
a simpler (and less general) notation if possible. Production systems, in their
basic form, are such a notation and have the advantage of being fairly intuitive,
especially to anyone with a knowledge of conventional programming languages.
However, it is sometimes useful to represent the final model in alternative nota¬
tions, such as mathematical logic to enable comparison with other models. This
approach is adopted in chapter 6 for comparing models of transitive inference.
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2.5 Overall Conclusions
A number of attempts to understand or model problems solving and inference
have been reviewed, with the emphasis on studies related in some way to transi¬
tive inference. Existing models have tended to fall into the following categories.
1. Those that have embraced the computational metaphor, and tried to give
procedural accounts of reasoning, have concentrated on relatively high level
reasoning where the intermediate states of problem solving can be intu¬
itively and/or empirically identified.
2. Researchers coming form a background in psycholinguistics have been con¬
cerned with the representation of the meaning of individual sentences in¬
volving comparatives rather than the processes of inference.
3. Some models rely heavily on an intuitive notion of 'mental image' without
specifying the computational processes that this implies.
Johnson-Laird's work appears to resist such a straightforward classification,
but on closer examination, it can be seen that his models are composites, rather
than truly crossing boundaries. For example, his model of the comprehension
of spatial descriptions uses both an 'image' and 'superficial linguistic represen¬
tations' to explain subjects behaviour. Although the existing methodologies fall
short of providing adequate explanations of fundamental forms of inference, there
is a lot to be learned from previous modelling attempts, and existing methodol¬
ogy can be built upon.
In particular, previous psychological studies of transitive inference have failed
to give satisfactory accounts, and this may be partly due to the underestima¬
tion of the complexity of the problems involved. Although transitive reasoning
superficially appears to be a simple form of reasoning, it can appear in several
guises and its operation can be difficult to disentangle from that of linguistic and
memorial processes. Just as data needs to be collected explicitly for the purposes
59
of protocol analysis, there is a need for in-depth, long term studies of transitive
inference, if it is to be adequately modelled and not simply described. Studies
of the N-term series task, described in the following chapter, come closest to




The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce the data base for the
modelling work presented in subsequent chapters. Before this how¬
ever, some studies of the N-term series task in children and birds
are reviewed. Although the data from these studies does not meet
our modelling requirements, the same basic experimental paradigm is
employed, and the common findings demonstrate that the form of rea¬
soning to be modelled is not species specific. Tables and figures in the
monkey section are provided courtesy of McGonigle and Chalmers.
3.1 Children
This literature on transitive inference in children has been extensively reviewed
elsewhere (Trabasso et al, 1975; Breslow, 1981; McGonigle & Chalmers, 1984a)
&; (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1986), so only an overview is given here. Bryant and
Trabasso developed new versions of the transitive inference task for two main
reasons. The first was that they challenged the accepted wisdom of the Piagetian
school of developmental psychology that young children do not have the logical
mechanism which is needed to co-ordinate separate items of information in an
inference. They hypothesised that the apparent inability observed by others, eg
(Piaget & Inhelder, 1969), was due to lack of retention or understanding of the
original premises rather than inability to put them together. The second reason
was their concern that where subjects (older children) did appear to show an
ability to coordinate relations, this might be due to 'parroting' a verbal label
picked up in the initial training. For example, the child could represent lA
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is bigger than B' using categorical labels such as ibig{Ay and lsmall(B)\ A
second relation, '5 is bigger than C\ could be represented similarly as lbig(By
and 'smo//(C)'. In attempting to combine this information, the child is left with
only two unambiguously labeled objects, A and. C, with B being both 'big' and
'small'. In comparing A and C all the subject has to do is recover their respective
categories.
Although both the above criticisms of the three-term series task had been
raised before (Smedslund, 1966), they had not been dealt with within one ex¬
periment. Bryant and Trabasso's solution to the first problem was simply to
ensure that the children had a lot of experience with the premises (the initial
comparisons), and then to test them for recall of the premises at the time of
testing on the inferential comparisons.
Their control for the possibility of 'parroting' was to extend the series to five
terms. If the above strategy is applied to five terms (four pairs), then it only
works for comparisons involving an unambiguously labeled item at one of the two
ends of the series. Given the series A>B>C>D>E, the 'internal' items B,
C and D, will end up being simultaneously labeled as 'big' and 'small'. The five-
term series thus affords one critical comparison, lB vs D\ which is neither one of
the original premises (the adjacent pairs), nor contains an item which could be
unambiguously labeled. A six-term series would afford three such comparisons.
Another, related, argument for using such a test is that ability to make a
'5 vs D' comparison would rule out a simple 'associationist' (stimulus-response)
learning theory as being applicable to this task. In a five-term series task, the
objects B, C and D are associated equally with selection or rejection and so
there is no grounds for discriminating between them. A more sophisticated
'connectionist' type model would be needed whereby objects become associated
with each other and there is a process of 'generalisation' of association (see
Trabasso's model, chapter 8).
Bryant summed up the necessary experiment as follows:
'The correct way to test for inferences in young children, therefore,
is to have four initial direct comparisons, to make sure that the child
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knows these fairly thoroughly, to test the child's memory for them
at the same time as testing his ability to combine them inferentially,
and to make the BD comparison the crucial test of the child's ability
to make inferences.' (Bryant, 1974)
The first experiment along these lines (Bryant &; Trabasso, 1971) involved
five coloured sticks of different lengths as stimuli. The subjects were in three
groups, with four, five and six year old children respectively. In the 'training
phase' the sticks were presented in four pairs A>B,B>C,C>D and D > E
where the ranking of the sticks from longest to shortest was A>B>C>D>
E. The procedure was to present a pair of sticks sticking out of a block of wood
with only an inch of each stick showing. The subject was then asked which was
taller (or shorter) and then shown the whole lengths of the sticks afterwards, by
way of feedback. The same pair would then be repeatedly presented until the
subject had learned to identify the correct answer by the colour cues alone. The
same procedure was then repeated for the other three pairs of sticks in turn.
The second phase of training involved presenting a different pair on each trial,
until the subjects reached a criterion of 90% correct on every pair. The testing
phase then began.
The subjects were tested on all ten pairs derivable from the five-term series;
the four original pairs, the critical BD pair and five pairs involving one or both
of the end terms, A and E. No feedback was given on any of these test trials.
The percentage of transitive responses on the BD pair were 78%, 88% and 92%
for 4, 5 and 6 year old children respectively; results which are all significantly
above chance levels. Responses on the other pairs were all similar or better.
Interestingly, the proportions of correct responses on all pairs involving an end-
term were generally higher than for the training pairs BC and CD. This suggests
that labeling of end-terms could play a significant role and so the precaution of
using a five-term series is a valid one.
Bryant and Trabasso concluded that children could indeed make deductive
inferences and that Piaget and Smedslund were too 'pessimistic' about their
abilities. They reasoned that retention of the original premises was the crucial
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factor and that, furthermore, errors on the BD pair were probably due to lapses
of memory for the BC and CD premises.
There remained the possibility, however, that subjects were performing the
task (in whole or in part) by remembering the absolute lengths of individual
sticks, which ranged from seven inches to three inches long in steps of one inch.
A second experiment was conducted to eliminate this possibility in which vi¬
sual feedback was not given in the training phase; subjects were simply told
whether they were right or wrong. This made the training phase more dif¬
ficult, but otherwise the results were similar to those obtained previously. See
(McGonigle &; Chalmers, 1984a) for discussion about the role of feedback during
training.
3.1.1 Conclusions
Although Bryant and Trabasso developed a very promising paradigm for in¬
ference research, they did not do in depth longitudinal studies on individuals
nor any kind of post-test which would give further insight into the mechanism
employed.
3.2 Birds
Von Fersen, a student of Professor Delius1 has recently carried out a five-term
series experiment on pigeons. The research is still in progress but the preliminary
findings are described here.
The basic training procedure was similar to that described for the monkey
work below except that the stimuli were five blacked-in, irregular shapes with
1Dept. Psychologisches Institut, Ruhr Universitat, Bochum, W. Germany (personal
communication)
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rounded contours, instead of colours, and the subjects pecked keys instead of
displacing tins. Pairs were presented in random order throughout the experiment
except for a few session in which they were presented in blocks. On the crucial
BD pair, subjects chose transitively on 87% of trials. This level of transitivity
compares favourably with previous studies.
The only additional point of interest here is that the pigeons appeared to em¬
ploy the same representational strategy even when they were offered a simpler
alternative. The subjects were divided into two groups. The first were presented
with a training set in which the stimuli shapes were of approximately equal area,
but for the second group, the same five shapes were graded in size from one end
of the series to the other. The ranking by size reflected the symbolic ordering. It
was expected that the ordering of the stimuli according to a perceivable dimen¬
sion would either facilitate the learning of the symbolic series or perhaps be used
directly as the basis of discrimination. However, it turned out that the differ¬
ence between the two groups was negligible over all but the first few trials. This
would appear to suggest that subjects do not employ an analogue representation
such as the 'mental line' in this task.
3.3 Monkeys
McGonigle and Chalmers adapted Bryant and Trabasso's task for use
with monkeys and their results were published in an article in Nature
(McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977). The shift to non-verbal subjects was interesting
for a number of reasons.
1. It was not known whether non-human primates could do an abstract rea¬
soning task such as this.
2. If they could perform the task it was of interest to study the process in
non-linguistic subjects so that it could be established whether the processes
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involved were pre-linguistic (or, at least, not dependent on a language fac¬
ulty). One tenable hypothesis is that inference is actually founded on such
pre-linguistic structures rather than deductive reasoning being based on
linguistic abilities (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1986). This idea is also com¬
patible with Bryant's position (Bryant, 1974) that deductive abilities are
present in very young children and that they underpin perceptual learning.
3. Animal subjects could be tested more intensively and over a longer period,
allowing high density data to be collected with the potential for follow-
up studies on the same subjects (children, on the other hand, are more
difficult to motivate in such a repetitious task). This is a very important
point from the perspective of modelling the data.
3.3.1 First Study
The original procedure is described in (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1977). Eight
adult squirrel monkeys were presented (in a Wisconsin General Testing Appa¬
ratus) with a series of choices, each between two tins differing in colour. Each
subject was presented with four pairs of colours, first in sequence and, later,
in random order. On each trial, the subject's task was to displace one of the
tins. 'Correct' choices were rewarded by the discovery of a peanut hidden un¬
der the appropriate tin. Displacement of the wrong coloured tin produced no
reward. Colours were drawn from the set yellow, blue, green red and white
and different subjects were given different combinations of colour and reward to
counterbalance for absolute colour preferences. Furthermore, the left-right loca¬
tion of reward was randomised. However, for individual subjects the pattern of
reward and non-reward was consistent according to the following schema, with
the letters A to E identifying five colours:
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A B B C C D D E Pair
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + Reward
Light Heavy Light Heavy Light Heavy Light Heavy 4 subjects
Heavy Light Heavy Light Heavy Light Heavy Light 4 subjects
The first two rows show how the four pairs were arranged to be adjacent in a
five term series. The second two rows refer to a second type of feedback that was
given to subjects during training. One of the tins in each pair was weighted so
that for half the subjects the 'correct' tin was lighter and for the other half the
correct choice was lighter. The idea behind this was to facilitate the formation of
an ordering on the items (from heavy to light or vice versa) by the subjects, even
though only two weight values were used. This is analogous to the procedure
used by Bryant and Trabasso in which coloured rods differed in length but the
difference could not be perceived by the subject until after the choice had been
made. However, in their second experiment (Bryant &: Trabasso, 1971), subjects
were given no feedback at all as to the actual length of the rods and there was no
essential difference in the results apart from the training taking longer. There
is no reason to suppose that the use of binary weight differences in the monkey
experiment makes a qualitative difference to subjects' learning or performance
over and above the effect of underlining the feedback given by presence or absence
of reward.
When the subjects had reached a performance criterion of 90% correct re¬
sponses they were transferred on to a random sequence of training pairs. After
this they were tested on novel pairs, including the 'critical' BD pair. No more
than two test trials were administered in a session of ten and a session was not
begun until the subjects had attained a performance criterion of 22 correct re¬
sponses in the course of 24 successive, randomly ordered trials. One subject
failed to meet these conditions and was rejected. During testing sessions, all
choices were rewarded. The arrangement of the testing sessions was thus de¬
signed to measure any spontaneous bias that the subjects might have on novel
pairs.
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The overall result (details are given further on) was that subjects responded
with a transitive bias to all ten pairs under these test conditions. A second kind
of test was then given in which the subjects were presented with triplets from the
series instead of pairs. These test 'triads' were administered in an analogous way
to the pairs, with subjects being rewarded whatever they chose. The motivation
for these tests was to see whether or not presenting more items from the series
would facilitate performance. For example, with the crucial comparison B v
D, a 'coordination' type of model (Bryant &; Trabasso, 1971) would predict that
the middle item, C, would have to be retrieved as a referent in order to mediate
the comparison. If this were the case, then presenting all three items explicitly
in the triad BCD ought to facilitate the inference. Instead, performance on the
triads was worse than on the pairs, with many choices going to the 'middle' item
(C in the previous example).
The entire experiment was repeated (over six years later) in a second study
with five of the original subjects being retrained on the same series as they had
previously learned. In the Second study, however, reaction time (RT) measures
were taken and along with video recordings. RT and video protocols are dealt
with in a later section. The second study also featured an additional, more
intensive phase of testing on the triads. In the second study, no further training
or selective feedback was given once testing had started. So as not to confuse the
different sets of data, the following naming conventions will be employed.
3.3.2 Summary of notation
The following notation has been adopted for convenience of reference in the
modelling chapter. Where it differs from McGonigle and Chalmer's notation,
the alternatives are shown in brackets.
1. The following data sets are referred to:
(a) Study 1 (1977, or 'original'). This includes binary and triadic choice
profiles but no reaction times. The triadic tests are referred to as
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early. The seven subjects' names were Bill, Bump, Brown, Blue,
Roger, Green and White.
(b) Study 2 (1983). Brown, Blue, Roger, Green and White were re¬
trained. Following this subjects were given, in chronological order:
i. Binary RTs — Reaction times taken during binary tests.
ii. Middle ('shallow' or 'early') — initial triadic tests.
iii. Late ('dense') — intensive triadic tests.
There are thus three phases of triadic tests, original, middle and late, with
re-training coming before the latter two.
2. Subjects were trained on adjacent pairs in the series A, B, C, D, E, with
items towards the E end being rewarded. Responses to untrained pairs or
triads are deemed to be transitive (correct) if the item nearest the E end
is selected.
3. The following convention has been adopted when referring to items in
triads, for the purposes of clarity. The item nearest the E anchor is referred
to as a2 (the 'transitive' choice), the middle item as (3 and the 'worst' choice
(the item nearest the A anchor) as -y.
A B D
Eg: 7 P a
(Non-transitive) (Intransitive) (Transitive)
2Note that a is chosen as a symbol because it stands for 'best' and should not be
confused with A.
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B C D E
A 98 100 100 100
B 93 90 76
C 89 87
D 97
Table 3—1: Percentage transitive choices on all pairs during testing phase
3.3.3 Study 1: Choice profiles
Binary tests
In the first experiment, only one monkey failed to meet the stringent precondi¬
tions for testing and the remainder showed a clear transitive choice bias an all
remote pairs, AC, BD, CE, AD, BE and AE. The bias was highly significant
on each pair (p < 0.001). The percentage of choices which had a transitive
bias are shown in table 3-1. This table is in close accord with the child data
(Bryant & Trabasso, 1971).
Acquisition
Figure 3-1 shows the relative percentage error rates (percentage of total error in
a given phase) on each pair during the subjects original training. In phase one,
training pairs were presented in 'runs' (as previously described) and in phase
two they were in pseudo-random order. It can be seen that there appears to
be no particular pattern to the errors in the first phase. Each pair contributes
about 25% of the errors. During the random presentation, however, an 'inverted-
U' shape emerges. This kind of curve is typical of memory studies in which
subjects have to learn a list of unrelated items; retention is better towards the
ends of the list. That subjects show the emergence of a strong invert-U curve
as their performance improves, before encountering any remote pairs, is strong
evidence against a model of inference in which pairs are simply 'stored' and then
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Figure 3—1: Acquisition profiles in monkeys
combined when the need arises. These curves are compared with equivalent
results for children in a later section.
Triadic choice profiles (early)
Although performance was worse for the triads, it still showed a convincing
transitive bias. Figure 3-2 compares the overall levels of transitive response on
pairs and triads. The critical triad (containing no end terms) BCD is shown
separately.
The binary sampling model
McGonigle and Chalmers proposed a 'non logical' account of how the monkey
subjects performed the binary and triadic tests (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1977;
McGonigle & Chalmers, 1984a). The idea is that triads and critical pairs are
treated by subjects in much the same way, by sampling a binary subset of the
relevant items and making a choice on the basis of this subset alone. For example
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Figure 3—2: Distribution of choices to binary and triadic subsets of series
are three subsets which could be sampled, BC, CD or BD. It is assumed that
subsets have an even chance of being sampled. Considering the triadic case first,
what is the outcome of selecting each of the subsets? If BC is selected then C is
chosen, as this is a training pair. Likewise, if CD is selected, D is chosen. Given
BD, however, a random choice is made as there is no recourse to either training
pairs or to uniquely labeled end-terms. Summing up the choices to individual
items, this gives a one in three chance of selecting C, a one in two chance of
selecting D (a third from CD plus a sixth from BD) and a one in six chance of
selecting B. Over a hundred trials, therefore, we might expect the distribution
of choices to be approximately 17% to B, 33% to C and 50% to D. In fact the
actual performance was somewhat better than this, the proportions being 3%,
3G% and 61%, respectively. Nevertheless, the overall fit of the projections of
this model to the group data is quite striking, as reported in the original Nature.
article.
Table 3-3 shows how another example triad projection is made. It is assumed
that if a sampled pair contains an end-term [A or E) or it is among the four
training pairs, then the response is unambiguous. The implication is that, to
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Triads Choice projection' Obtained
ABC 00 33 67 (X) 31 69
BCD 17 33 50 03 36 61
BDE 17 17 67 16 24 60
CDE 00 33 67 1 1 24 65
BCE 00 33 67 06 28 66
A3D 00 50 50 00 44 56
ACD 00 33 67 00 30 70
ADE 00 33 67 01 21 78
ABE 00 33 67 00 30 70
ACE 00 33 67 00 26 74
Average distribution 0.03 0.33 0.64 0.04 0.29 0.67
"The figures in the left-hand column are predictions based on the assumptions that the
subjects are sampled equally often and that preferences are absolute within those subsets
presented during original training.
Projections of binary sampling model compared with early monkey triadic
choice distributions. Adapted from (McGonigle is Chalmers, 1977).
Table 3—2: Binary sampling model and early monkey triads.
perform at the level they do on the triads, subjects need only have learned (a)
the correct response to the training pairs and (b) the unique labeling of the
end-terms as rewarded or non-rewarded. Table 3-2 compares the projections for
all ten triads with the actual distribution of choices averaged across all eight
subjects. It is interesting to note that even this 'non-logical' strategy allows for
a graded response to each of the items such that there is a degree of seriation of
the set of items. Table 3-4 shows the monkey choices displayed in another way
such that the number of times each item is selected is summed. Each of the five
items appears with equal frequency within the set of triads and so the apparent
scriation can be compared with the null hypothesis that each item has the same
chance of being selected. The projection of the binary sampling model has been
included for a further comparison.
Difficulties with the binary sampling model
Although the binary sampling model is plausible for the triadic (group) data,
it does not seem so attractive in the case of the pairwise comparisons. Going
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Subset B D E
BD 1 1 —
BE 0 — 2
DE — 0 2
Totals 1 1 4
% 17 17 67
Table 3—3: Example showing how projection is made for a single triad
Triad A B C D E
ABC 0 22 48 — —
BCD — 2 25 43 —
BDE — 11 — 17 42
CDE — — 8 17 45
BCE — 4 20 — 46
ABD 0 31 — 39 —
ACD 0 — 21 49 —
ADE 1 — — 15 54
ABE 0 21 — — 49
ACE 0 — 18 — 52
Totals 1 91 140 180 288
% 0 13 20 26 41
Sampling 0 15 22 23 40
Table 3—4: Overall triadic choice matrix for monkeys showing frequency of
choice within triads and for individual items. Bottom rows show percentages of
total number of choices and the percentages predicted according to the binary
sampling model. Note the gradation of response according to serial position
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back to the previous example, the model says that, given the pair BD, the
item C must be inferred by common association with the other two items. The
same process then occurs as for the triad BCD except that all choices which
would have gone to C now go to D: '... the choice proportions attributable to
C when actually present will now add to the overall proportions for D (as half
of them will rule out responses to B, the other half will confirm D directly).
The probability values for BD in a two-choice situation will now be: B = 0.17,
D — 0.83.' (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1977). It is not at all clear how choices
attributable to C could 'confirm D directly' because C is only chosen when the
pair BC is sampled. The process would have to be one of rejecting B and thus
picking D by default.
The account is vague on the issue of how other remote pairs are dealt with.
For example, the comparison of A and D could elicit either or both of the
'reference' items B and C, making the decision process still more complex. This
would appear to go against the ordinal distance effect finding (described for
monkeys in a later section), whereby adjacent pairs are the slowest responded
to and more distant pairs are faster. The problem of specifying how 'internal'
items are 'inferred' is also more acute for the remote pairs. One possible way
round these problems might appear to be for subjects to deal with pairs involving
end terms firstly and separately, without bothering to infer intermediate terms
and sample from them. A problem with this is that the model is then predicts
subjects would be limited to five-term series. They would not be able to compare,
say, items 2 and 5 in a six term series, whereas Trabasso et al have shown children
can learn six-term series - there is no reason to suppose that monkeys could not.
There is also recent evidence from a study of transitivity in pigeons (section 3.2)
that the presence of an explicit dimension of difference between stimuli does not
significantly affect performance.
There are still more reasons for rejecting such a compromise. First, the ordi¬
nal distance effect exists even amongst the 'internal' items, as we shall see below.
Finally, if decisions are made first and foremost on the basis of the selection or
rejection of end-anchors, then this undermines the rationale for sampling in the
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triadic case. For example, given that the triad BDE then, to be consistent with
the binary strategy, subjects should first look for an end-anchor, in this case,
E. As this leads to a decision straight away (select E) then there is no point in
sampling a binary subset.
3.3.4 Study 2: Choice Profiles
Binary choices
Following retraining, all five subjects showed a strong transitive choice profile,
including one subject who performed weakly on the BD pair the first time round.
Middle Phase
This short testing phase showed a similar drop in performance, in comparison
with the binary tests, as occurred in the first study.
Late Phase
Subjects showed an improved performance compared with the middle phase,
despite having received no intervening training and no selective feedback as to
whether their responses were correct or incorrect3. Figure 3-3 shows the change
in performance, with the original phase also shown for comparison.
3.3.5 Study 2: Monkey reaction times
A major initial finding was that the monkeys showed an ordinal distance effect.
Figure 3-4 shows the group effect for all pairs and separately for the 'internal'
3The subjects were explicitly trained to perform the triads after the late phase to see if
their performance could be tuned up still further. With selective feedback, performance
became almost perfect.
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Figure 3—3: Improvement in triadic performance across testing phases
pairs. Figure 3-5 shows that this effect is not merely an emergent group phe¬
nomenon but exists for each individual (albeit with less linearity in some cases).
This is the only study in which the distance effect had been demonstrated in
'non-logical' subjects, and the finding of the effect in individuals represents the
most convincing evidence yet obtained that subjects are employing an integrated
representation.
3.3.6 Comparing Children and Monkeys
McGonigle and Chalmers carried out analogous transitivity experiments with
children. The experimental procedures employed were similar enough to those
they employed with monkeys to enable a detailed cross-comparison of perfor¬
mance to be made (McGonigle &: Chalmers, 1984a). In the first experiment, six
year old children were given a non-verbal version of the five-term series task,
using the same stimuli and basic procedure as employed with the monkeys (de¬
scribed above). Instead of peanuts, a counter was hidden under one of the tins in
each training trial, and subjects were encouraged to collect these and exchange
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Figure 3—4: Ordinal distance effect in monkeys (N = 5) for all pairs (a) and









Figure 3—5: Monkey ordinal distance effect plotted for individual subjects
78
correct choices the experimenter said "That's right", when wrong, they were
told "No, thats wrong, isn't it?", and the experimenter demonstrated that the
counter was hiding under the other tin. The training schedules paralleled those
of the monkeys (starting with the pairs presented serially and then switching
to random presentation), although the childrens' training was shorter and less
intensive. The acquisition profile is shown in table 3-6 below, and this can be
compared to the corresponding monkey data (albeit with one less phase) shown
in table 3-1. The three phases for the children are (l) serial (runs of AB, BC,
CD, DE in order), (2) recursive serial (serial but with each pair presented four
times consecutively) and (3) random (trials were presented in randomly ordered
blocks of the four different pairs). It can be seen that children and monkeys'
learning curves appear similar, with both tending towards an inverted-U shape.
The only major difference is that the children appear to start of by showing a
strong 'recency effect' in which the most recently presented pair is remembered
better. It is not known why they should show this and not the monkeys, but it
could be an artifact of differences in experimental procedure during early train¬
ing. Certainly the most salient aspect of the two experiments, taken together is
the way both sets of subjects 'grow' into a pronounced serial position curve.
Binary tests
Table 3-5 below, shows the results of the subsequent testing phase compared
with the monkey results. As with the monkeys, the six remote pairs were tested
without differential feedback, although corrective feedback was maintained on
the adjacent pairs. All test responses were significantly biased (p < 0.01) except
for the pair AD. It seems likely that the lack of a significant bias on this pair
is due to the relatively short training that the children received and the small
sample size. Inspection of the data from individuals shows that most subjects
showed a stronger bias than emerges for the group and that two or three subjects
showed a bias in the reverse direction on the crucial pair BD. Unfortunately,
there is not enough data to support separate statistical tests for individuals. It
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Figure 3—6: Acquisition profiles for six year old children compared with mon¬
keys
difficult to compare the patterns because of the ceiling effect for the monkeys. It
seems that, by casual inspection, the tables are almost mirror images, with high
performance on the E pairs for children and high performance of the A pairs for
monkeys.
B C D E B C D E
A 98 70 57* 80 A 98 100 100 100
B — 98 70 88 B — 93 90 76
C — — 98 78 C — — 89 87
D — — — 98 D — — — 97
Children (N=10) Monkeys (N=8)
*Non significant on a binomial test
Table 3—5: Child and monkey binary choice profiles
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Children Monkeys Bin.Samp.
Triad 7 Pa 7 /3 a 7 fl a
ABC 8 28 64 0 31 69 0 33 67
BCD 20 23 57 3 36 61 17 33 50
CDE 17 15 68 11 24 65 0 33 67
ABD 10 43 47 0 44 56 0 50 50
BCE 3 47 50 6 28 66 0 33 67
BDE 28 20 52 16 24 60 17 17 66
Means 14 29 57 6 31 63 6 33 61
Child and monkey choice profiles compared with binary sampling model
projections (only six of the possible triads are shown). Data from
(McGonigle &; Chalmers, 1984a).
Table 3-6: Child and monkey triadic test results
Triadic tests
Table 3-6 shows the children's triadic test profiles compared "with the monkeys'.
The children were only given six of the ten possible triads (to avoid making the
tests too laborious for the subjects). It can be seen that children, like monkeys,
show a marked reduction in transitive bias compared with the binary tests and
both show a reasonable concordance with the projections of the binary sampling
model. Unfortunately a statistical comparison between choice levels in the two
species is not possible as monkeys were given more presentations of each pair
and triad as well as a larger set of triads (all ten) than were given to the children.
Verbal Training
Despite the overall similarity between children and monkeys on the above non¬
verbal version of the five-term series task (as indicated by the acquisition profiles,
successful binary test performance and the reduction in transitive bias on the
triads), it could be argued that the training procedure somehow induces an atyp¬
ical 'non-logical' strategy. In particular, the training is non-verbal and effectively
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involves only one comparative for any given subject (eg choose heavier). This
is in contrast to (Riley &: Trabasso, 1974), who found that linguistic training
using both complements of a comparative (A is longer than B and B is shorter
than A) produced better retention on the pairs BC and CD. These authors
concluded that use of only a single comparative promoted use of nominal rather
than ordinal encoding strategies, and thus gave rise to poorer performance.
To help settle this issue, McGonigle and Chalmers conducted a second exper¬
iment (published in the same paper) in which the only difference in procedure
was that the children had to answer verbal questions instead of just selecting
the 'correct' tin. In both training and testing subjects had to respond to each
trial by answering one of the questions "Which is the heavy one?" or "Which is
the light one?". Question form varied randomly from trial to trial and feedback
(during training) was verbal, eg "That's right, green is the heavy one" or "No,
that's wrong, green is the heavy one". A 'reward' (sweets) was given at the end
of every training session to encourage participation.
As the structure of this experiment was the same as the previous one (in terms
of length of training and testing etc), a direct statistical comparison of verbal
and non-verbal performance was possible. A two way analysis of variance with
repeated measures revealed no significant main effects or interactions between the
verbal/non-verbal grouping and test pair. Triadic performance was also highly
concordant (14; 29; 57% and (14; 34 ;52%) to 7, /? and a items for non-verbal
and verbal groups.
In addition to the binary and triadic tests, subjects were also presented with
a verbal seriation task. With no stimulus present, the child was asked, "Which
is the heaviest tin?", "Which is the next heaviest", and so on until they gave up
or repeated earlier colours. As an additional test for ordinal encoding, subjects
were shown one tin at a time (in random order) and asked to categorise it as
heavy or light purely on the basis of seeing its colour. Both these post-tests
showed that subjects could only locate the ends of the series with any reliability.
The results of the verbal seriation task are shown in table 3-7. This apparent
inability to seriate, combined with the reduced performance on the triads, is
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Item A B C D E
P 37* 15 29 26 37*
Probability of assigning each item its correct position in the se¬
ries. *Significantly deviant from chance (20%). Data from
(McGonigle Sz Chalmers, 1984a).
Table 3—7: Verbal seriation post-test (N=19)
evidence against the idea that an ability to mentally seriate objects underpins
performance in transitive inference tasks.
3.4 Conclusions
1. It appears that the ability of subjects to show a transitive bias on the crucial
BD pair in the five-term series task is a phenomenon which is robust with
respect to species, methodology and stimuli.
2. The ordinal distance effect, 'reduced' performance on triadic tests and an
inverted-U shaped serial position curve during acquisition all appear to be
indexical of subjects strategies.
3. 'Symbolic' differences between the stimuli determine the representation
and that it is not crucial to have the presence of a physical metric such as
size.
4. Subjects appear to employ a 'non-logical' strategy even in verbal versions
of the five-term series task.
5. Ability to seriate (assign each object a unique location within the series)
does not appear to be a prerequisite for solving the five-term series task.
6. Given the strong concordance between the child and monkey data, it is
reasonable to assume that, in this domain, monkeys' strategies are repre¬
sentative of those used by children.
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Clearly, it must be accepted that subjects are not doing 'formal' (deductive)
transitive inference in these tasks. Breslow is right in this respect. Monkeys,
or young children, cannot be assumed to be logical symbol-manipulators by
birthright, and it is unreasonable to suppose that they can acquire a formal the¬
ory of transitivity during the course of the five-term series task. Such skills need
to be acquired through teaching, after all, it took two thousand years for modern
logical calculus to be developed from its roots among the Greek philosophers.
Furthermore, transitivity is not inherently 'in' the environment and so cannot
be acquired, in the way Piaget suggests, by internalising actions. The available
evidence suggests that rather than the ability to physically seriate underpinning
the emergence of formal transitive reasoning, its more the other way round; a
'pre-logical' form of reasoning involving linear orders is the primitive on which
these other skills are built. This primitive form of reasoning, which appears to
be captured in the five-term series task, can still be regarded as inference, in the
psychological sense discussed in the previous chapter. These issues are returned
to in the concluding chapters.
As the monkey studies are the only ones to have a rich data base for each indi¬
vidual subject (thus supporting statistical analysis for individuals), the monkey
data provides the only viable source for a microanalysis, based on computational




This chapter introduces and specifies a simple rule-based model of
the decision mechanism underlying subjects' choices during perfor¬
mance of the five-term series task. It is shown that the model can
account qualitatively for the main (group) phenomena associated with
the child and animal data introduced in the previous chapter. Some
possible variations on the model are considered but a simple core
model is put forward as the best candidate for assessment.
4.1 A task Analysis
In order to produce a computational model of a typical subject's strategy, it
is first necessary to form a "monkey's eye" impression of the five-term series
task (described in the previous chapter). It is difficult to do this for competent
performance alone — a task analysis almost inevitably raises questions about
what knowledge subjects bring to the task vs what they learn from the task.
What prior knowledge can we safely assume the subjects possess? Firstly,
as the animals had some prior testing experience, it seems reasonable to assume
that they had some knowledge of the generic form of the task which faced them.
They would know they had to choose one from a (small) number of differing
stimuli and that (at least?) one of the possible choices would be rewarded and,
possibly, that one would be unrewarded. Children performing the task might be
told as much directly.
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The nature of other prior knowledge has to be inferred more indirectly. From
the subject's point of view, rather than having to 'make an inference' (a request
which would be difficult to communicate to children, let alone animals), the task
must surely be to learn how to use the characteristics of the stimuli to predict
which future choices will be rewarded. From this perspective, it is not safe to
assume that subjects will either possess or employ a transitive inference schema;
or that they will organise the knowledge they pick up, in any particular format.
We may assume that subjects will bring to bear some general cognitive apparatus
for dealing with situations of this type, although we cannot say a priori what
this will be. There may also be special purpose mechanisms brought to bear
but, again, we cannot say what these are without further evidence.
Let us now consider the task itself. The training stimuli which the subjects
had to make sense of are shown schematically below. Letters represent colours,
the location of stimuli is represented by their left-right relation on the page. A
'+' underneath a letter indicates a (hidden) reward associated with the corre¬
sponding object and '0' indicates no reward.
A B B c C D D E
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
B A C B D C E D
+ 0 + 0 + 0 + 0
It can be seen that there are eight basic training situations which could poten¬
tially be discriminated prior to each choice. However, it must be remembered
that this is an abstraction; there are multiple occurrences of each of the situa¬
tions in an unpredictable order J. From the subject's point of view, there is only
i
a succession of trials which must each be dealt with; the subject cannot know
in advance (or ever be certain) how the set is bounded. At any stage a novel
xNot completely random — early trials were presented in a systematic order.
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situation might arise which would break previous rules or categories. Indeed,
this is just what happens when the testing phase starts.
Given this state of affairs, what are the space of possible inductions? In other
words what generalisations can be made about the above training instances?
Here are some examples of possible generalisations, expressed as rules, using a
production systems shorthand: < condition > =>• < action >.
1. left(C) & right(B) => rewarded{C).
2. present(B) & present(C) =r> rewarded(C).
3. present(E) =>• rewarded(E)
4. -irewarded(A)
5. present{D) & absent{E) =>• rewarded[D).
6. 3x present(x) -i rewarded(x)
(At least one of the choice objects in a trial is not rewarded.)
7. The colours form a series, A,B,C,D,E and from any subset of these
colours the item nearest the E end will be rewarded.
8. present(C) & absent(D) => rewarded(C).
The first example may, at first sight, appear not to be a generalisation at all
because it only covers one case. However, this case is itself a generalisation, as
pointed out above. The second example abstracts out location as being unim¬
portant. It employs the higher level concept of presence of an item within a
particular trial. The next few rules capture the same kinds of principles as used
in the stack model. The seventh example is the most abstract and might seem
the least likely to arise from a general inductive process, yet this is the kind
of thing that is generally supposed is learned in the transitivity task. Up to
this point all the generalisations make 'correct' predictions for the remote pairs
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(where they are applicable). The last example is included to show that this is
not necessarily the case. This rule is compatible with all the training instances
and yet leads to a 'non-transitive' prediction for the pair CE.
Clearly such inductions are potentially useful. The question of how the in¬
ductive process itself might work is postponed until chapter 7. Our main concern
for the moment is to decide what abstractions are employed by a competent per¬
former of the task. The model which is described below was developed according
to 'Occam's razor' principle that the number of objects within a theory should
be minimised. It was decided to employ a production systems notation for the
reasons outlined in chapter 2. Since the transitive reasoning task is essentially
a symbolic inference problem, it was felt that it was likely that at least some
aspects of the information gain processes could be captured using a sequential
rule based system.
4.2 A model of binary performance
In outline, the model is based around the concept of avoidance and selection of
objects along with a simple control element. A strategy for performing the task
consists of having a small set of rules, each one of which is an instruction to
either avoid or select a particular feature, along with a control element which
attempts to apply each rule in turn in a fixed order. The strategy lends itself to a
simple production system notation of a set of conditional rules, as shown below.
The rules are applied to the task by an interpreter or control structure which, in
this case, basically tries each rule in turn until one succeeds. For example, the
series A, B, C, D, E can be represented by the stack of four rules and interpreter
shown below:
STACK
1) present(E) =£• select(E)
2) present(D) =>• select(D)
3) present{C) =>• select(C)
4) present[B) =>- select(B)
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INTERPRETER
1) Remove a rule from the top of the stack.
2) If the rule is not applicable to the trial then go back to step 1.
3) Carry out the action of the rule and stop.
In order to make the critical BD comparison, the interpreter would scan
down the stack to the first relevant rule, which in this case is the third. The
action of the rule leads to the choice of D This example rule stack also gives
correct responses to all the other pairs. For example, all the pairs containing
E are discriminated by the first rule, whereas the interpreter only reaches the
fourth rule for one pair, BC.
4.2.1 Variants of the stack
There are a number of variants of the example stack which will also give correct
performance. For example, the second and third rules can be swapped around.
However, the third and fourth rules cannot be swapped around without giving
an incorrect choice on the pair CD. A second source of variation is in the
rules themselves, which can each take one of two forms. This particular rule set
consists of three 'selection' rules and an 'avoidance' rule (no. 2). Either form
of rule can refer to any one (and only one) of the objects in the series. For
example, the last rule could be 'if B is present then avoid J3' and the stack will
still give correct answers. In fact there are sixteen (24) stacks of this generic
form which will 'perform' correctly on all pairs from the five-term series. These
range from a stack consisting of all selection rules through various mixed stacks
such as the previous example to one consisting entirely of avoidance rules. The
range is illustrated in table 4-1. A six-term series would require five rules per
stack and there would be 2s = 32 variants.
Note also that the order of mention of the items down the stack does not
necessarily correspond to the order implied by the performance (ie the series A
to E). This is in contradistinction to previous linear representation models as
discussed in chapter 6.
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1) present(E) =>• select(E)
2) present(D) =>• select(D)
3) present(C) =>• select{C)
4) present(B) select(B)
1) present[A) =>■ avoid(A)
2) present(E) =>■ select(E)
3) present(B) =>• avoid(B)
4) present(D) =>■ select(D)
1) present(A) =£■ avoid(A)
2) present(B) =$■ avoid[B)
3) present(C) =>• avoid[C)
4) present(D) =>• avoid(D)
Table 4—1: The range of rule stacks for solving the five-term series
Although there are as many as sixteen possible rule stacks which satisfy the
constraint of performing correctly on all the pairs, the space of stacks which do
not satisfy this constraint is even larger. Given five items and two forms of rule
and then the number of stacks which contain four different rules is 10x9x8x7 =
5040 stacks. It is interesting to note, therefore, that a property of this space
is that any stack which performs correctly on the adjacent pairs also performs
correctly on the remote pairs. This is important because subjects only receive
training on the adjacent pairs. Our model is therefore that subjects construct
a stack for the purpose of dealing with the training information, and that this
then (somewhat indirectly) gives them the ability to deal with remote pairs. The
process by which stacks might be constructed is discussed in chapter 7.
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4.3 The Full Stack Model
The basic control structure described above does not specify what happens if
the task is to select between more than two items. For example, given the triad
ACD then the following process results (with the same stack as before): Rule 1
does not match any item so the next rule is taken off the stack: 'If A is present
then avoid A\ This eliminates A as a candidate but leaves the subject with no
way of making a choice between C and D. Other triads, such as BCD present
no such problems, with rule three making an appropriate unique choice in this
case. One possible strategy would be to simply make a random choice where a
single application of a rule fails to give a unique choice. This strategy is called
naive and an interpreter is shown in figure 4-2.
The naive strategy makes a unique choice for each triad, but errors will be
made where avoidance rules are involved. This turns out to be a good model
of the early triadic tests, as shown in chapter 5. An implication of the naive
control strategy being employed is the existence of two basic types of triad (with
respect to a given rule stack). The first type, henceforth called random triads,
have an expected distribution of 50% of choices to each of the a2 and 0 items
with zero choices to the qr item. Random triads are those where the shallowest
applicable rule is an avoidance one. The second type, alpha triads, are those
where the shallowest applicable rule is a selection one, because it expected that
all the available choices will go to the a item.
A final point about the naive strategy is that the fourth rule never gets
reached when the stack is applied to a triad — for any of the ten possible triads,
one of the first three rules is always applicable, whatever stack is employed. This
is simply because three rules are relevant to three out of the five items from the
series, and a triad cannot be constructed from the remaining two.
2These symbols are defined in chapter 3.
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4.3.1 Variants of the interpreter
In the cases like ACD (with stack 3), where an avoidance rule is the shallowest
applicable rule, a more sophisticated control regime is needed which allows more
than a single rule application. For example, the second control structure in
table 4-2 makes sure that deeper rules are considered after the shallowest one
has fired. Such a strategy is referred to as iterative.
These two types of control strategy (naive and iterative) show how the con¬
trol strategy affects the adequacy of performance. In particular, a strategy which
gives correct performance on the binary task will not necessarily perform cor¬
rectly on triads. Performance on the binary tests is more 'robust' in the sense
that the control structure is not so critical.
Partial iteration
Another aspect of the triadic testing phase is the 'spontaneous' improvement
found in the second study. This can be accommodated into the above framework
by assuming that the new tests lead the subject to develop a more principled
control structure for the task. In other words they generalise their strategy so
that it is not limited to pairs but can make a unique choice between a number
of items. This seems plausible, as it is only on the triadic tests that the short¬
comings of a simple control structure become apparent. However, subjects do
not appear to make a sudden jump in performance as they switch strategies but
rather show a more gradual improvement over the three phases. It seems that
there is a need to hypothesise some intermediate kind of control strategy, or a
process of transition.
The only difference between the naive and iterative strategies (as specified) is
in (the last clause of) the fourth step. If this rule does not suddenly get changed,
there could be a transition period during which both forms of step 4 are kept
around (pending evaluation of the new form). This idea is encapsulated in the
third strategy in table 4-2, named semi-iterative. If, upon reaching step 4, there
was (say) a 50% chance of either version being used then this would lead to
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Example Stack:
1) present(E) =>• select(E)
2) present(A) => aucud(A)
3) present(D) =>• select(D)
4) present(C) => select(C)
NAIVE
1) Remove a rule from the top of the stack.
2) If the rule is not applicable to the trial then go back to step 1.
3) Carry out the action of the rule.
4) If unique choice then stop, else make a random selection.
ITERATIVE
1) Remove a rule from the top of the stack.
2) If the rule is not applicable to the trial then go back to step 1.
3) Carry out the action of the rule.
4) If unique choice then stop, else go back to step 1.
SEMI-ITERATIVE
1) Remove a rule from the top of the stack.
2) If the rule is not applicable to the trial then go back to step 1.
3) Carry out the action of the rule.
4) If unique choice then stop, else —
— either go back to step 1 or make a random selection.
Table 4—2: Three control strategies for the stack model together with sample
rule stack
93
an intermediate level of performance of the triads. Returning to the example
rule set and the triad ACD, rule 2 is applied (as before) at step three in the
strategy, thus eliminating A. At step three the process will either terminate with
a random choice between C and D or it will recurse back to step one. Over a
number of trials on which the former happens, the average distribution of choices
between A, C and D will be 0%, 50% and 50%, respectively. In the latter case,
rule 3 will be invoked at step 3, and the process will terminate at step four with
the unique selection of D (and a resulting distribution of 0%, 0%, 100%). The
net result of applying the semi-iterative strategy would thus be a distribution of
0%, 25% and 75%, halfway between the other two strategies.
Naturally, a different probability weighting between the two parts of step
four would lead to a proportionally different outcome. In the next chapter this
variable factor is referred to as the percentage of iteration (the probability of
carrying out the first part of rule 4). Over a number of decisions, this is equivalent
to the proportion of trials on which more than one rule is applied. Note that the
naive and iterative strategies can be viewed as special cases of the semi-iterative
strategy, with 0% and 100% iteration, respectively. Also, of course, any strategy
will work for the binary pairs where avoidance rules are unambiguous.
This completes the description of the stack model. It was considered that
three control strategies (combined with the sixteen possible rule stacks) give
enough degrees of freedom to make an interesting modelling attempt. The final
section in this chapter contains a discussion of further possible control strategies
which, it was considered, would make the evaluation process (in the next chapter)
too complex.
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4.4 Summary of the Stack Model
The basic model to be evaluated with respect to the monkey five-term series
data is summarised below.
1. There are four rules per subject which are relevant to a set of five ob¬
jects: A, B, C, D and E. Alternatively, these may be thought of as five
distinguishing properties (for example, colour) of a set of objects.
2. Each conditional rule may have two forms, selection and avoidance:
• selection: present(X) => select(X)
• avoidance: present(X) => avoid(X)
Where X is one of the five items.
3. The four rules allow the correct choice to be made on all training pairs
(and hence on all the pairs).
4. The forms and order of the rules are invariant for a given stack.
5. The stack is interpreted by one of three control strategies (to be specified in
the evaluation): naive, iterative or semi-iterative as outlined in table 4-2.
6. The semi-iterative control strategy has a variable component which speci¬
fies the degree of iteration. This can vary from 0% (equivalent to naive to
100% (equivalent to iterative).
Variables
1. Rule form and order can vary between subjects.
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Identity Rule depth
1 2 3 4
*1. Se(E) Se(D) Se(C) -
2. Se(E) Se(D) Av(A)
3. Se(E) Av(A) Se(D) -
4. Se(E) Av(A) Av(B) -
5. Av(A) Se(E) Se(D) -
6. Av(A) Se(E) Av(B) -
7. Av(A) Av(B) Se(E) -
*8. Av(A) Av(B) Av(C) -
Table 4—3: Enumeration of stacks for modelling purposes
2. In the case of the semi-iterative control strategy, the relative probability
of making a random choice o,r recursing can vary between subjects or for
the same subject across time.
Enumerating the stacks
There are sixteen possible rule sets which satisfy the above constraints. For
shorthand purposes, it will be useful to enumerate these explicitly. The number¬
ing system that has been adopted here is geared to the purposes of evaluation.
For each possible sequence of rule forms, there is one corresponding set of rules
which give correct performance on all the pairs. The ordering is based on a bi¬
nary sequence progressing form all selection to all avoidance. However, we need
only consider eight stack forms, and these are enumerated in table 4-3, with
the form of the fourth rule unspecified (rule forms are denoted by their first two
letters). The stack used in the examples corresponds to number 3 in this schema.
The form of the fourth rule has few implications for the behaviour of the rule
stack. This is because the last rule is only ever used to discriminate one pair,
the other possible binary (and triadic) combinations being dealt with by rules
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higher in the stack. For evaluation purposes, it makes little difference to the
overall projected performance profile whether the last pair is discriminated on
the basis of selection or avoidance. The simplifying assumption will be made,
therefore, that the fourth rule is always a selection one, unless otherwise stated.
For the sake of completeness, the remaining eight rule stacks (with an avoidance
rule at the bottom) may be referred to as l(av), 2(av) etc.
4.5 Implications and global fit of the model
This section describes the ways in which the stack model demonstrates the typical
group phenomena (described in the previous chapter). Also discussed, are the
implications of the model for evaluation at a more detailed level.
4.5.1 The ordinal distance effect
If the main source of RT variation is the depth of the rule which 'fires' then
any set of rules fitting the specification will show an ordinal distance
effect. This is assuming that the length of time it takes to carry out selection
and avoidance actions are not too dissimilar3. An example of how an RT profile
can be generated from a set of rules is given below.
Assuming that it takes one unit of time to pull a rule off the stack, one unit
of time to test a condition and two units of time to carry out the action and
displace the object (the assignments are not critical), then the predicted RTs for
each pair can be tabulated along with the mean RTs for every ordinal separation
(table 4-4). The mean RTs along the diagonals of this table give the projected
3The difference must not be larger than the time to fail a condition and move onto
the next rule. This works out to be equivalent to assuming that the main source of
variation in reaction time is the number of rules that are tried before one succeeds, or
the depth of the successful rule.
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B C D E
1) present(E) => select(E)
2) present(A) =>• avoid(A)
3) present(D) =$■ select(D)
4) present(C) =>• select[C)













Table 4—4: Projected RTs show distance effect for stack No. 3
distance effect as shown alongside. Any of the other stacks will give the same
distance effect — the tabulated RTs look similar except for permutation of the
entries along the diagonals (the AE comparison always takes 4 units, as the top
rule in every stack must be either about A or E).
Note that the same rank differences in the RTs are produced by taking the
depth of the rule employed to discriminate each pair as a measure. An alternative
explanation for the reason why the distance effect emerges for any stack is that,
the further apart two items are in the series, the more likely it is that one of
them will be 'caught' by a rule high up in the stack.
Linearity hypothesis
Although the model is thus in accord with the monkey phenomena in showing
a distance effect at both the group and individual levels, it also predicts a more
fundamental effect at the individual level. That is, it should be possible to plot
a linear relationship between an individual's reaction times and the depth of rule
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employed to make a decision. In the actual data, this will be referred to as the
depth effect. The prediction can be broken down into two parts:
Grouping hypothesis: Pairs involving the same decision process should pro¬
duce the same RT. For example, given the stack in the previous example,
the pairs AB, AC and AD should all have the same RT.
Linearity hypothesis: The variable component of RT should be proportional
to the depth of the rule that provides the choice. A weaker version of
this hypothesis states that the RT should monotonically increase with rule
depth.
The rank ordering of reaction times from fastest to slowest can thus be rep¬
resented as follows, for stack No. 3:
1) AE BE CE AE




The stack model as presented makes no prediction about error rates on the binary
tests except for the possibilities mentioned in the discussion of resource limited
strategies (section 4.6.2). If there were errors correlated with the depth of search
of the stack then this would lead to an 'inverted-U' curve for the error rates on
adjacent pairs when averaged across a group of subjects using different stacks.
The serial position curves for individuals, however, could be asymmetrical or
zig-zag in shape depending on the particular rule stack. Chapter 7 discusses
how the curve could emerge as part of the learning process.
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4.5.3 Triadic choice profiles
Section 4.3.1 describes how the stack model with the naive control strategy
can account for the diminished levels of performance on transferring from the
binary to the triadic tests. The semi-iterative control strategy can also model
the increase in performance on the triads across time. Moreover, the model
predicts that individuals will show differing characteristic patterns of selection
and avoidance on the triads, depending on which stack they are employing. This
fact will be exploited in evaluating the model in the next chapter.
For example, stack No. 1 will give correct performance on all the triads
(irrespective of control strategy). This is because it contains only selection rules
which always specify a unique choice. At the other extreme, stack number 8 will
give a poor performance on all the triads. Versions of stacks 1 and 8 are shown
in table 4-1. Intermediate stacks lead to a mixed performance whereby perfect
performance is attained for some triads and a diminished performance for the
remainder. The factor determining performance for any particular combination
of stack and triad is whether the shallowest relevant rule in the stack is selection
or avoidance.
4.5.4 Conclusions
At a gross descriptive level, the stack model appears to be able to account for
most of the phenomena associated with the binary tests and for the drop in
performance on transferring to the triadic tests. This is an encouraging start
but begs the question of whether the model would stand up to a quantitative
comparison with the data, particularly the triadic choice patterns.
It can now be seen why the monkey studies are the only appropriate source
of data for such an analysis. This is partly because of the peculiar nature of the
stack model in that, unlike its predecessors, it claims to be able to model indi¬
vidual subjects better than group data. Only the monkey research has collected
enough data on individuals to make this feasible. A second reason for preferring
the data from this study is the triadic post tests given to subjects after they had
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learned the series. If we are correct in our assumption that subjects continue
to use the same basic representation on transferring to the triads, then these
provide a unique 'second window' onto the underlying processes, and a critical
test for any model.
4.6 Variations on the stack model
The following variations on the stack model are not explicitly evaluated in the
following chapter. They are included mainly for discussion purposes, but may
be referred to with respect to potential solutions where the stack model breaks
down.
4.6.1 Dynamic ordering of rules
A major assumption with the stack model is that subjects use the same rule
stack throughout binary and triadic testing. Whilst the possibility of dynamic
rule ordering is considered for the acquisition phase of the binary task (chapter
7) it is assumed that subjects would stick with the same set of rules once success
was established. The possibility that subjects might re-order rules to optimise
their performance in the triadic phase should not be ruled out. Similarly, rules
might be added to or dropped from the stack.
Instead of a stack-like rule ordering in which each rule has an unambiguous
(discrete) position, rules could have different (numerical) priorities and the con¬
trol strategy could operate with respect to these. If each rule has one of four
discrete, ascending values attached to it then the predictions of this version of
the model remain much as before. However, this mechanism allows the possi¬
bility of two or more rules having the same priority value, or of some values
being closer to each other than others. This potentially allows a different kind
of indeterminacy from that in the random type triads, previously considered.
With such a mechanism, it is easy to imagine that the order of rules might not
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be totally rigid but could fluctuate across time, depending on how stable the
priority values were. Such a fluctuation might also, conceivably, be an integral
part of the mechanism for acquiring a rule stack.
Assuming that (effective) rule order is not entirely stable, the high perfor¬
mance that most subjects achieve on the binary tests (previous chapter) would
appear to constrain most of the possible fluctuations to those that do not affect
binary performance. Adjacent avoidance and selection rules can be swapped
around without causing problems on the binary tests. However, such swapping
does have implications for the triadic tests, causing variation in the distribution
of choices between a and /3 items, as should become clear in the next chapter.
4.6.2 Resource limited control
The idea behind this is that the improvement on the triads is correlated with
some kind of increased allocation of computational resources the task. Corre¬
spondingly, the initial reduction in performance that subjects show when trans¬
ferring from the binary to the triadic task is because the triadic tests are more
computationally intensive. A control strategy which produces this kind of be¬
haviour is partially represented in table 4-5. Each time the strategy is called
upon to make a decision it is allocated a finite amount of computational re¬
sources (eg memory, processing time or their biological equivalents). This seems
a sensible precaution in a real-time system; in general, if a process uses more
resources than expected, the chances are that something has gone wrong. As the
process runs, it monitors its use of resources, which will be depleted by its own
actions. For our purposes, we will consider such imposed resource limitations as
outweighing any absolute (hardware) limitations.
In the example, the monitoring process occurs in step 2, which acts as a kind
of 'fail-safe' condition, ensuring that the process will not grind to a halt without
some kind of decision being made. If the process was given unlimited resources,
however, this condition would never arise and the strategy could make a unique
selection between any subset of an arbitrarily long series (given an appropriate
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1) If unique choice then stop.
2) If low resources then make random choice and stop.
3) Remove a rule from the top of the stack.
4) If the rule is not applicable to the trial then go to step 2.
5) Carry out the action of the rule and go back to step 1.
Table 4—5: Resource-limited control strategy
stack of rules). With limited resources (diminishing at each step of the process),
however, the process may terminate before the choice has been narrowed down
to a unique item.
Overall, this leads to very similar behaviour to the semi-iterative control
strategy, but there are some subtle differences. For example, using this strategy
the previous example example triad (ACD) and rule stack (table 4-2), the results
are pretty much the same. Given resources which are only sufficient for binary
pairs, A will be eliminated and a random choice made between C and D. Beyond
this point, the more resources there are available, the deeper the stack can be
searched. A slight increase is all that is needed in this example for the third rule
in the stack to be reached (present(D) =>■ select(D)) thus enabling a unique
choice. However, this would not be sufficient to make a unique choice from the
triad ABC, where the fourth rule needs to be reached.
In summary, all that is needed is some trial to trial variation (noise) in the
resource allocation to this strategy and it gives rise to a similar set of choice
distributions to the semi-iterative strategy. The difference is that there would be
a gradation of performance between the triads depending on how deep the rules
needed to be searched to make a unique choice. The advantages of this version
of the model are twofold. Firstly, it can potentially account for a wide range
of behaviour with the changing of a single variable (or, more realistically, set
of variables) — resource allocation. Secondly, it gives a neat way of accounting
for the noise in the choice profiles in both versions of the task. This could be
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viewed as either due to noise in the levels of resources allocation itself or in the
quantities of resources used during each step of the process itself. For example, if
time is one of the resources, then distractions during the decision-making process
might lead to the occasional random choice even in the binary tests. The main
disadvantage is that the model is very difficult to evaluate precisely because it
is powerful. A major problem would be establishing the relative costs of the
diferent components of resource usage.
4.6.3 Item-driven control
The class of control structures which have been alluded to so far are all what
might be called 'stack-driven', in that the order in which rules are retrieved and
tested is governed by the stack order. This means that, where more than one
rule is applicable to a given trial, the shallowest one will always be applied first.
At the other extreme, rule selection could be entirely item driven, so that instead
of retrieving a rule and testing its condition against the items in the trial; an
item is selected, and then a rule found to fit it. The way the decision process
works in this case is that firstly, all of the rules relevant to a particular trial
are retrieved and secondly, they are applied in the order dictated by the stack
ranking. This would appear to predict perfect performance on the triadic tests,
however unless there was something analogous to resource limitation, in which
case the predictions are similar.
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Chapter 5
Evaluating The Stack Model
Having shown how the stack model is capable of accounting qualita¬
tively for the group phenomena associated with the monkey data, this
chapter deals with the evaluation of the model more quantitatively.
The approach is to assess the 'fit' at coarse levels of description and
then to progressively chunk the data more finely until the inadequa¬
cies of the model become apparent. The analysis begins with triadic
error patterns and goes on to look at reaction times during binary
tests. The notation used to refer to the data differs slightly from that
employed by McGonigle and Chalmers — see section 8.8.2.
5.1 Methodology
It was decided that the triadic choice profiles, particularly from the early phase,
should form a key role in evaluating the stack model. This is because the stack
model makes clear quantitative predictions in this area which are different from
its only rival in this area, the binary sampling model (see chapter 3). Another
reason for putting the emphasis on the triadic data is that most subjects made
very few errors in the binary tests, creating a 'ceiling effect' whereby the error
rates are uninterpretable. Table 5-1 shows the distribution of choices amongst
the remote pairs for each of the seven subjects (adjacent pairs were not tested
without differential feedback). It can be seen that whilst the first five subjects
show a near perfect performance, White is a little erratic on two pairs and Green
actually has a reverse bias on one pair.
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A E A C A D c E B E B D
Bill 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 0 10
Bump 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 1 9 0 10
Brown 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 0 10
Roger 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 1 9 0 10
Blue 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10
White 0 10 0 10 0 10 6 4 5 5 1 9
Green 0 10 0 10 0 10 2 8 9 1 6 4
Table 5—1: Individual binary choice data from early phase.
The first study was considered the best starting place because the triadic tests
were novel to subjects at this point, and so it can most reasonably be assumed
that subjects attempted to apply the the same strategy that was successful for
the binary tests. This means that the simple naive control strategy (which also
makes the most straightforward predictions) is the most appropriate. Later
triadic phases present more of a problem for two reasons. First, the case for
assuming that subjects continue to use the same set of rules is weaker. Secondly,
(b) the semi-iterative control strategy needs to be invoked, and this contains an
additional variable to cater for (the probability of the control structure iterating).
Although the stack model also makes predictions about (relative) reaction times,
there is another reason for preferring choice data, in the first instance, which is
related to the following problem.
A major difficulty in evaluating the stack model is that there is no way of
telling in advance which stack of rules a subject might be using. There are three
possible approaches to this problem, all of which will be used in some form or
other in this analysis.
1. As we have no prior reason to suppose that any particular stack is more
likely to be employed than any other, the predicted profile for a reasonably
sized group of subjects would be that formed by taking the average of
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the projections from individual rule stacks. Even with a small group of
subjects, such as we have with the monkeys, this approach still has some
validity. This is because the behaviour of the eight rule stacks overlap
to a great extent, and can thus be thought of specifying a characteristic
range of behaviour rather than eight discrete categories. This range is
reasonably well reflected by the binary enumeration of the stacks from 1
to 8 (eg see table 5-3). An 'averaged' stack model should therefore give a
good approximation to the averaged data for a group of subjects as long
as they employed a reasonably varied sample from the range of stacks.
2. Another approach is to take the eight separate projections from each of
the stacks and to compare these with the obtained profiles for individual
subjects. This may appear somewhat post hoc in that obtaining a degree
of fit to the data is inevitably more likely if there are a varied set of
projections to choose between. However, this still constitutes a test of
the model because the eight profiles cover a restricted range of possible
behaviours and, in principle, it is certainly possible for a subject to show
a pattern of choices which falls completely outside the space of behaviours
allowed by the model. Moreover, when assessing the degree of fit between
a projected and obtained profile, the criteria can be adopted that the fit
should be (a) better than for the 'averaged' stack model and (b) better
than other models.
3. The strongest test of the model is to take a stack which has been assigned
to a subject on the basis of one set of data points, and to assess its fit
on different data for the same subject. The latter could come from a
different block of trials, a different measure (eg error vs reaction time) or,
if the original data points were means, they could be expanded into smaller
chunks.
This following sections therefore evaluate the stack model against the triadic
choice data, starting with the early phase and the naive control strategy. The
general tactic is to organise both monkey data and the projected data (predicted
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from the model) into the same form so that they can be easily compared. In
doing this, the approach is to chunk the data progressively more finely, starting
with a relatively coarse summary and tending towards the level of individual
trials. Subjects' performances on the binary tests were generally too good to
generate interpretable error data but binary reaction times are dealt with in a
later section.
5.1.1 Generating Projections for the Triads
Assuming a naive control strategy, triadic choice profiles can be generated for
each of the eight stacks as shown in table 5-2 for the example stack x. The
projection is for a 100 trials, ten for each triad. It was assumed that on triads
where the shallowest applicable rule is an avoidance one, the choices are split
50/50 among the remaining items. This would only be true on average and only
providing that such uninformed choices are random (as opposed to the subject
selecting a favourite colour, for example). The binary sampling model makes an
analogous assumption, and the fit of the two models will be compared in this
section. The bottom row of the table summarises the projection to five data
points (sums), one per choice item, in the same way as was done for the actual
group data in table 3-4.
Projections have similarly been made for the other rule stacks and five point
summaries of all eight are shown in table 5-3. As the projection is for a total of
100 trials in each case, the figures can conveniently be read as percentages of the
total accruing to the corresponding item. Note that the profile for stack 1 is the
same as that for perfect performance and that performance degrades in a way
correlated with the stack number. This table effectively summarises a space of
possible projected profiles, and will be used extensively. The bottom row shows
the averaged distribution across all stack forms and is thus a summary of the







Triad A B c D E
ABC 0 5 5 — —
BCD — 0 0 10 —
BDE — 0 — 0 10
CDE — — 0 0 10
BCE — 0 0 — 10
ABD 0 5 — 5 —
ACD 0 — 5 5 —
ADE 0 — — 0 10
ABE 0 0 — — 10
ACE 0 — 0 — 10
Totals 0 10 10 20 60
Projected average distribution of choices to each item with ten presentations
of each triad and naive control strategy.
Table 5—2: Projected choice distributions for stack 3.
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Identity RuleForms A B C D E
1. SeSeSe 0 0 10 30 60
2. SeSeAv 0 5 5 30 60
3. SeAvSe 0 10 10 20 60
4. SeAvAv 0 10 15 15 60
5. AvSeSe 0 15 15 25 45
6. AvSeAv 0 15 20 20 45
7. AvAvSe 0 15 25 25 35
8. AvAvAv 0 15 25 30 30
— Overall% 0 10.6 15.6 24.4 49.4
Table 5—3: Projected percentage of total choices to each item for all stack
forms.
'averaged stack model' described in the previous section. Note that this is not
the only way of summarising the projections; a 'horizontal' summary (by triad
instead of by item) will be made use of further on.
Preliminary comparison with group monkey profile
Two of the monkeys in this sample break a basic assumption of the stack model,
which is that each subject possesses a rule stack which is fully functioning for
the binary pairs. Two subjects performed erratically on some pairs in the binary
testing phase, whilst the remaining five were almost error free. Strictly speaking,
therefore, the stack model (in its current form) is only valid for these five sub¬
jects. However, previously, the data from all seven subjects has been analysed
together, so it is in order to make a comparison of the averaged stack projection
with the data grouped as previously published (McGonigle k Chalmers, 1977;
McGonigle k Chalmers, 1986).
In table 5-5, the averaged stack profile is compared with the projection from
110
the binary sampling for fit to the combined profile from seven subjects. The
binary sampling model has already been compared with the monkey profile in
chapter 3 (last two rows of table 3-4), but an attempt at a more formal analysis
is given here, based on the chi-squared goodness-of-fit test. This is a method
of comparing a set of observed (independently sampled) frequencies with the
set of frequencies expected according to some model. It assumes a binomial
distribution of sampling error in the observed frequencies. A theoretical chi-
squared distribution is used to assess whether the observed set of frequencies is
significantly different from those expected according to the model.
For example, the averaged stack model predicts choices to be distributed, in
certain proportions, between the B, C, D and E items. Under the null hypothesis
(H0) that these proportions are correct (te they would arise given an sufficiently
large sample size), we can use the chi-squared test to tell us the probability of
obtaining the proportions actually observed. The following convention is adopted
for interpreting the results. A low probability (p < 0.05) means that the H0 can
reasonably be rejected — the model is inaccurate. An intermediate probability
(p > 0.1) means that there is no reason to reject Hq — the data lends some
support to the theory. High probabilities (p > 0.5) mean (in the psychological
domain), that the model describes the data well. This categorisation leaves a
grey area of probabilities between 0.05 and 0.1, where there there is insufficient
data to either accept or reject the model. The significance levels used here relate
to the standard ones employed in more commonly used statistical distributions,
as shown in table 5-4.
The conclusions of this test can only be accepted with certain reservations
for this application. First, the frequencies of choices to the items B, C, D
and E are not totally independent. For example, it is impossible for all the
choices to go to E with none to the other items. However, bearing in mind
the stochastic component of the model, the situation does approximate to the
conditions required by the test. Second, the test is based on a null hypothesis
which is a little too stringent for psychological models. In rejecting H0 we should
not necessarily reject the model which may in fact provide a useful approximation
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Probability (p) Interpretation
p > 0.1 No grounds to reject Ho
0.05 < p < 0.1 Insufficient evidence to reject H0
p < 0.05 Reject Hq (5% level)
p < 0.01 Reject Ho with confidence (1% level)
p < 0.001 Reject Ho (highly significant)
Table 5—4: Standard significance levels and interpretation heuristics (Experi¬
mental Psychology).
to the data, albeit consistently slightly inaccurate. For this reason we interpret
the intermediate probabilities liberally. Finally, we will only be testing for the
ability of models to predict proportions of choices to four of the items; they are
already correct in predicting zero choices to the A item.
Table 5-5 shows a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test applied to the averaged
stack model and the binary sampling model. The measure of total deviation
between observed (O) and expected (E) frequencies is given by the formulae:
2
= y- (0 ~ E)2
E
A zero value x2 indicates a perfect fit, whilst higher values can be used to assess
the relative fit of different models and can also be interpreted with respect to
the theoretical chi-squared distributions. First, it can be seen that the binary
sampling model gives a closer fit than the stack model (though both are much
much better than a perfectly transitive profile). As both models predict zero
choices to A this has to be eliminated from the goodness-of-fit test. As the total
number of choices is fixed, the relevant theoretical distribution is chi-squared
with 3 degrees of freedom.
It can be seen that the data gives some support to the binary sampling model
(0.2 > p > 0.1) (whilst the (averaged) stack model can reasonably be rejected
(p < 0.001). In particular, the stack model predicts too many choices to the
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E item. However, both models provide a much better fit than the perfectly
transitive profile (not shown). As already stated, this particular comparison has
been made primarily because the monkey data has already been published in this
form (though this statistical test has not previously been applied). The binary
sampling model also performs somewhat better when the data and projections
are summarised by triad, as in the original Nature paper (table 3-2).
The subsequent analysis of the early phase concentrates on the combined and
individual data of the five subjects Bill, Blue, Bump, Brown and Roger, whose
performances were all near perfect on the binary tests.
A B C D E E p(Observed)
Monkeys (O) 1 91 140 180 288 700 —
Stack Mod. (E) 0 74 109 171 346 700 —
(0-E)*
E
— 3.91 8.82 0.47 9.72 X2 = 22.9 p < 0.001
Bin. Samp. (E) 0 105 154 161 280 700 —
(0-E)'
E
— 1.87 1.27 2.74 0.23 X2 = 6.1 p > 0.1
The top box (tow rows) shows the observed frequencies of choices to each
item (early phase). The second box down shows the frequencies expected ac¬
cording to the averaged stack model, with measures of deviation in the row
below. The bottom box (last two rows) similarly shows expected frequen¬
cies and deviations for the binary sampling model. The X) column shows
the sums of the entries in the rows to the left. The summed deviances give
the 'goodness of fit' statistic, x2- Each entry in the column on the far right
gives the probability of the of the observed frequencies arising, under the
null hypothesis Hq that there is no significant difference between expected
and observed frequencies. The probabilities are obtained from standard
chi-squared tables (3 degrees of freedom).
Table 5—5: Relative fits of average stack profile and binary sampling model to
grouped data for all seven subjects.
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5.2 Study 1
Following the methodology described above, the first step is to evaluate the fit
of the averaged stack model to the (redefined) group data with two subjects
rejected.
5.2.1 Global Fit
Table 5-6 compares the relative fit of the data to the averaged stack model,
binary sampling model and a perfect transitive profile. The format is the same
as in table 5-5. It can be seen that, with two subjects removed, the relative
fit of the models is strikingly reversed. The data fits the stack model very well
(0.7 > p > 0.5), whereas the binary sampling model can be safely rejected. The
data are also far removed from the perfect response profile.
5.2.2 Microanalysis by Triad
The projections can also be summarised in a different direction, which is to
calculate the average of the eight projections for each triad. Table 5-7 compares
these with the mean monkey distribution and analogous projections from the
binary sampling model. See appendix A for the calculations.
Inspection of this table reveals that the stack model gives a better fit to the
data than the binary sampling model, both with respect to the mean distribution
of choices between 7, (3 and a items and at the level of individual triads. In
particular, the binary sampling model predicts choices to the 7 item on the
triads BCD and BDE which are not reflected in the data for this group. The
stack model predicts zero choices to the 7 item. An important question remains,
however. Is the relative success of the stack model entirely due to correctly
projecting the overall relative proportions of choices to the a and (3 or is the
projected variation between the triads significant? In other words, would the fit
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A B C D E E p(Observed)
Monkeys (O) 1 46 72 131 250 500 —
Stack Mod. (£) 0 53 78 122 247 500 —
(0-£)2
E
— 0.93 0.46 0.66 0.04 X2 = 2.1 p > 0.5 (3d/)
Bin. Samp. (E) 0 75 108 117 200 500 —
(0-£)2
E
— 6.45 12.17 1.68 12.50 X2 = 32.8 p < 0.001 (3d/)
Perfect TI (E) 0 0 50 150 300 500 —
(0-.E)2
E
— — 9.68 2.41 8.33 X2 = 20.4 p <C 0.001 (2d/)
Observed frequencies of choices to each item (early phase) compared with
those expected according to the (averaged) stack model, the binary sam¬
pling model, and a perfectly transitive profile. CF table 5-5.
Table 5—6: Relative fits of average stack profile and binary sampling model to
grouped data for five subjects.
be just as good if a 0, 25, 75% distribution were the projection for each individual
triad?
If the handful of choices to the 7 item are disregarded, then the main de¬
terminant of the profiles can be considered to be the proportion of choices to
the a item (the proportion choices to the /? item can then be calculated by
subtraction). The previous question can therefore be answered by finding the
statistical correlation between the respective a columns. This is only valid for
the stack model, as the binary sampling model predicts too many choices to the
7 item. Spearman's correlation statistic indicates a significant positive correla¬
tion (r = 0.634: see table 5-8) between the ten projected and obtained a values.
An interpretation of this result is that the averaged stack model can account for
approximately 40% (r2) of the inter-triad variance for this group of subjects2.
This is an encouragingly high proportion, considering the low number of sub-
2The correlation coefficient r ranges from +1 (maximum correlation) through 0 (no
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Triad Stack Mod. Monkeys B. Samp.
7/5" 7 fi a 7 0 a 7 P a
ABC 0 44 56 0 38 62 0 33 67
BCD 0 25 75 4 26 70 17 33 50
BDE 0 12* *r-oo 0 20 80 17 17 67
CDE 0 6 94 2 18 80 0 33 67
BCE 0 12* 00 * 2 12 86 0 33 67
ABD 0 37* 62* 0 34 66 0 50 50
ACD 0 37* 62* 0 22 78 0 50 50
ADE 0 25 75 0 12 88 0 33 67
ABE 0 25 75 0 14 86 0 33 67
ACE 0 25 75 0 20 80 0 33 67
Means 0 25 75 1 22 78 3 35 63
Projection of averaged (naive) stack model compared with monkey distribu¬
tions and binary sampling model projections. All percentages are rounded
to nearest whole number. *Rounded down 0.5%.
Table 5—7: Relative fit of averaged stack model at triadic level.
Projected 56 75 87.5 94 87.5 62.5 62.5 75 75 75
Obtained 62 70 80 80 86 66 78 88 86 80
Projected and obtained choices to a item (from table 5-7). Spearman's
product-moment correlation coefficient: r = 0.634 (t test p < 0.05).
Table 5—8: Correlation of averaged stack model with group data
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jects and the fact that, according to the model, we expect differences between
individuals to contribute to the overall variance. Also, some stochastic variance
would be expected due to the random component of the control strategy.
The overall conclusion from the two previous analyses is that the (averaged)
stack model gives a very promising degree of fit to the data from the five best
subjects. It seems that the binary sampling model would need'to be significantly
modified to account for the data from these subjects. Nevertheless it will be re¬
tained as a useful yardstick in subsequent analysis. Also, the possibility that
some individuals might be using a binary sampling strategy should not be ruled
out at this stage. This brings us on to the question of why the averaged stack
model provides such a good fit. It could be that the assumptions behind it are
correct and that the five individuals are each using a rule stack and that the
sample of stacks is reasonably spread across the eight possibilities. This possi¬
bility is explored below. On the other hand, it could be that the averaged stack
model is successful for different (unanticipated) reasons and that the averaged
profile would turn out to be accurate at the individual as well as the group level.
5.2.3 Microanalysis by Individual
It ought to be possible to account for more of the group variance in the previ¬
ous analysis if it could be discovered which five rule stacks were being employed,
rather than averaging the projections from all eight stacks. The next step, there¬
fore, is to attempt to assign rule stacks to individual subjects. If the model is
correct it should be possible, in principle, to obtain a much closer fit at the
individual level. However, the problem is that there is also much less data at
the individual level. At the group level there are 50 trials for each triad and so
random components of the decision process would tend to average out. At the
systematic relationship between variables) to —1 (maximum negative correlation). Cor¬
relation and its relationship with variance are described in standard statistics references.
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individual level there are only ten trials per triad so random effects can have a
severe effect of the distribution of choices between the critical a, (3 items.
For this reason, it was decided to take the same approach as for the group
data, and summarise each subject's choices to a five point profile. Each could
then be compared with the eight projected summaries shown in table 5-3 to find
the best match. In each case the best match ought to fit better than the averaged
stack model. The results are shown in tables 5-9 to 5-13 and are commented
individually.
Overall, the analyses provide strong supportive evidence for the stack model.
It may be concluded that the stack model is an essentially correct description
of five subjects' decision procedures in the early testing phase, although some
of the simplifying assumptions may be incorrect in detail. In particular, the
assumption about individual's rule stacks being invariant may be incorrect for
at least one subject, namely Blue.
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A B C D E E p(Observed)
Bill 0 8 20 17 55 100 —
Stack 4. 0 10 15 15 60 100 —
[0-E)»
E
— 0.40 1.67 0.60 0.42 ■rHCOIINX p > 0.3
A.S.P 0 11 16 24 49 100 —
(■O-EY
E
— 0.82 1.00 2.04 0.51 x2 = 4.4 p > 0.2
B.S.M. 0 15 22 23 40 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 3.27 0.18 1.57 5.63 X2 = 10.7 p < 0.02
This and the following four tables have the same structure as table 5-5. The
abbreviations are for the .Average Stack Profile and the Sinary Sampling
Model.
Comment: Although this subjects data fits the averaged stack model well,
stack 4. provides an even better fit. The subject does not appear to be




A B C D E E p(Observed)
Blue 0 6 14 25 55 100 —
Stack 3. 0 10 10 20 60 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 1.60 1.60 1.25 0.42 x2 = 4.9 p > 0.1
A.S.P 0 11 16 24 49 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 2.27 0.25 0.04 0.73 X2 = 3.3 p > 0.3
B.S.M. 0 15 22 23 40 100 —
(O-E)3
E
— 5.40 2.91 0.17 5.63 X2 = 14.1 p < 0.01
Comment: None of the eight stacks fit better than the averaged stack
model for this subject. Nevertheless, stack 3 cannot be rejected as a model
of the data (p > 0.1). The binary sampling model can be rejected. That the
averaged stack profile fits so well, suggests that the subject is using a stack
of rules which is changing over the course of the test or that the subject is
using something other than a naive control strategy. Either solution breaks
some assumptions of the stack model.
Table 5—10: Blue
A B C D E E p[Observed)
Bump 1 4 8 34 53 100 —
Stack 2. 0 5 5 30 60 100 —
(O-E)3
E
— 0.20 1.80 0.53 1.07 x2 = 3.6 p > 0.3
A.S.P 0 11 16 24 49 100 —
(O-E)3
E
— 4.45 4.00 4.17 0.33 X2 = 12.9 p < 0.01
B.S.M. 0 15 22 23 40 100 —
(O-E)3
E
— 8.07 8.91 5.26 0.23 x2 = 22.5 p < 0.001
Comment: This subject performs exceedingly well on the triads and the
perfect transitive profile (stack 1) fits the data well. However, the stack 2
profile provides an even better characterisation. Both the other models, and
the remaining stacks, can be rejected. This is strong supportive evidence
for the stack model account.
Table 5—11: Bump
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A B C D E E p(Observed)
Brown 0 11 24 29 36 100 —
Stack 7. 0 15 25 25 35 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 1.07 0.04 0.64 0.03 X II I—4 00 p > 0.5
A.S.P 0 11 16 24 49 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 0 4.00 1.04 3.45 X
to
II 00 01 p < 0.05
B.S.M. 0 15 22 23 40 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 1.07 0.18 1.57 0.40 x2 = 3.2 p > 0.3
Comment: Unlike Bump, this subject performs poorly on the triads and
stack 7 (the second worst) gives a very good fit to the data (p > 0.5).
The binary sampling model also gives a (less) good fit in this case but the
averaged stack profile can be rejected. This analysis provides important
supportive evidence for the stack model account because it shows that the
improved accuracy of a single stack over other models is not limited to
subjects with a strong transitive bias on the triads.
Table 5—12: Brown
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A B C D E E p(Observed)
Roger 0 17 6 26 51 100 —
Stack 5. 0 15 15 25 45 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 0.27 5.40 0.04 0.03 x2 = 6.5 0.05 < p < 0.1
A.S.P 0 11 16 24 49 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 3.27 6.25 0.04 0.08 X2 = 9.7 p < 0.05
B.S.M. 0 15 22 23 40 100 —
(O-E)2
E
— 0.27 11.6 0.39 3.01 X2 = 15.3 p < 0.01
Comment: In one respect, the data from this subject runs counter to all
the models (and to the data from the other subjects) in that there appear
to be significantly more choices to B than to C. Although none of the
models actually rules out such an outcome, the averaged stack profile and
the binary sampling model are sufficiently deviant to be rejected. The
best fitting stack is No. 5 which is not conclusively supported or rejected
by the data. Overall, the data form this subject supports (albeit weakly)
the stack account. It is a reasonable hypothesis that there was a chance
perturbation in the data which a greater number of trials would have ironed
out. However, it may be the case that one or more of our assumptions are
wrong, as was suggested for Blue.
Table 5—13: Roger
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5.2.4 Microanalysis by Individual and by Triad
Following the same methodology as for the group data, the next step is to break
down the projections for individuals into individual triads. Tables 5-14 to 5-18
show the stacks selected for each subject (above) with the projected and obtained
distributions for each triad. Only choices to the a and (3 items are shown. The
number of 7 choices can be obtained by subtracting the a and (3 choices away
from 10 (the total number of trials for each triad). In the case of the stack
projections, this is always zero, but a scattering of choices do go to 7 items for




1) present[E) => select(E)
2) present(A) => avoid(A)
3) present(B) avoid{B)
4) present(D) select(D)
Triad Stk 4. Fit Bill
1 /3 a (3 a V (3 a
ABC 5 5 X 1 9
BCD 5 5 V 6 4
BDE 0 10 y/ 0 10
CDE 0 10 y/ 1 9
BCE 0 10 V 1 9
ABD 5 5 V 5 5
ACD 5 5 V 3 7
ADE 0 10 V 0 10
ABE 0 10 V 2 8
ACE 0 10 V 1 9
Totals 20 80 9 20 80
Comment: Good overall fit except for the triad ABC (p » 0.01).
Table 5—14: Triads: Bill
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Stack 3.
1) present(E) =>■ select(E)
2) present(A) =>■ avoid(A)
3) present(D) =>• select(D)
4) present(C) =>■ select(C)
Triad Stk 3. Fit Blue
1 P « 0 a V P a
ABC 5 5 X 2 8
BCD 0 10 ? 3 7
BDE 0 10 V 1 9
CDE 0 10 V 0 10
BCE 0 10 V 0 10
ABD 5 5 V 4 6
ACD 5 5 X 1 9
ADE 0 10 V 2 8
ABE 0 10 V 0 10
ACE 0 10 V 2 8
Totals 15 85 7 15 85
Comment: Poor overall fit (p « 0.17) especially for the triad BCD, which
is worse than expected, and the triad ACD which is better than expected.
Table 5—15: Triads: Blue
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Stack 2.
1) present(E) => select(E)
2) present(D) =£- select(D)
3) present(A) => avoid(A)
4) present(C) =>■ select(C)
Triad Stk 2. Fit Bump
1 P OL (3 a xV (3 a
ABC 5 5 V 3 7
BCD 0 10 y/ 0 10
BDE 0 10 V 2 8
CDE 0 10 V 2 8
BCE 0 10 V 0 10
ABD 0 10 V 0 10
ACD 0 10 V 0 10
ADE 0 10 V 0 9
ABE 0 10 V 0 9
ACE 0 10 V 1 9
Totals 5 95 10 8 90
Comment: Highly significant overall fit (p « 0.001) Performance is slightly
worse than expected on triads BDE and CDE. The performance on ABC
is better than expected but still within chance levels.
Table 5—16: Triads: Bump
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Stack 7. Stack 8.
1) present(A) =>• avoid(A) 1) present(A) =>• avoid(A)
2) present(B) =>■ avoid[B) 2) present[B) => avoid(B)
3) present(E) => select(E) 3) present(C) => avoid{C)
4) present(D) =>• select(D) 4) present(E) => select(E)
Triad Stk 7. Fit Brown
7 0 a P a X\/ P a
ABC 5 5 V 4 6
BCD 5 5 v/ 3 6
BDE 5 5 V 5 5
CDE 0 10 X 5 4
BCE 5 5 v/ 5 5
ABD 5 5 v/ 4 6
ACD 5 5 >/ 5 5
ADE 5 5 X 2 8
ABE 5 5 X 2 8
ACE 5 5 V 4 6
Totals 45 55 7 39 59
Comment: Stack 7 narrowly misses achieving a 5% significance level. The
main problem is with the triad CDE, which is worse than expected. Stack
8, which projects a 0, 5, 5 distribution to all triads would have provided
a significant fit. Another mismatch is that the triads ADE and ABE are
more biased than expected. Looking at the overall proportions obtained
(39/59%), it seems that the hypothesis that the distribution is 50/50% on
random triads is probably incorrect. This might be explained if the subject
were using something better than a naive control strategy.
Table 5—17: Triads: Brown
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Stack 5. Stack 3.
1) present(A) =>■ avoid{A) 1) present(E) =>• select(E)
2) present(E) =>■ select(E) 2) present(A) =>■ avoid(A)
3) present(B) => avoid(B) 3) present(D) =>• select(D)
4) present(D) =>■ select(D) 4) present(C) =$■ select(C)
Triad Stk 5. Fit Roger Stk 3 Fit
7 j3 a P a xV (3 a P a x\/
ABC 5 5 X 9 1 5 5 X
BCD 5 5 X 1 8 0 10 V
BDE 0 10 V 2 8 0 10 V
CDE 0 10 V 1 9 0 10 V
BCE 0 10 V 0 9 0 10 V
ABD 5 5 V 4 6 5 5 V
ACD 5 5 ? 2 8 5 5 ?
ADE 5 5 X 1 9 0 10 V
ABE 5 5 ? 2 8 0 10 V
ACE 5 5 ? 2 8 0 10 V
Totals 30 70 4 24 74 15 85 8
Comment: The stack 5 projection does not give a good fit to the individual
triads. In particular, the peculiar distribution of choices to the triad ABC
is not predicted by any version of the model. Extra choices also went to B
on the triads BCD and BCE suggesting that the subject had some kind
of bias in favour of this item. This suggests that the selection of stack 5
was an anomaly. If the apparent bias towards B is compensated for, then
the best fitting stack is number 3, as shown on the right, which would have
achieved a 1% significance level.
Table 5—18: Triads: Roger
128
Even a cursory comparison of expected and obtained numbers of choices
shows that the stack model is not literally correct. There are only two kinds
of distributions projected, those where 100% of choices are expected to go to
the a item (alpha triads), and those where a random (50/50) distribution is
expected between /? and 7 items (random triads). Consider first the alpha
triads. Overall, 10.8% of the available choices on such trials are diverted to
/? and 7 items. This seems too high a percentage to be simply attributed to
noise. Furthermore, it can be broken down into 9.6% diverted to the (3 item and
only 1.2% to 7. If these a choices were being lost because of some completely
random noise element we would expect them to be diverted equally between the
remaining alternatives. Instead (in terms of the model) it is as though subjects
occasionally fail to identify the shallowest applicable rule in the stack and go on
to select the second best choice. Another possibility is that the rule order itself
is not rigid but is subject to some variation (see section 4.6.1).
These possible modifications to the stack model suggested above would also
help explain the unexpectedly high degree of fit obtained with the averaged stack
model; if the rule order is not rigid then one stack may temporarily appear like
another. However, before constructing a more complex model it is still worth
assessing how good the simple stack model is as an approximation to the decision
mechanism, even though it is wrong in detail. The basic problem is to see if the
data reflects the categorisation of triads as either alpha or random. In order to
do this we need an independent criterion for classifying the choice data.
We will, therefore, consider the data to be an adequate fit to the projection on
alpha triads if 80% or more of the choices go to the a item (8/10). This threshold
is low enough to catch the alpha triads and (just) high enough to exclude most
random triads. According to probability theory, there is only a 5.5% (p < 0.055)
chance that eight or more of the ten choices would go to the a item (given the null
hypothesis that the probability is 0.5 on each trial). Unfortunately, this gives
us a 5% chance of misclassifying a random triad as an alpha triad. The chance
of misclassifying an alpha triad as a random one is unknown, but is hopefully
no higher. Triads will be classified as random if the split of choices between a
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and (3 items is no more skewed than 30/70% in either direction. 89% of random
triads should have a distribution in this range (3 < a < 7), according to the null
hypothesis. Each of the tables (5-14 to 5-18) includes a column of ticks and
crosses. A tick indicates a correspondence between the projection and the data
according to the above classification. A question mark indicates a narrow miss
(8/10 for a random triad and 7/10 for an alpha triad. The number of ticks is
summed at the bottom, thus giving an overall measure of fit.
Taking into account the above assumptions and the inherent problem of mis-
classification, a score of 8/10 or more should be expected, for an individual, if
the stack model is a good approximation and the particular stack selected is
appropriate. To see why this is the case, suppose we take a null hypothesis that
both the monkey data and the projection consist of a random mix of alpha and
random triad types (ignoring the possibility of triads biased heavily towards the
/? item). This is a good null hypothesis as it is compatible with the overall ob¬
served distribution. It leads to a 0, 25, 75% distribution, as does the averaged
stack model. According to the hypothesis, the chance of getting the projection
correct for any particular triad is 50%. Thus a score of 5/10 would mean that the
fit was no better than chance level. The probability of getting 8/10 (or better)
correct is about 5%, the probability of 9+/10 is about 1% and the probability
of getting 10/10 correct is about 0.1% (probabilities from binomial distribution,
N=10). A score of 7/10 may mean that the stack has some predictive value but
there is not enough data to reject the null hypothesis for that individual.
Conclusions
Overall, the combined score for the five subjects is 37/50 for the original five
stacks (selected in section 5.2.3). With this combined score the null hypothesis
can be confidently rejected at the 0.1% significance level (p < 0.001 using a
normal approximation to the binomial curve, N=50). This means that the stack
model has some value as an approximation to the data for individuals — above
and beyond predicting the correct overall choice proportions to the 7, /3 and a
items (0, 25, 75%).
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The fit is not significant for every individual, however. Two subjects, Bill
and Bump (with scores of 9 and 10, respectively), unambiguously pass the 8/10
criterion. Brown narrowly misses (see commentary in table 5-17), and would
have passed with stack 8, which differs from the selected stack, 7, on one triad. It
seems that the selection of stack 5 for Roger was a mistake due to an unexpected
bias towards the item B which distorted the summarised choice profile (table 5-
13). Stack 5 was not conclusively accepted previously (table 5-13) and stack 3
gives a much better fit at the local level. There is no stack which gives a better
fit for Blue on the other hand, and it may be that this subject is doing something
different from the others. This fits in with the previous finding (table 5-10) that
no individual stack could be found which fitted better than the averaged stack
model.
The overall score is 42/50 with the post hoc replacement stacks for Brown
and Roger. The significance of this is that five stacks can be matched up to
individuals such that 84% of triads can be correctly classified as belonging to
one of two categories:
alpha triads in which 80% or more of the choices go to the a item.
random triads in which choices are split between the alpha and j3 items in a
ratio not exceeding 70/30%.
This 84% is almost as high a percentage as could maximally be expected, given
that about 5% of random would be misclassified as alpha and that some misclas-
sification in the other direction is also possible.
Given the partial success of this classification system, under the final assign¬
ment of rule stacks, it makes sense to reassess the assumptions behind the naive
control strategy. If we combine the data from all the triads projected as random
and alpha separately, we can assess whether they are significantly different in the
actual data. This is shown in table 5-19. It can be seen that the relative pro¬
portions of choices to /? and a items are 39/61% and differ significantly from the
expected 50/50% distribution. Thus it may be the case that the semi-iterative
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control strategy (see previous chapter) is more appropriate. For example, If
there was approximately a 20% chance of the control strategy iterating then this
would give a 40/60% distribution on the random triads.
P a No. Triads
Random 3.9 6.1 21
Alpha 1.1 8.9 29
Significantly more than half the available choices go to the a item in both
types of triad (binomial test p < 0.001). However, significantly more choices
go to the a item in alpha triads than in random triads (t test for independent
samples).
Table 5—19: Mean distributions for random and alpha type triads.
5.2.5 Summary
1. Theoretical choice distributions were generated for the eight significantly
>
different rule stacks assuming a naive control strategy. These were then
summarised in various ways for ease of comparison with the early triadic
choice data. In particular, the average profile of all eight stacks was gen¬
erated for comparison with the group data.
2. The fit of the averaged stack model profile was compared with the averaged
data for five subjects and was found to fit very well.
3. Rule stacks were selected for individual subjects by finding the best match
from eight projected profiles to five point summaries of each subject's tri¬
adic choice data. The degree of fit obtained varied but was better than
the fit to the binary sampling model and the perfect transitive profile in
all cases. In all but one case, a better fit could be found with an individual
stack than for the averaged stack model. This supports the contention that
the success of the averaged stack model is due to the five individuals using
different rule stacks.
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4. The projected profiles from the five selected stacks were then tested for fit
against the individual data on a triad by triad basis. It was found that the
stack model failed to predict a significant diversion of choices away from
the a items to the /? items. It was suggested that the assumption of a rigid
rule order for each individual may be incorrect, in that there may be some
fluctuation.
5. The degree to which the individual stack projections successfully approxi¬
mated the subjects data was assessed. Overall, the stack model did signifi¬
cantly better than chance, although there appeared to be one or two errors
in the previous selection of stacks for individuals. In the final analysis, it
was found that four out of the five subjects could be assigned rule stacks
which gave a convincing degree of fit to their data. One subject (Blue)
appeared to differ from the others, and this may have been due to (a) the
rule order changing during the course of the test or (b) the subject using
a different control strategy.
6. The data from all the triads which were projected as random were combined
and it was found that approximately 60% (significantly more than half)
of the choices went to the a item. This suggests that the control strategy
was iterating on approximately 20% of trials.
The overall conclusion from the analysis presented thus far is that the the
stack model with a naive control strategy is useful as an approximation to mon¬
keys' decision procedures during the early triadic tests. The assignment of dif¬
ferent rule stacks to each individual has at least partial validity, although rule
order may not be as rigid as anticipated for some subjects.
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5.3 Study 2
Five of the subjects in the first study were retrained on the same series as they
had previously learned. These were Blue, Brown, Roger, White and Green.
White and Green were previously rejected from the analysis but all subjects were
fully transitive on the pairs after retraining. Blue, Brown and Roger are analysed
with respect to the stacks assigned to them in the previous analysis, on the
assumption that these would be retained. White and Green were assigned stacks
on the basis of a preliminary analysis of their binary reaction times, explained
below.
As all subjects had prior experience of triadic tests, it could not assumed
that subjects would be employing a naive control strategy. Also, there were two
phases of triadic tests in this study, middle and late, with better performance
in the more intensive late phase (figure 3-3). It was decided to see if the choice
patterns and improvement could be accounted for with the semi-iterative con¬
trol strategy, with different levels of iteration allowed for different subjects and
different phases. For each individual, and for each testing phase, the assumed
level of iteration will be calculated on the basis of the average bias to the a item
on the projected random triads.
For the subjects Blue, Brown and Roger, the data from the early phase
(study 1) is also incorporated into the analysis, to see if the semi-iterative control
strategy could better account for the choices in this phase too. However, any
improvement between the early and middle phases may be due to the retraining.
5.3.1 Construction of Tables
Tables 5-20, 5-21 and 5-23 have the same basic structure as the previous ones for
individual triads except that they show three separate sets of data, early, middle
and late. As before, only the choices to a and (3 items are shown as these add
up to nearly the total number of choices. The total row shows the percentages
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of choices to an item out of the total number of choices (in the corresponding
phase). The three 'model' columns show projections from the same stack with
differing levels of iteration. The level of iteration was determined as follows.
For each phase the average distribution on random triads was determined. Here,
random triads are those predicted to contain a random component in the decision
process because the shallowest applicable rule in the stack is an avoidance one.
A level of iteration is then chosen to produce the same average distribution in
the projected random triads.
For example, there are three random type triads projected for Blue from stack
3. The average distribution on these in the early phase is 0, 23, 77% to qr, /?
and a items respectively. According to the semi-iterative control strategy, this
would mean that 46% (23 + 23) of choices on these triads were split (on average)
equally between (3 and a items and that the remaining 54% (77 — 23) are made
correctly to the a item by the control iterating and applying a second rule. The
average expected distribution over ten trials is 2.3 to the (3 item and 7.7 to a.
The bottom row shows (where applicable) the choice distributions on the
remaining (alpha type) triads. If our previous analysis is correct, this gives an
indication of how 'rigidly' the rules are ordered. The more choices that 'leak'
to the j3 item on these triads, the less tenable the assumption of a fixed stack
order is and, also, the more difficult it is to distinguish alpha and random type
triads empirically. In the previous example, the proportions are 11% to f3 and
89% to a in the early phase, which is difficult to distinguish from the 23/77%
proportions on random triads. In contrast, the same ratios for Roger are 13/84%
and 50/50%, respectively, which are more likely to be distinguishable. The same
problem does not exist for Brown, as no alpha type triads are predicted.
5.3.2 Evaluation
Blue
The data for this subject are included for completeness and do not initially
appear very interesting at the level of individual triads (see commentary in ta-
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Stack 3.
1) present(E) =>• select(E)
2) present(A) =>■ avoid(A)
3) present(D) =£► select(D)
4) present[C) =>■ select(C)
Triad Early 54% Middle 67% Late 92%
<7 /? a P a P a P a P a P a P a
ABC 2 8 2.3 7.7 2 4 1 5 3 21 1 23
BCD 3 7 0 10 1 5 0 6 0 24 0 24
BDE 1 9 0 10 0 6 0 6 0 23 0 24
CDE 0 10 0 10 0 6 0 6 0 24 0 24
BCE 0 10 0 10 1 5 0 6 0 24 0 24
ABD 4 6 2.3 7.7 1 5 1 5 0 24 1 23
ACD 1 9 2.3 7.7 0 6 1 5 0 24 1 23
ADE 2 8 0 10 1 5 0 6 0 24 0 24
ABE 0 10 0 10 1 5 0 6 0 24 0 24
ACE 2 8 0 10 1 5 0 6 0 24 0 24
Total% 15 85 7 93 13 87 5 95 1 98 1 99
Random% 23 77 23 77 17 83 17 83 4 96 4 96
Alpha% 11 89 0 100 12 88 0 100 1 99 0 100
Comment: There is an improvement in performance for both random and
alpha type triads across the three phases. In each phase there is little
difference in the obtained proportions between the two types of triad so it
is very difficult to assess the fit of stack 3, especially for the middle late
phases. These data are therefore not incompatible with the stack model
but does not conclusively support it either.
Table 5—20: Three phases: Blue
136
ble 5-20). From the averaged distributions (bottom three rows) it can be seen
that increasing iteration in the control strategy can only account for part of the
total improvement. Random type triads show a greater improvement in perfor¬
mance than alpha ones but this may be simply because there is little room for
improvement on alpha triads (a ceiling effect).
Brown
Table 5-21 shows how the gradual improvement across the three phases can
be approximately modelled by simply changing the level of iteration. However,
a curious feature of this subject's performance is the apparent deterioration in
the level of choice to the a item on triad ADE from the early to later phases.
Furthermore, there is a distinct lack of improvement in the triads BDE and
CDE. The three 'odd' triads are distinguished by containing both D and E. The
most economical explanation is that, for some reason, this subject has dropped
the fourth rule (present{E) => select(E)) from the stack. Table 5-22 shows how
an even better fit to the data can be obtained with a three rule stack with 67%
iteration. The fit is only shown explicitly for the late phase where it is especially
striking. This is probably because there are a larger number of trials per triad
(24) and so choice distributions can be estimated more accurately.
This raises the question of why this subject might drop a rule which was
(presumably) essential in its binary performance. The fact is that, for any stack,
if there is no iteration in the employment of the stack (te a naive strategy is used)
then the fourth rule is never encountered. A possible explanation is therefore that
Brown, after doing a number of trials on the triadic tests, dropped the fourth
rule before discovering the need for iteration. It seems feasible that without
explicit feedback, the fourth rule would not be regained.
In conclusion, although a certain amount of post hoc 'tailoring' has been
involved in achieving this degree of fit, the resulting three rule model was thought
to be worth including at this point because of its simplicity and plausibility.
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Stack 8.
1) present(A) => avoid(A)
2) present(B) => avoid(B)
3) present[C) =>■ avoid(C)
4) present(E) =>■ select(E)
Triad Early 20% Middle 33% Late 46%
1 (3 a (3 a (3 a 13 a P a: (3 a P a
ABC 4 6 4 6 1 5 2 4 1 23 7 17
BCD 3 6 4 6 2 3 2 4 4 18 7 17
BDE 5 5 4 6 3 2 2 4 12 12 7 17
CDE 5 4 4 6 2 4 2 4 10 12 7 17
BCE 5 5 4 6 2 4 2 4 7 17 7 17
ABD 4 6 4 6 4 2 2 4 6 18 7 17
ACD 5 5 4 6 2 4 2 4 6 18 7 17
ADE 2 8 4 6 3 3 2 4 10 14 7 17
ABE 2 8 4 6 1 5 2 4 1 23 7 17
ACE 4 6 4 6 1 5 2 4 6 18 7 17
Total% 39 59 40 60 35 62 33 67 26 72 26 72
Comment: No alpha type triads are projected for this subject so all the
improvement across the three phases is accounted for by increasing iteration.
The overall fit is good but note the apparently random choice on triads
BDE, CDE and ADE in the late phase and, possibly, in earlier phases.
Table 5—21: Three phases: Brown
138
1) present(A) =>• avoid[A)
2) present(B) =>- avoid(B)
3) present(C) =>• auotd(C)
Triad Late 67%
7 /3 a P a P a
ABC 1 23 4 20
BCD 4 18 4 20
BDE 12 12 12 12
CDE 10 12 12 12
BCE 7 17 4 20
ABD 6 18 4 20
ACD 6 18 4 20
ADE 10 14 12 12
ABE 1 23 4 20
ACE 6 18 4 20
Total% 26 72 27 71
Comment: The correspondence between the projected and obtained pro¬
files is very close (cf. table 5-21). The 4/20 distribution, projected for most
triads, is made up of 8 choices split randomly between /? and a items with
the remaining 16 going exclusively to a. All the obtained distributions are
well within expected chance deviations away from this projection.
Table 5—22: Modelling Brown's late phase with a three rule stack
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5.3.3 Roger
Table 5-23 shows that the stack model accounts for Roger's data extremely well,
with a good fit being obtained on all phases. The previous conclusion about
the early phase, that the choice distribution on the triad ABC must be some
kind of artifact, appears to be vindicated by the consistency in the later phases.
The only way in which the data differs significantly from the projections is in
that some of the observed improvement is due to better performance on alpha
type triads. However, over half the overall improvement can be accounted for by
the combined improvement of the three random triads (this proportion is based
on the increases in the number of choices to the a item from the early to the
middle phase). As with Blue, this is not too surprising, as there is more room
for improvement on random triads.
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Stack 3.
1) present(E) =>■ select(E)
2) present(A) =>• avoid(A)
3) present(D) => select(D)
4) present(C) =>■ select[C)
Triad Early 0% Middle 44% Late 44%
7 (3 a (3 a P a (3 a P a (3 a P a
ABC 9 1 5 5 2 4 1.7 4.3 5 19 7 17
BCD 1 8 0 10 2 3 0 6 3 16 0 24
BDE 2 8 0 10 0 6 0 6 0 20 0 24
CDE 1 9 0 10 0 6 0 6 3 21 0 24
BCE 0 9 0 10 0 6 0 6 1 22 0 24
ABD 4 6 5 5 1 5 1.7 4.3 9 15 7 17
ACD 2 8 • 5 5 2 4 1.7 4.3 6 18 7 17
ADE 1 9 0 10 0 6 0 6 0 24 0 24
ABE 2 8 0 10 0 6 0 6 0 24 0 24
ACE 2 8 0 10 0 6 0 6 0 24 0 24
Total% 24 74 7 93 12 87 9 91 11 85 9 91
Random% 50 50 50 50 28 72 28 72 28 72 28 72
Alpha% 13 84 0 100 5 93 0 100 4 90 0 100
Comment:the inter-triadic variation on all three phases is modelled con¬
vincingly by stack 3, with iteration increasing from 0% (a naive control
strategy) to 44% in the middle phase. It seems that performance does not
improve at all after the middle phase.
Table 5—23: Three phases: Roger
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White and Green
These subjects were excluded from the analysis of the early phase because
of their erratic performance, particularly Green's. Whilst their performance
improved after retraining, single stacks could not be unambiguously assigned
by the previous method of using a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test. During the
late phase, on the other hand, their performances were too good for our method
of selecting stacks to be readily applicable. It was therefore decided to defer
analysis of these subjects choice data until some other method of assigning a
stack had been developed. This turned out to be an preliminary analysis of
the binary reaction time data, a more rigorous version of which is described in
the next section. The mean RTs for each pair were plotted in order to see (by
visual inspection) how the RTs for different pairs appeared to group together. It
appeared that, for both subjects, a plot according to stack 4 produced the best
chunking of RTs and the most linear relationship between depth of rule and RT.
A linear regression (on the mean RTs for each pair) confirmed the existence of
a strong linear component in the relationship between RT and depth.
Tables 5-24 and 5-25 therefore show choice data from the middle and late
phases for these subjects, analysed in the same way as for the other subjects.
Stack 4 fits the data for the late phases of both subjects well (and better than
other stacks). Green appears to be behaving erratically during the middle phase
and this may be a hangover from the first study. This was the only subject which
originally failed to be transitive on the crucial BD pair and showed a reverse
bias on the pair BE.
Overall conclusions
Overall, these results support the stack model. The idea that subjects start
with a naive control strategy and then begin to increase iteration (semi-iterative
control) with experience, appears to account for many features of the data. The
analysis of the transitions across three testing phases gives further support to
the categorisation of triads into random and alpha types. The main way in which
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Stack 4.
1) present(E) =>■ select(E)
2) present(A) =>■ avoid(A)
3) present(B) =>■ avoid(B)
4) present(D) =>• select(D)
Triad Middle 50%
7 (3 a (3 a 0 a
ABC 1 5 1.5 4.5
BCD 2 4 1.5 4.5
BDE 1 5 0 6
CDE 0 6 0 6
BCE 0 6 0 6
ABD 2 4 1.5" 4.5
ACD 1 5 1.5 4.5
ADE 0 6 0 6
ABE 0 6 0 6
ACE 2 4 0 6
Total% 15 85 10 90
Random% 25 75 25 75
Alpha% 8 92 0 100
Late 50%
(3 a 0 a
2 22 6 18
8 16 6 18
1 23 0 24
3 21 0 24
1 23 0 24
9 15 6 18
4 20 6 18
0 24 0 24
1 23 0 24
0 24 0 24
12 88 10 90
24 76 25 75
4 96 0 100
Comment: The data are consistent with the use of stack 4 with 50%
iteration for both middle and late phases. The subject does not appear
to improve performance significantly between the phases on either type of
triad.












7 0 a (3 a 0 a
ABC 3 2 1.9 4.1
BCD 0 5 1.9 4.1
BDE 3 3 0 6
CDE 2 4 0 6
BCE 1 5 0 6
ABD 3 3 1.9 4.1
ACD 1 4 1.9 4.1
ADE 1 5 0 6
ABE 3 3 0 6
ACE 0 6 0 6
Total% 32 67 13 87
Random% 29 63 32 68
Alpha% 28 72 0 100
Late 50%
(3 a f3 a
5 15 6 18
5 17 6 18
1 21 0 24
1 23 0 24
0 24 0 24
9 15 6 18
2 22 6 18
0 24 0 24
1 23 0 24
0 24 0 24
10 87 10 90
22 72 25 75
2 97 0 100
Comment: There is not much evidence here that this subject is employing
stack 4 in the middle phase — the data appear very erratic and there is no
appreciable difference between random and alpha types of triad. However,
the performance during the late phase is much more regular and, with the
possible exception of ACD, the data fit the stack model well.
Table 5—25: Two phases: Green
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the model breaks down (and which was already recognised to be a problem from
the analysis of the early phase) is that part of the reason for poor performance
on alpha triads is an apparent loss of choices from a to /? items. For Blue and
Roger, the observed improvement in performance is partially due to a reduction
of this loss. This aspect of the improvement could potentially be accounted for
by a model in which subject's stacks became more rigidly ordered with usage,
starting out with some kind of 'noisy' or 'dynamic' ordering as suggested in
section 4.6.1.
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5.4 Study 2: Analysis of Binary RTs
The subsequent analysis is based on binary tests given just prior to the middle
and late triadic tests, and includes the five subjects analysed above. The data
consists of the last 100 observations for each subject (10 per pair). There is also
an extra subject, Bump, for which RTs were taken a year after the early phase
as part of a pilot study. The data from this subject are something of a bonus,
and they are not subjected to the same in-depth analysis as for the other five
subjects.
The procedure adopted was to plot the RTs against 'depth of rule', in order
to test the grouping and linearity predictions described in the previous chapter
(section 4.5.1). Both predictions rely on the assignment of a particular rule stack
to a subject.
• Grouping — pairs which are effectively decided by the same rule are
grouped together. There are thus four groups, one for each depth of rule
(the last contains only one pair). The hypothesis is that this chunking is
meaningful in terms of the RT distribution. This will be tested by compar¬
ing the four-group chunking of the observations with a ten-group chunk¬
ing, where each group consists of the observations for a single pair. If the
ten-group chunking accounts for significantly more of the variance than
the four-group chunking then the latter is inappropriate. Similarly, the
chunking suggested by the ordinal distance effect can also be evaluated.
Here, the four groups consist of the four ordinal separations possible in
the five-term series. For each individual, the chunking according to depth
should be better (account for more variance) than the chunking according
to separation.
• Linearity — if the grouping by depth turns out to be valid, then the next
question is whether RT increases linearly with depth. This is to be expected
if the rules are applied in a strict temporal sequence down the stack. If some
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other control structure is used (perhaps a more parallel one) then there
may may be some kind of non-linear, or even non-monotonic, relationship
between depth and RT. The linearity hypothesis will be tested by seeing
if the four-group chunking (above) accounts for significantly more of the
variance than a linear regression on the same data. A similar analysis can
be carried out for the ordinal distance effect with the chunking according
to separation.
A comprehensive analysis of variance was thus carried out for five subjects,
with each subject's data organised according to the rule stack selected on the
basis of the choice data (previous section) and, in the case of White and Green, a
preliminary analysis of RTs3. Each analysis consists of five parts, each involving
all 100 observations:
1. A one way analysis of variance with ten groups corresponding to the ten
pairs. This provides the base-line against which other models are com¬
pared. The ten way grouping can itself be regarded as a model — one
in which the mean RTs for pairs can have an arbitrary relationship with
each other. It is the most powerful model (from the point of view of fitting
data), but is the least concise description.
2. A one way analysis of variance with four groups corresponding to the four
depths.
3. A linear regression on the RTs, with the independent variable taking four
values (1,2,3 & 4) corresponding to the four depths.
4. A one way analysis of variance with four groups corresponding to the four
ordinal separations.
3The preliminary choice of stacks for White and Green was corroborated by the
choice data analysis, so it is not thought that this departure from the main sequence of
analyses affects the logic of the argument or validity of the statistical tests described in
this section.
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5. A linear regression on the RTs, with the independent variable taking four
values (1,2,3 & 4) corresponding to the four ordinal separations.
The results of these analyses are organsised into two sets of tables4 (5-26 to
5-30). One set contains analyses for the stack model and the other set is for
the ordinal separation model. Each table has the same structure, and is based
on four sums of squares (S.S., the measure of variance). These sums of squares
were obtained from three types of computer analyses5, a regression, a one-way
with four groups and a one-way with ten groups. Note that these computer
analyses were simply used to calculate the sums of squares needed for the analysis
of variance tables, and were not directly used to compute significance levels
themselves. As the ten group analysis us used as the baseline for interpreting
the other measures (as described above), the residual sums of squares (error)
from it are employed. The residuals from the regression and the four group
analysis are not needed. Thus the four SSs employed in each anova table are as
follows:
1. The sums of squares from the regression (Reg). This appears at the left of
first main row.
2. The sums of square from the four-group anova (Four). This appears sepa¬
rately at the top of each table.
3. The sums of square from the ten pair anova (Ten). This also appears at
the top of each table.
4. The residual sums of squares (error) from the ten pair anova (Residual).
This is used as the denominator for computing all the F ratios, and appears
at the left of the bottom row.
Acknowledgement — this form of analysis was suggested to me by Francis Provan,
consultant statistician for Edinburgh University Computing Services.
5British Medical Diagnostics Packages P1R and P1V.
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The actual values used in the statistical tests are as follows:
1. The sums of squares from the regression (above). If this is large then there
is a linear trend to the data (RT increases with depth/ordinal separation).
If it is low, then there is no evidence of a correlation.
2. The difference between the sums of squares from the four-group anova
and the regression (Four - Reg). This gives the variance accounted for
by the four group model which is not accounted for by the regression.
If this quantity is not significantly large then the linear model adequately
describes the relationship between the four groups. If it is large, then there
are deviations from the linear.
3. The difference between the sums of squares from the ten pair anova and the
four group anova (Ten - Four). This gives the size of variance accounted
for by the ten group chunking which is not accounted for by the four group
model. If this quantity is not significantly large then the chunking into
four groups is valid.
The actual tests of significance are carried out by computing the mean squares
(dividing by the number of degrees of freedom) and the F ratio (dividing by the
residual mean squares). The F ratios are then looked up in standard statistical
tables which give the threshold values necessary for significance at the 5% and
1% levels (high values are significant). The 5% threshold values are given in the
'significance' column in the tables in parenthesese. F ratios not reaching this
5% threshold are deemed to be non-significant (N.S.).
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WHITE: STACK 4
Four-group: SS = 2030822 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 2970759 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 2210236 1 2210236 18.38 p < 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 5046 2 2523 0.02 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 755477 6 12593 1.05 N.S. (2.2)
Residual 10825593 90 20284 — —
Interpretation — the ten-way grouping by pair is not significantly better than the four-
way grouping by depth which, in turn, is not significantly better than the regression.
The linear trend is highly significant with a huge F ratio, whilst the other F ratios are
extremely low. Stack 4 and the depth effect provides a very good characterisation of
this data. CF similar outcome for Brown.
WHITE: ORDINAL DISTANCE
Four-group: SS = 2030822 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 2970759 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 1994850 1 1994850 16.58 p 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 33927 2 17986 0.15 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 939937 6 156656 1.30 N.S. (2.2)
Residual 10825593 90 20284 — —
Interpretation — The pattern is much the same as above with a slightly lower (but
still highly significant) F ratio for the linear regression and slightly higher (but non¬
significant) values for the others. The ordinal distance effect is also a very good charac¬
terisation of this data. CF similar outcome for Brown.
Table 5—26: Analysis of RT variance for White
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BROWN: STACK 8
Four-group: SS = 618696 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 1112860 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 581235 1 581235 7.57 p < 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 37461 2 18731 0.24 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 494164 6 82361 1.07 N.S. (2.2)
Residual 6911256 90 76792 — —
Interpretation — the ten-way grouping by pair is not significantly better than the four-
way grouping by depth which, in turn, is not significantly better than the regression.
The linear trend is significant at the 1% level, whilst the other tests are far from reaching
5% significance. Stack 8 and the depth effect provides a very good characterisation of
this data. CF similar outcome for White.
BROWN: ORDINAL DISTANCE .
Four-group: SS = 553539 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 1112860 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 471289 1 471289 6.14 p < 0.05 (3.9)
Four - Reg 82250 2 41125 0.54 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 559321 6 93220 1.21 N.S. (2.2) ■
Residual 6911256 90 76792 — —
Interpretation — The pattern is much the same as above but with a less significantly
linear trend. The ordinal distance effect is also a reasonable characterisation of this
data. CF similar outcome for White.
Table 5—27: Analysis of RT variance for Brown
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BLUE: STACK 3
Four-group: SS = 5080804 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 8033850 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 642089 1 642089 2.30 N.S. (3.9)
Four - Reg 4438715 2 2219357 7.94 p < 0.01 (3.1)
Ten - Four 2953046 6 492174 1.76 N.S. (2.2)
Residual 25160580 90 279562 — —
Interpretation — the ten-way grouping by pair is not significantly better than the four-
way grouping by depth, but the regression is not significant. Depth in stack 3 provides
a reasonable chunking but RT does not increase linearly with depth.
BLUE: ORDINAL DISTANCE
Four-group: SS = 1766300 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 8033850 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 8682164 1 8682164 6.02 p < 0.05 (3.9)
Four - Reg 84136 2 42068 0.15 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 6267550 6 1044592 3.74 p < 0.01 (2.2)
Residual 25160580 90 279562 — —
Interpretation — The grouping by ordinal separation does not account for significantly
more variance than the full regression, which is significant at the 5% level. However,
the ten-way grouping by pair is significantly better than either of these. So, although
there does appear to be a linear trend, the chunking by ordinal separation is not the
best, leaving much variance unaccounted for. CF corresponding analysis for Green and
Roger.
Table 5—28: Analysis of RT variance for Blue
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GREEN: STACK 4
Four-group: SS = 8604915 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 10129527 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 3555046 1 3555046 15.03 p <C 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 5049869 2 2524935 10.68 p < 0.01 (3.1)
Ten - Four 1524612 6 254102 1.07 N.S. (2.2)
Residual 21285837 90 236509 — —
Interpretation — the ten-way grouping by pair is not significantly better than the group¬
ing by depth. Although there is a highly significant linear trend, the four-way chunking
is still significantly better. Depth in stack 4 provides a very good chunking but there
are significant deviations from the linear trend. CF corresponding analysis for Roger.
GREEN: ORDINAL DISTANCE
Four-group: SS = 284441 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 10129527 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 2189533 1 2189533 9.26 p < 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 94908 2 47454 0.20 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 7845086 6 1307514 5.35 p < 0-.01 (2.2)
Residual 21285837 90 236509 — —
Interpretation — The chunking by ordinal separation does not account for significantly
more variance than the regression, which is significant at the 1% level. However, the ten-
way grouping by pair is significantly better than either of these. So, although there does
appear to be a linear trend, the chunking by ordinal separation leaves much variance
unaccounted for. CF corresponding analysis for Blue and Roger.
Table 5—29: Analysis of RT variance for Green
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ROGER: STACK 3
Four-group: SS = 13577994 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 15212727 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 8705905 1 8705905 38.50 p <C 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 4872089 2 2436044 10.77 p < 0.01 (3.1)
Ten - Four 1634733 6 272456 1.20 N.S. (2.2)
Residual 20351700 90 226130 — -—
Interpretation— the ten-way grouping by pair is not significantly better than the group¬
ing by depth. Although there is a highly significant linear trend (the highest F ratio
found out of all the analyses) the four-way chunking is still significantly better. Depth
in stack 3 provides a very good chunking but there are significant deviations from the
linear trend.
ROGER: ORDINAL DISTANCE
Four-group: SS = 4152520 (3 df) Ten-group: SS = 15212727 (9 df)
Source Sums of Sqs df Mean Sqs F ratio Significance
Regression 3545715 1 3545715 15.68 p < 0.01 (3.9)
Four - Reg 606805 2 303403 1.34 N.S. (3.1)
Ten - Four 11060207 6 1843368 8.15 p < 0.01 (2.2)
Residual 20351700 90 226130 — —
Interpretation— The analysis shows a similar pattern as the corresponding one for Blue.
The chunking by ordinal separation does not account for significantly more variance than
the full regression, which is highly significant. However, the ten-way grouping by pair is
highly significantly better than either of these. So, although there does appear to be a
linear trend, the chunking by ordinal separation leaves much variance unaccounted for.
CF corresponding analysis for Blue and Green.
Table 5—30: Analysis of RT variance for Roger
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5.4.1 Summary and Conclusions
Only two subjects, White and Brown (stacks 4 and 8), appear to provide un¬
ambiguous support for the stack model. For both these subjects there appear
to be linear depth effects which account for more variance than the ordinal dis¬
tance model (which is a descriptive, not a computational model). For the three
other subjects, the grouping hypothesis appears to be correct but there is not
a straightforward linear relationship between the RTs for the four depths. For
one subject, Blue, there appears to be no linear trend at all, whilst Green and
Roger appear to show zig-zag like deviations from the trend. The ordinal dis¬
tance model also fares badly with respect to Blue, Green and Roger. Although
there is a significant linear trend in each case, it appears that the data do not
chunk naturally into the four ordinal separations. Where ordinal distance is a
good description (for White and Brown), the depth effect provides an as-good
or better characterisation.
The reaction times for the subjects are plotted against depth of rule in fig¬
ures 5-1 to 5-5 at the end of this chapter. The RT for each pair is plotted
separately so that the clustering of RTs at each depth can be observed. Broken
lines indicate the line found by regression, where this is significant, and solid lines
indicate the relationships between the mean RTs at each depth, where this is the
best description. The RTs for Bump are also plotted for comparison, although
the linear regression was only carried out on the means for each pair (10 data
points). Nevertheless, the trend is significant (r = 0.86, p < 0.01, t-test, 9df).
The slope of the linear trends which were significant were as follows, White 149
mS/Rule, Green 189 mS/Rule, Roger 295 mS/Rule, and Brown 76 mS/Rule. If
the model were correct, it would appear that there is a fair degree of variation
in the time it takes the subject to test the precondition of each rule and to move
on to the next — from about 80 mS to about 300 mS, almost a factor of four.
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5.4.1.1 Conclusion
It seems as though the stack model captures the logic of subjects strategies but
not the details of actual processing (at least, not in all cases). That subjects
behave as though they employ a stack of rules as a logical sequence, is supported
by the fact that the reaction times for the pairs appear to chunk naturally
according to depth of rule for every subject. In other words, pairs which are
decided by the same rule take the same time to process. However, the simple
idea that the rules are applied in temporal sequence (down the stack) appears to
be at least partially incorrect. Three subjects, Blue, Green and Roger show a
non-linear relationship between depth of rule and RT (although significant linear
trends exist for Green and Roger). If these deviations from the linear are genuine
phenomena, as the evidence strongly suggests, then this means that subjects'
representations must be considerably more complex than previously supposed.
This detracts somewhat from the attractive simplicity of the stack model, but
perhaps it is not too surprising that this turns out to be necessary. In particular,
it seems that it will no longer be possible to think of the ordering of rules as being
a purely temporal/procedural one; subjects must somehow explicitly represent
the order of the rules independently of their application. Also, I would have
expected the time taken to step through the rules to be more consistent between
subjects if this was the primitive mechanism, though this is just an intuition.
Although the above analysis shows that the proposed 'depth effect' is not
a unitary phenomenon (but just a trend in the data), it also shows that the
ordinal distance effect is similarly artifactual, in that the reaction times do not
chunk naturally into ordinal separation categories. What is clear is that there are
strong regularities in the data which are incompletely captured by both models.
It seems likely that the variation in RT is caused by a mechanism for invoking
and applying avoidance and selection rules, but that the mechanism is more
sophisticated than a simple rim down a stack. Other possible sources of RT
variation which were entertained were:
1. avoidance rules taking longer.
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2. differences between training and remote pairs.
3. variation with the number of rules applicable to a pair.
Whilst these possibilities have not been definitely ruled out, no systematic vari¬
ation in RT with these factors has been detected.
5.5 Overall Conclusions
The stack model may be incorrect in subtle ways but, overall, it is a remarkably
simple and effective approximation of monkeys' decision procedures during the
five-term series task. The data from seven subjects and a number of experiments
has been analysed at several different levels. With the possible exception of one
subject (Blue), all the analyses lend support to the model.
Tn more detail, the stack model appears to be correct in the following aspects:
1. The distinction between alpha and random types of triads appears to have
a great deal of validity, and supports the notion of subjects employing a
combination of avoidance and selection rules. This is also supported by
the clustering of RTs of pairs which would be discriminated by the same
rule.
2. There appears to be some mechanism by which rules are ordered, but this
may not be a rigid stack as originally supposed. This is supported by the
ability of the model to account for much of the variation in choice patterns
between triads and, to a lesser extent, the overall linear trend in the RT
data for all subjects except Blue.
3. The improvement in performance observed across the three triadic testing
phases can be partly accounted for by increasing iteration in the control
strategy for applying the rules. The residual improvement can potentially
be accounted for by the stack becoming more 'rigid' (firmly ordered) with
usage, although there is no formal model for this.
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There are a number of problems with the model however, some of which are
summarised below.
1. The model predicts all the choices to go to the a item in alpha type triads,
whereas a proportion get diverted to (3. It seems likely that this is because
the assumption about rule order being fixed is partially wrong.
2. As discussed in the last section, there is mismatch between the linear binary
RT profiles predicted by the stack and those obtained, particularly in the
case of Blue, Green and Roger. However, the ordinal distance effect does
not characterise these subjects well either.
5.5.1 Further Work
Triadic RTs
Working out the implications of the partially iterating control strategy for RTs is
not simple as there are many parameters to specify. The implications of the naive
strategy are simpler, but unfortunately RTs were not taken in the early phase
where this strategy is a reasonable approximation (according to the choice data).
With an iterating strategy, the problem is that rules get used in combinations so
there is no simple 'depth' prediction. Furthermore, we can no longer assume a
uniform time for the testing of preconditions of rules because of the elimination
of items. Initially, there are three items to check for relevance to each rule but
this is reduced to two after deciding to avoid one item.
Another question is what happens on triads where there is partial iteration?
Should trials on which there is a lack of iteration be faster? Perhaps iteration
is attempted every trial but sometimes aborts. It may be possible to answer
this question empirically. We already know that, overall, triadic RTs increase
with improved performance, but it remains to be seen whether this is selective
between trials and triads.
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Other sources of data
It has been observed (informally) from the video tapes of the monkeys perform¬
ing the triadic task that some subjects will often try to pick the second best
choice after they have correctly picked the a item. They are prevented from
doing this by the termination of the trial by the experimenter (the objects are
withdrawn from view), but it is often clear which item would have been the
subject's second choice. This is not predicted by a simple stack driven model in
which the application of a selection rule would leave the subject with no means
of determining the 'second best' (/?) item. This is because the time between
the subject making its first and (would be) second choice is, almost certainly,
too short for the decision procedure to be invoked again for the remaining pair.
This suggests that, at least in some circumstances, that at the time of making
the decision, the subject has more than one relevant rule available for governing
choice.
The process of reducing the data inherent in the video tapes into a man¬
ageable form (as formal protocols) is beginning to be undertaken. It may be
possible to use such measures as the time and order each item is attended to to
disambiguate between possible decision procedures.
Finally, there is data from children which might fruitfully be analysed accord¬
ing to the stack model. Children have been tested under analogous conditions
to the monkeys (including triadic tests). Although there is possibly not enough
data to model individuals in detail, it ought to at least be possible to test the
averaged stack model.
Suggested Experiments
The stack model could be quite simply tested if it were possible to test sub¬
jects with pairs containing a 'neutral' item which had previously neither been
'rewarded' nor 'punished' with respect to the other items, and yet was familiar
enough not to cause an aversive 'novelty' reaction. Such pairs could be used as
'probes' to discover which (if any) stack the subject was using. For example, a
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sixth colour in the five-term series experiment would sometimes be chosen and
sometimes not, depending on which of the five trained items it was paired with.
Such an experiment would be possible with Von Feren's paradigm (chapter 3),
where absense of a reward is not synomymous with an incorrect response. Dur¬
ing training, it would be possible to have the neutral items ocasionally paired
with the main ones without giving either positive or negative feedback. This
would, hopefully familiarise the subjects with the neutral items without them
becoming incorporated into the series.
Another possible extension to the experiment would be to test subjects with
quadruplets in addition to pairs and triads (triplets). There are five possi¬
ble quadruplets in a five-term series, each with one of the five items missing.
Quadruplets would be most interesting for subjects which appeared to be em¬
ploying more than one avoidance rule. In some such cases, three rules would
need to be applied in order for a unique choice to be made. For example, if
Brown, White or Green were to be given the items A, B, C, and D to choose
between, then the successive application of the rules:
present(A)'=> avoid(A)
present(B) =>• avoid(B)
— would not be sufficient to allow a unique choice between C and D. If a subject
could cope with triplets but made random choices in situations such as the one
above, this would be indicative of some kind of resource limitation, such that
there was a limit on how many rules could be applied. If, in such case, a subject
performed better with a quadruplet than a triad, this would be evidence against
the stack model.

















1 2 tvHtT£ 3 4 R"'° R°P t'1














« - - •* "*
"•AS
















































Figure 5-6: Bump's 1978 binary RTs plotted against depth of rule in stack 2.
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Chapter 6
Deductive Processes in Transitive
Inference
Having presented an account of how monkeys solve the N-term series
problem, this chapter goes into a deeper analysis of existing models of
transitive inference, introduced in chapter 2, and compares them with
the stack model. It is argued that most rely, at some level, on hy¬
pothesising the existence of a transitive inference rule and deductive
reasoning. The comparison includes a re-examination of Trabasso
and Breslow's models (introduced in chapter 2) and various AI ap¬
proaches to transitive inference and the SDE phenomenon. Both the
quantitative predictions and the theoretical properties of models are
considered.
6.1 Trabasso's and Related Models of the Dis¬
tance Effect
Experimental investigation into human performance of transitive inference
started as a study of abstract deductive reasoning. Formal deduction was, in
the time of Burt and Piaget and right up until recent years, the major model
of human reasoning (Gregory, 1981; Johnson-Laird, 1983), or at least, the major
paradigm for thinking about human reasoning. Johnson-Laird refers to this as
the 'doctrine of mental logic'. Thus even when Trabasso discovered that children
performed the task by constructing some kind of integrated representation of the
starting premises, he still assumed that this was a deductive process involving a
transitive inference rule. The inference problem got pushed one level deeper and
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the investigation concentrated on the retrieval aspects. Only Breslow tried to
give a detailed account of how pairwise information might be combined without
appealing to an innate transitive inference schema. However, it turns out that
his explanation is only superficially different from Trabasso's on this count, as is
demonstrated below.
Trabasso and Riley (Trabasso &; Riley, 1975) argued that the end-anchor,
marking and distance effects could only be explained by hypothesising that sub¬
jects employ transitive inferences to construct a linear order (seriate the objects)
at the time of learning the premises. The distance effect is then due to the 'look¬
up' processes for locating or comparing the positions of two objects within the
order to find which comes first and which second. The basic idea is that the fur¬
ther points are apart in the linear representation, the easier it is to discriminate
them. Although Trabasso does not explicitly say it, this is presumably supposed
to be analogous to perceptual discrimination.
6.1.1 The Training Phase
Although Trabasso et aFs experiments and models are mostly concerned with
the testing phase, they do say that the series is constructed in an 'end-inwards'
fashion, reflecting the finding that subjects learn the premises involving end
terms first and learn premises involving middle terms last. There is no detailed
computational account of how the series is constructed but ordered pairs are
supposed to be combined transitively;
<AB>&<BC> —> < A B C >
so that some kind of vector is formed by forward inference. This is not free
standing, but is associated with a linear scale as I have tried to illustrate in
figure 6-1.
It is not at all clear whether the objects are being mapped onto a pre-existing
set of codes or whether the order is constructed as a function of the information
being integrated. However, the net result is that there is some kind of linear
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Long Short Dimension
1 2 3 4 5 6 Codes
t t t
A B F Learned Objects
( CD E Unassociated Objects
Figure 6—1: Partially learned series — Trabasso's model
scale (perhaps with a spatial metric) onto which object labels become mapped.
The first objects to become associated are the end terms as these have only one
comparative identified with them. Once this has happened, information from
ordered pairs allows further objects to be inserted into the line. The pairs, AB
and EF, allow objects B and E to be associated, followed by pairs BC, DE being
assimilated, and so on. If there are errors associated with each of these steps
then this helps to explain the serial position effect in training— the performance
is poorer the nearer the pairs are towards the middle of the series.
Trabasso et al propose two explanations of how use of a linear order may give
rise to the distance effect: the associative strength model and the spatial discrim¬
ination model.
Both give identical predictions about the rank order of reaction times for
different pairs. In one model the 'confusability' of the codes for different objects
is the relevant factor, while in the other, the (spatial) 'discriminability' of each
object from others in the series is what affects decision times. Both models make
quantitative predictions rooted in information theory, however, no specific mech-
6.1.2 The Testing Phase
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anisms for comparison or location of objects are proposed and many arbitrary
assumptions are necessary.
In the associative strength model each object is associated with several codes
in the array with differing degrees of strength. The idea is that an object is
initially associated with one code (as described above) but that somehow the
association 'rubs off' onto adjacent codes, declining in a monotonic fashion away
from the main point of association. This is supposed to reflect the fact that 'very
short' is similar to 'short' etc. and is called 'generalization'. The initial strengths
of the associations depend on a number of factors including the 'availability' of
the code (reflecting the marked/unmarked difference) which gives rise to the dis¬
tance effect. However, as the latter aspect of the account is somewhat vague (the
model already has too many degrees of freedom), we must suppose that all initial
strengths of association are equal. The idea of variable strengths of association
is akin to the idea of variable rule priorities, as discussed in section 4.6.1.
The way objects are compared, as described in (Trabasso & Riley, 1975), is to
compare their relative strengths of association (after the process of generalisation
has taken place). Here, the 'relative strength' is the ratio:
strength (of association) from an object to a code
itO — ~~~~■—"""~~■—~~~~~—~"~~~~—————————————^——
summed strengths of object to all codes
This is supposed to give the probability of association of an object with a
particular code, but it is not made clear at what point this ratio is computed, if
at all, by the subject. Perhaps it should be regarded as a mathematical model of
the end result of generalisation, rather than having any bearing on the process
itself. It is then assumed that 'the ease of generating a pair of codes is directly
related to the sum of the code probabilities' and it is these summed probabilities
that give the reaction time predictions for each pair. It is not clear why this
should be so.
Note that the success of this prediction algorithm depends on the fact that
comparisons are not local but depend on codes for the entire series. If the
relative discriminability had to be directly calculated by the subject this would
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seem to imply a computational commitment way beyond the complexity the
task demands. However, Trabasso et al are not really proposing a mechanism
— they are giving a quantitative mathematical description of the behaviour of
some hypothetical decision making machinery. In the same way, information
theory does not prescribe choice algorithms — it describes 'virtual' information
processors, for example: what can be maximally done with a noisy set of data.
The authors employ notions of probability and they are not clear whether they
are proposing a stochastic mechanism which will show the distance effect over a
large number of trials or whether the 'confusability' of codes somehow leads to
reaction times proportional to the uncertainty. The problems mentioned above
also apply to the second model, described below.
The spatial discrimination model attributes the differences in reaction times
to differences in the ease of locating objects within a spatial array. Again, no
specific mechanism is proposed but a metric of 'relative discriminability' is given:
_ , sum of distances from object to other objectsRelative Discrimmabihty = —-—
sum of all the distances between objects
This measure is higher for items near the ends of the array, reflecting the
idea that these terms are somehow easier to find. As both objects have to be
located before they can be compared, the sum of their relative discriminabilities
is hypothesised to be inversely proportional to the reaction time for that pair.
This produces a predicted scale of reaction times exactly the same as for the more
complex association model above, and so the simpler model will be assessed:
For the five-term series, for example, the sum of all the distances between
items is 10, assuming a unit distance of 1. The total distance of the item B from
the other four items is 1 + 1 + 2 + 3 = 7, giving rise to a relative discriminability




— where c and k are constants. Table 6-2 shows the predictions for each pair
scaled so that the full range of variation is 0 to 100. The same scaling mechanism
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has been applied to the monkey RTs for ease of comparison. The monkey data
are binary RTs averaged across the subjects which were analysed individually in
section 5.4, excluding Bill, who was tested at a different time. The rest of the
table is explained further on.
Taking the overall ranking of projection times, the projection from this model
is not bad. It correctly projects higher RTs in the middle of the diagonals
(\)x and, of course, decreasing RTs with ordinal separation (/* towards AE).
However, Trabasso's model incorrectly predicts some local exceptions to the
distance effect, for example AB being faster than AC. Also, it does not predict
the overall asymmetry in the monkey data and predicts too low an RT for the
pair BD.
The averaged stack projection was generated by combining the projections
from all eight stacks for each pair, and is also symmetrical. An asymmetrical
projection would result if there was an overall bias in favour of selection over
avoidance rules in the stacks, as was the case in the analysis of individuals. The
average of all eight stacks is given here for generality, and it can be seen that it
fares better than Trabasso's model on all the points raised above. Furthermore,
Trabasso's model has no principled way of accounting for individual variation
and makes no predictions about error rates on the triadic tests.
1The arrows refer to directions in the table.
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6.2 Breslow's Sequential Contiguity Model
The model about to be described was invented by Breslow as part of an argument
against Trabasso's claim to have found coordination of transitive relations in
children. Here we examine it in its own right for its ability to explain Trabasso
et aVs empirical data on the five and six term series tasks.
Like Trabasso's models, this consists of two parts: information from separate
premises is integrated into a unitary representation during the acquisition phase,
and there is a procedure for interrogating this representation in order to answer
questions during the testing phase. As Breslow also supposes that subjects form
a linear ordering, the two parts of his model can be assessed separately.
The main idea in the learning phase is that an understanding of the premises
as order relations is not a necessary precondition for constructing a linear order.
Young subjects treat the premises as categorical statements about the absolute
properties of objects (as has also been suggested by other authors). 'X is longer
than Y' is interpreted as 'X is long' and 'Y is short' and also that X 'goes with'
Y. Both comparatives are given to the subjects so the information initially ap¬
pears contradictory with all but the end terms appearing sometimes long and
sometimes short. However, the contiguity between pairs that are always men¬
tioned together will also be learned. Although they do not start out to form a
linear order, it supposedly materialises out of contiguity relationships, growing
end inwards from the unambiguously labelled long and short end items.
Breslow argues that this does not involve transitive inferences:
'A becomes related to B, which becomes related to C, and so on,
without the generation of any higher order relation such as "A is
related to C". Further, the fact that they learn to produce the linear
order from both ends does not imply that they deduce the reversabil-
ity of the ordering. For instance, they do not infer the ordering from
E to A from the already established ordering from A to E. Rather,
they simply learn the linear ordering in each direction separately and




Figure 6—2: Long and short chains — sequential contiguity model
I have attempted to illustrate this idea in figure 6-2. The problem with
this argument is that the 'higher order inferences' that Breslow is calling for
as evidence of transitivity can inevitably not be found in the integrative stage
alone. Inferences only manifest themselves when representational and interrog¬
ative processes both happen. It is no good putting part of the information
process under the microscope and asking "where's the inference?". Incidently,
this is also an argument against the opposite theoretical position as espoused by
Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird, 1983), who claims that all deductive inference is
mediated without (logical) inferential machinery. However, this debate about
whether information processes are 'logical' or not is something of a diversion.
Let us continue with the second part of Breslow's model — that for question
answering.
Subjects make comparisons by assessing the linear order in the same end-
inwards sequence in which they originally constructed it. If the comparative in
the question is 'longer' , as in 'which is longer, X or Y?', then they start from the
'long' end of the sequence until they come across either X or Y. Whichever comes
first is deemed to be the 'long' object, in categorical fashion, as it is nearest the
'long' end of the ordering. Again, Breslow states that this process requires no
transitive inferences, although this is a matter of perspective.
If it is assumed that each traversal along the sequence takes a constant





. A B C D E
A — 0 0 0 0
B 3 — 1 1 1
C 2 2 — 2 2
D 1 1 1 — 3
E 0 0 0 0 —
Which
longer?
Table 6—1: Traversal times for Breslow's model.
jects are, the nearer the chosen object will be to an end anchor and the fewer
traversals will be needed. However, this is a very asymmetrical effect, being
different for each of the two comparative forms of question. Table 6-1 shows the
number of traversals needed for each comparison for both 'longer' and 'shorter'
type questions. The table is for a five term series in which A is the long end
anchor and E is the short one. The diagonals show comparisons between pairs
which have the same ordinal separation and the means of these give the distance
effect. Because the table has rotational symmetry, the distance effect for either
question form is the same. The success of Breslow's model with respect to other
aspects of the RT variation crucially depends on averaging RTs across the two
question forms. Table 6-2 shows these averaged traversal times scaled to vary
from 0 to 100, for comparison with the other models. Notice that these averaged
RT projections contain no element of variation other than the distance effect.
In order to account for other aspects of the RT variation, such as the higher
times for pairs towards the middle of the series, Breslow made some additional
assumptions. Basically, if, when the appropriate anchor is retrieved, it turns out
to be one of the comparison items, the accessing time is assumed to be shorter.
Furthermore, this advantage is greater for the long anchor than for the short
anchor, thus producing an asymmetry. With these adjustments, the ranking
of the fifteen possible pairs closely correlates with the ranking from Trabasso's
reaction time experiments. For the five term series, the projection becomes very
similar to that of the stack model.
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However, the stack model makes no special assumptions about end-anchors
and, furthermore, it subsumes Breslow's basic model. Stacks 1 and 8 (in con¬
junction with a control strategy) are computationally equivalent to traversing
one or the other of Breslow's chains. Averaging the projections from stack 1 and
8 produces an identical projection to that shown for Breslow's model in table
6-2. The relationship between the two models is explored further in section 6.4.
A final point about Breslow's model is that it predicts wildly varying reaction
times for certain pairs depending on which comparative appears in the question.
For example, the number of traversals for pair AB is three or zero depending
on whether the question is 'which shorter?' or 'which longer?' This prediction
cannot be tested with the monkey data and, unfortunately, Trabasso et a/'s
results for the two comparatives were only reported lumped together. The only
exception was the congruence effect reported for end-anchor pairs — when the
question matched the end anchor label, the reaction time was faster. However,
it seems that this effect was a fairly small in comparison with the distance effect.
It seems likely that individual variation is more important.
6.2.1 Concluding Remarks — the Trabasso vs Breslow
Debate
On the one hand, we have Breslow discounting Trabasso's work as being irrel¬
evant to true transitivity on the grounds that he can model the behaviour of
Trabasso's subjects with 'non-transitive' techniques. He suggests that this is
a computational strategy using low-level categorial processing which is set up
in response to practice at a particular task. It is thus irrelevant to measuring
attainment of a concept of transitivity or classical logical behaviour. How then
are we to interpret the work on the five and six term series, Breslow's own, and
related information processing models? Is it all of no psychological interest?
On the other hand Trabasso claims that this task is relevant to a variety of
behaviours: the whole domain of processing information with transitive prop¬
erties including the work on seriation (Inhelder &: Piaget, 1958) and symbolic
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Monkeys (N = 5) Trabasso Mod.
B C D E B C D E
A 84 58 55 0 A 33 46 33 0
B — 75 73 15 B — 100 59 33
C — — 100 35 C — — 100 46
D — — — 27 D — — — 33
Av. Stack Mod. Breslow Mod.
B C D E B C D E
A 41 35 24 0 A 100 67 33 0
B — 100 71 24 B — 100 67 33
C — — 100 35 C — — 100 67
D — — — 41 D — — — 100
The monkey data and the predictions from Trabasso's, Breslow's and the
averaged stack model are all scaled so that the quickest pair is zero and
the slowest is 100. Note that all the model projections are symmetrical
around the diagonal axis (/"), whereas the monkey data is not. With
some additional assumptions (see text) the projections of Breslow's model
converge with those of the stack model.
Table 6-2: Scaled variation in RTs — monkey data compared with models
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comparisons (Moyer, 1973). Yet he offers no explanation of logical competence
and almost seems to be saying that the problem is the solution: although he
supposes children have the ability to coordinate transitive relations much earlier
than Piaget claims, and calls on information processing ideas to support his ar¬
gument, he has cornered himself into the position of being a 'Nativist'2 with all
its attendant problems as discussed by Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird, 1983).
An alternative to these perspectives is the view that not only are transitivity
tasks related to other types of inference as Trabasso states but that the informa¬
tion processing analysis is important in its own right The study of transitivity
tasks gives us a vehicle for studying representation, strategy and other topics
fundamental to cognitive science. Furthermore, we may begin to be able to offer
an explanation for the emergence of conceptual transitivity and logical compe¬
tence in general. Breslow states that he knows of no information processing type
models which explain generation of processing strategies from general cognitive
structures. It seems to me that this is a good statement of what the goal of
Cognitive Science should be and of what we should be working towards in the
domain of transitivity tasks. The acquisition model discussed in chapter 7 may
be a small step in this direction.
6.3 Discrimination Trees
Bundy wrote a Prolog program3 in which information about the relative positions
of a set of objects along an ordinal scale was stored in the form of a discrimination
tree4. The program is included in appendix B.l.
2Believing that logical skills are innate (inherited)
3'Modelling McGonigle's 'Bigger-Than' Data With a Discrimination Tree', Dept AI,
Mathematical Reasoning Group, internal note
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Figure 6—3: Discrimination tree representation of eight term series.
Bundy picked a discrimination tree to base his model on because it had the
right 'gross' timing properties (it shows a distance effect). 'Timing' refers to
the number of operations necessary to make a decision, in the same way as
for the stack model. Using a discrimination tree, the objects of the series are
represented as the leaves of a binary decision tree so the number of key decisions
is equivalent to the depth of the search before a divergence in the representations
of the objects is found. However, as we shall see, with this representation the
relationship between the ordinal separation of a pair of objects and decision time
is not monotonic.
For example, in figure 6-3 D and E diverge at the root whereas C and D
do not diverge until a node three levels deep. Both these pairs have an ordinal
separation of 1. The decision 'times' (depth) for different pairs in the series
A — H are tabulated in table 6-3.
This shows clearly that the time for pairs of any given ordinal separation
smaller than four (with this size tree) is not constant but varies in a convoluted
way with the ordinal position of the pair. As with Breslow's model, it is only
when averages are taken that the times reflect the general distance effect. For
example, the discrimination tree would appear to predict a particularly quick
response to questions referring to the pair DE (or, in general, pairs which straddle
the two main branches of the tree). This effect is not found with the monkey
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Table 6—3: Discrimination times for different pairs and means for each ordinal
separation (diagonals).
subjects, even at the individual level (section 5.4). No such effect was reported
by Trabasso et al either, although it might seem that the dividing point in the
series between the two main branches varies from individual and the effect has
been 'averaged out' in pooling data from many individuals.
The discrimination tree model could still be a candidate for modelling the
distance effect in the SDE studies (see chapter 2). However, the 'straddling'
effect has not been found to occur in the symbolic comparison task
(McGonigle & Chalmers, 1984a) where the subjective midpoint of a series has
been found to be remarkably stable between and within subjects. Children were
quite willing to categorise animals with a range of sizes as either 'big' or 'small'
and the 'cut-point' seemed to be in the middle of the series and thus dependent
on the range of sizes in the task and not on any absolute metric.
A number of other researchers have suggested 'categorical' models of the
distance effect in which the range of sizes, or whatever, is chunked into two or
more categories. The further apart two objects are apart the more likely it is that
they will fall into different categories thus enabling a simple and fast decision.
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Kosslyn et al have suggested 'dual process' models in which categorical and
analogue comparators operate sequentially or concurrently (Kosslyn et al, 1977).
However, categorical comparison of this kind does not appear to occur in the
transitivity task. For example, Woocher et al trained subjects on two separate
arbitrary rankings and then combined them into one ranking with an additional
linking premise. The serial position effects indicated that the subjects used one
long series for the comparisons and were not significantly faster on comparisons
between the two original series (Woocher et al, 1978).
For a symmetrical discrimination tree, such as the one illustrated in figure 6-
3, there is no privileged end of the series and no sense in which the series is
directional. The technique is neutral with respect to comparative and so there
can be no interaction between serial position and comparative and so no congruity
effect.
However, this is the closest to a simple computable model that I can think
of for what Trabasso had in mind when he was talking about 'discriminability'
of objects in a series. The tree representation of a series can be viewed from the
root to the leaves as a successively finer grained representation of a linear space.
Large separations can be resolved immediately using a low level resolution, while
objects which are close together need to be 'focussed' on with a higher resolution.
This is like using smaller and smaller scale maps to find which of two streets (in
some town, in some country) is further to the North.
It is certainly worth keeping discrimination trees in mind as a possible com¬
ponent (perhaps in changed form) of more sophisticated models. More generally,
I think there are good reasons for supposing that some kind of hierarchical repre¬
sentation for an ordered series (which relates parts of a series together at a more
abstract level than individual object pairs) may be useful but need not take the












Figure 6—4: Asymmetric discrimination trees
6.4 Linking and Formalising the models
There are a number of connections between these models which become apparent
when they are formalised enough to allow computational implementation. One,
perhaps counter-intuitive, finding is that there are so many ways of representing
the humble series. Some of these can be regarded as computationally isomorphic,
but others appear to have differing procedural implications. In any case, at this
level of description it ceases to become safe to draw the distinction between
operations upon a representation and the representation itself.
It is interesting to note that Breslow's model can be seen as a special case of
discrimination trees where the tree is completely lop-sided as shown in figure 6-4.
To make an isomorph of the contiguity model, however, it is necessary to have
two trees, each constructed in a different direction but representing the same
series. One tree is used with each comparative.
Breslow's model can also be captured by a set of logical rules, as pointed out
by Bundy5. The rules, shown in table 6-5, need a procedural interpretation, as
Prolog clauses for example, and then they will produce an asymmetric distance
effect such as Breslow would predict (for one comparative). The notation for




The notation is Horn clause logic adapted for a standard character set and
written in Kowalski form with the head of each clause on the left. This is
preferred to standard logical notation as it has a standard procedural inter¬
pretation (Kowalski, 1979) which is intended as part of the models. The ex¬
amples, therefore, run as Prolog programs with minor syntactic changes. See
(Clocksin &: Mellish, 1981) for an introduction to Prolog.
Constants and functors are written in lower-case and variables in upper-case.
Unfortunately, this means that the convention used throughout the rest of the
thesis, of writing five-term series items in upper-case italics, needs to be changed
here. The series is now written 'a' to 'e'.
Arrows indicate implications, capital letters indicate variables, '&' indicates
conjunction and 'v' indicates disjunction. An '=' sign indicates that the struc¬
tures on either side are unifiable and '\ =' (not equal) indicates that unification
fails. A list enclosed in square brackets is 'syntactic sugar' (shorthand) for a
nested list structure made up of binary units as shown in table 6-6. A vertical
bar within a list indicates that the remainder of the list (also a list) lies to the
right of the bar.
In Bundy's representation, the series is explicitly represented as a list which
is 'scanned' from beginning to end until one of the items to be compared is found.
Lists are common computational/logical structures used for representing series,
sets and bags; and they have an inherently asymmetrical nested structure which
is illustrated in figure 6-6. In order to complete the logical implementation of
Breslow's model using lists, it is necessary to have a reversed object list for use
with the converse comparative, 'smaller'. This is shown in (ii). It is difficult to
justify such a program on computational grounds as it seems highly redundant,
especially for longer series, when 'smaller' questions can be answered by selecting
the item which is 'not-bigger'. Predicate (iii) shows how this can be done. The
two alternative definitions of 'smaller' predict different behavioural profiles. In
the version (iii) with a reversed list, we have a cross-over effect, with a positive or
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(i) big_to_small([a,b,c,d,e] ).
bigger(X,Y,Choice) <- big_to_small(List) k
first(X,Y,List,Choice).
first(X,Y,[ZlRest],Z) <- X=Z v Y=Z.
first(X.Y, [WI Rest] .Choice) <- W\=X k W\=Y k
first(X,Y,Rest,Choice).
(ii) small_to_big([e,d,c,b,a]).
smaller(X,Y,Choice) <- small_to_big(List) k
first(X,Y,List,Choice).
(iii) not_bigger(X,Y,Choice) <- bigger(X.Y.Big) k
(Choice=X v Choice=Y) k Choice \= Big.
Figure 6—5: (i) Bundy's rules for Breslow's model, (ii) and (iii) show alternative
implementations of 'choose smaller'.
negative slope being produced depending on which end of the list is scanned from,
but no marking effect. With the 'not bigger' version the curves for both 'bigger'
and 'smaller' comparisons have the same slope and do not cross. However,
comparisons will always be faster for the more primitive 'bigger' predicate, so
there is a 'marking' effect.
If this kind of 'scanning' model is correct then one possibility is that both
kinds of strategy are used for the marked comparative by different subjects or
at different levels of expertise. However for a set of subjects using a uniform
strategy we would expect marking and congruity effects to be mutually exclusive.
Marschark and Pavio have argued that according to their 'expectancy' account,
congruity and marking will be mutually exclusive (Marschark & Paivio, 1981)
but Banks et al have disputed their empirical claim (Banks et al, 1983).
An alternative computational representation of a series is to use pointers from
each object to its successor together with a note of the first item. This is shown
in table 6-4. Although the representation of the series is different, the clauses
that do the work are virtually identical. The main difference is that an extra
variable is needed for the list case in order to store the part of the list structure
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(i) [a,b,c,d,e] = .(a, .(b, .(c, .(d, .(e, [])))))







Lists are nested structures of arbitrary depth. The dot is a functor and
'[]' represents (by convention) an empty list. This does not exhaust possible
representations.
Figure 6—6: Three different ways of representing a list
which has not been processed, whereas the remainder of the sequence is implicit
when pointers are used. This is offset by the fact that the sequence information
is stored in separate predicates for the pointer method so that the search space
is larger.
Just as with the list representation, the program does not naturally extend
to producing a mirror image distance effect for the comparative 'smaller'. A
'smaller' predicate can be produced by having a reversed sequence or doing
a transformation, as before. However, logical pointers of the type above are
different from the computationally primitive pointer in that they can be used in
either direction. That is, a statement that one item is the successor of another
can be used equally well to retrieve the predecessor given the successor. As the
series is stored above, it is just as easy to work backwards through the pointers
starting from the smallest, and a 'smaller' predicate can be written this way
without having to represent the sequence twice.
However, not only will this produce no marking effect but it does not fit
the evidence that successor links are asymmetrical and that, in general, subjects
cannot access a series with equal facility in both directions. As an informal








bigger(X,Y, Choice) <- biggest(Big) k bigger(X,Y, Big, Choice).
bigger(X,Y, Referent, Referent) <- X=Referent v Y=Referent.
biggerCX.Y, Referent, Choice) <- X\=Referent k Y\= Referent k
successor(Referent, Next.ref) k
bigger(X,Y, Next_ref, Choice).
Table 6—4: A representation of the Breslow model using pointers
The asymmetry of the primitive pointer arises from a one-to-many relation¬
ship. This kind of pointer is like a clue in a treasure hunt that tells the finder
where to look for the next clue or for the treasure. An item is paired with a
memory location which informs the machine code where the 'pointed to' item is
stored. Pointers cannot be traversed backwards without searching through thou¬
sands ofmemory locations. In order to represent a sequence bi-directionally with
pointers like these it is necessary create an extra set of pointers. If subjects' suc¬
cessor links are analogous to these then it might help explain directional effects
if some or all the pointers in the reverse direction are missing.
Pointers can have further constraints placed upon them than this. An im¬
portant difference between them and the list structures previously mentioned is
that lists are intrinsically constrained to represent linear orders whereas point¬
ers can represent any kind of graph consisting of nodes interconnected by arcs.
Viewed like this, linear orders are seen as a special case of graphs. The more
general hierarchy of graphs can be depicted as shown in figure 6-7 along with
an analogous hierarchy for nested structures.
The case we have been interested in so far is that of the linear graph which is
isomorphic with a set of strictly nested sets or a list. A list is a highly constrained
structure and to achieve the same effect in a logical model extra axioms have






ACYCLIC GRAPHS (Intersecting and nested sets)
1
TREES (Nested sets with disjoint subsets)
I
LINEAR GRAPHS (Strictly nested sets with no disjoint sets)
I
ORDERED PAIRS (Set and subset)
Arrows represent increasing constraint so that items at the bottom can be
seen as special cases of the structures above. An analogy between some
of the graphs and nested structures is shown in parentheses. Transitive
closure is represented by directed paths in graphs and by inclusion in set
structures.
Figure 6-7: Linear orders in the context of graphs
or more than one predecessor. In most of the psychological experiments in the
transitive inference paradigm subjects were not presented with such a situation
which would enable us to judge whether human's successor links are linearly
constrained or whether they are equally capable of representing indeterminate
or partial orders which have the structure of an acyclic graphs. However, the
evidence for the existence of a 'mental line' would seem to suggest that linear
representations are a preferred form.
6.4.2 New models
If we allow the pointer of figure 6-4 representation to work in both directions
then it is possible to produce a symmetrical distance effect, of the type described
by Trabasso, by treating the series as a set of shells as in figure 6-8. This nested
structure is much more clumsy than the list, but it can be constructed in an
'ends-inward' fashion which is why it has been included.
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-CHead/Middle/Last> = o(Head, Middle, Last)
This shows how a list might be represented as a nested set of shells so that
the middle of the list is the most deeply nested instead of the tail. I have
called the hypothetical three place predicate 'o' for 'onion' and the curly
brackets are shorthand in the same way as square brackets notate a list. A
null atom is needed as well as the empty list.
Figure &-8: Representing a series as nested shells
The model program in table 6-9 behaves in a similar way to the one in
table 6-4 except that the objects are compared with both end items. The pro¬
gram accurately reflects the data as described by Trabasso but it produces no
interaction between the position of the item in a series and the form of the com¬
parative (congruity effect). It does produce a marking effect, however as the
'smaller' questions are answered by interpreting the question as a 'bigger-than'
one and then transforming the answer. The shell-like structure seems reminis¬
cent of Trabasso's 'end-inwards' principle for constructing series. The program
would perform equally well on partially constructed series for which the middle
pointers (successor predicates) are missing.
Indirect representation of a series.
The stack model differs in character from the previous accounts in that there is
no single preferred 'explicit' representation of the series. Rather, the mechanism
provides a framework for indirectly representing the series. It suffices to produce
the transitive behavioural profile and yet does not carry with it the implication








bigger(X,Y,Choice) <- biggest(Big) k smallest(Small) k
bigger(X,Y,Big,Small,Choice).
smaller(X,Y,Choice) <- bigger(X,Y,Bigger) k
other(X,Y,Bigger,Choice)
bigger(X,Y,Big,Small,Big) <- X=Big k Y=Big.
bigger(X,Y,Big,Small,Choice) <- (X=Small v Y=Small) k
other(X,Y,Small,Choice).
f, If either X or Y is the smallest then select the other.
bigger(X,Y,Big,Small,Choice) <- X \= Big k
Y \= Big k
X \= Small k




% If neither X or Y is the biggest nor the smallest then
'/, find the next biggest and the next smallest and repeat
'/. the whole procedure (recurse) .
other(X,Y,X,Y). % If X then pick Y
other(X.Y.Y.X). % If Y then pick X
The program instantiates the variable 'Choice' to either X or Y depending
on which item is nearest to the biggest object, if the predicate BIGGER
is used, or to the smallest item if the predicate SMALLER is used. The
program works 'end inwards' on the series; at each stage checking to see
if either of the items to be compared is an end item and then chopping
the two end items olf and repeating the process with the middle section.
SMALLER questions are answered by finding which item is the biggest and
giving the other item as the choice. Both forms of question give rise to a
symmetrical distance effect but SMALLER questions take a fraction longer
due to the extra transformation.
Figure 6—9: Ends-inward model of the distance effect
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'explicit', above, has been put inside scare quotes because it is used informally,
in the way psychologists have tended to use it. Of course the representation is
explicit when the whole representational system (rules plus control strategy) is
considered. One way of thinking about it is a list made from interleaving two
others, ordered from different ends of the series (cf Breslow's model).
Of the models which have been analysed, the stack model is closest in kind
to the discrimination tree model. In the minimal stack model, each stack can
be represented by a tree structure with one level for each rule. When all the
rules are of the same form (stacks 1 and 8) the model converges with that of the
'scanning' type models, such as Breslow's. The tree form of stack 3 is represented
below. It can be thought of as a special case of discrimination tree where one of
the nodes terminates at each branching. The reaction time projections for the
binary pairs (previous chapter) are effectively using the depth of the tree as was












The previous logical models have all had the characteristic that they show either
a cross-over effect or marking but never both. For explaining the cross-over effect
the models either have the unsatisfactory feature of requiring two independently
constructed 'mental lines' or they use logical pointers which do not reflect the
overall asymmetry of the series. This model is explained as a derivation of the







bigger(X,Y,Choice) <- objects(List) k
ranked(X,Y,List.Choice) <(i) then (ii)>.
smaller(X.Y,Choice) <- obj ects (List) k
ranked(X,Y,List.Choice) <(ii) then (i)>.
(i) ranked(X,Y,[ZI Rest],Z) <- X=Z v Y=Z.
(ii) ranked(X,Y,[W|Rest].Choice) <- ranked(X,Y,Rest.Choice)
Figure 6—10: Simple rules for cross-over model
Figure 6-10 includes a predicate ranked which is exactly the same as the
predicate first in Bundy's rules for Breslow's model (table 6-5) except that the
conditions 11
X\=W k Y\=W
have been removed from the body of the recursive call in the second predicate.
When this is done then the variable Z, and hence Choice can logically be in¬
stantiated to either X or Y, the items to choose between. However, according to
the procedural interpretation, the order in which they instantiate is dependent
on the order of the two clauses for ranked. If the first choice is accepted as
the only answer and the program is procedurally prevented from allowing the
other choice to be found [eg by using the Prolog cut), then the program will have
the same kind of 'reaction time' profile for 'bigger' comparisons as previously,
with Bundy's rules. However, 'smaller' comparisons are made differently. This
is because the items are not compared as the program recurses down the list (tail
recursion) but, instead, the work is done on the way up out of the recursion.
An alternative way of viewing this process is that a tree structure (like the
one shown in figure 6-6) is searched top-downwards for 'bigger' comparisons
and bottom-up for smaller comparisons. A Prolog program which produces this
behaviour is included in appendix B.2 and the search trees produced for two
'worst case' comparisons are shown in appendix B.3. These are d-e for the










Figure 6-11: Simulated cross-over effect
Figure 6-11 shows how the number of search operations (represented as ar¬
rows in the or trees in appendix B.3) varies with ordinal position of adjacent
pairs. The plot resembles a typical crossover effect with a net time advantage to
the serial position curve is steeper for the unmarked comparative. By inspection,
this seems to be typical of cross-over effects in the symbolic distance literature,
for example (Banks & Flora, 1977) but it is unclear whether this is typical of
the N-term series task because of lack of evidence. Although this very simple
mechanism appears to show both marking and congruity effects, it cannot simul¬
taneously account for the subtleties of the N-term series task. It is concluded
that more research needs to be done before the connection between the SDE and
N-term series effects can be fully established.
the unmarked comparative. Another feature of this profile is that the slope of
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6.5 General discussion
As an account of performance of the N-term series task, the stack model out¬
performs existing models. A comparison with the binary sampling model, which
does not make binary reaction time predictions, was made in the previous chap¬
ter. The main strength of the stack model is being able to account for individual
variation, but the averaged stack profile also fits the monkey group reaction time
profile better than Trabasso's model, Breslow's basic model and Bundy's model.
It has been shown that the stack model subsumes the core part of Breslow's
model (based on traversal times) and that the assumptions Breslow has to make
about the retrieval of end-anchors are unnecessary.
None of the models described in this chapter makes predictions about what
would happen in triadic tests without making extra assumptions. In Trabasso's
model, all items need to be located in the 'mental line' before a comparison is
made, so presumably, triadic comparisons would simply take longer. However,
Breslow's model would make equivalent projections to a subset of the stack model
comprising stacks 1 and 8, provided that the assumptions of the stack model
were also taken aboard. Bundy's discrimination tree model is actually explicitly
geared towards making binary choices because of the binary tree representation.
Given a triad, some mechanism would have to be provided for dealing with
binary subsets. This would simply make the decision process longer, without
predicting particular error patterns.
Some alternative representations of series were described above, and formal
links between the various models were pointed out. It was shown how a cross¬
over effect, of the kind produced when question form is varied, can be produced
by a very simple representation, in which question form affects search control.
This simple model is no good for modelling the details of the five-term series
task, however. The connection between the congruity effect found in the SDE
literature and the asymmetries found in the five-term series task remains to be es¬
tablished. One possible avenue to explore is that different question forms might
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map on to 'winning' or 'losing' in the monkey task. Suppose the instruction
'choose bigger' is analogous to 'winning' (selecting the item which will be re¬
warded — the tin with a peanut underneath it). Perhaps 'choose smaller' would
be analogous to instructing the subject to 'lose' (avoid the 'reward'). There are
obvious methodological problems in testing this idea because of the difficulty of
motivating the subject to 'lose'. If these problems could be overcome, however,
then we might expect a cross-over effect such that 'winning' would be faster
towards the rewarded end and 'losing' would be faster towards the unrewarded
end of the series. It is not clear whether the stack model could be adapted to
deal with such a finding.
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Chapter 7
Transitive Inference as Induction
'Proof in logic is only a mechanical expedient to facilitate the recog¬
nition of tautology, where it is complicated.' (Wittgenstein 1922
Tractacus)
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that the simple stack model has de¬
scriptive power with respect to the monkey data. Although evaluation
of this kind of performance model could be taken further, this should
not be done at the expense of asking why subjects employ an integrated
representation, as opposed to storing adjacent pairs. This chapter ar¬
gues that performance of the N-term series task is best understood as
resulting from an act of Inductive, rather than Deductive, inference.
A simple inductive learning algorithm is proposed which builds rule
stacks (of the kind previously described), given a sequence of training
examples. The chapter appears here, as opposed to in the main mod¬
elling section, because it is less empirical and more theoretical and
exploratory in nature.
7.1 Introduction
Although the simple stack model is surprisingly successful in modelling the per¬
formance phases of the five-term series tasks, there are likely to be diminishing
returns in trying to extend and modify the model to cover more aspects of this
data. There would be a danger of over-extending principles expressed in a few
simple rules into what is, after all, a complex and dynamic learning situation.
What do these rules and principles express? So far, no more than a schema
for cheaply processing queries about finite linear orders. It seems unlikely that
the stack model can be extended in a principled way without considering wider
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issues outside the narrow domain of (deductive) transitive inference. A larger
framework is needed within which to explain the following.
Why do subjects make (or appear to make) transitive inferences at all? Per¬
haps they appear to choose transitively simply because a representation involv¬
ing a set of avoidance and selection rules is convenient? If this is the case, then
why is it convenient, given that subjects presumably could represent the training
information as discrete pairs? Do the subjects somehow anticipate the presenta¬
tion of novel pairs and choose a representation accordingly? During testing, the
monkey subjects were rewarded indiscriminately, so whatever the reason, it must
be entirely to do with.representation. Similar problems arise in trying to explain
performance on the triadic tests, particularly the spontaneous improvement.
Part of the answer may be that the stack representation is, computationally,
cheap enough to be a sensible representation of four pairwise relations. Suppose
the four training pairs were totally unrelated to each other. How might the
information be represented? Rather than remembering eight items, the most
economical solution is to store only four which must be selected or, alternatively,
the four which should be avoided. Add to this a mechanism for ordering the
comparison of the stored items with test items, and the representation begins to
look like the stack model. This still leaves many unanswered questions, however,
such as why mixtures of avoidance and selection rules are employed, how the
rules become ordered and why the representation should vary between subjects.
I hope to show that the answers to the problems above lie in the fact that
the transitivity task is essentially solved by inductive, rather than deductive pro¬
cesses. We cannot assume either that the subjects have a ready made transitive
inference rule or that, even if they had, that they would know to apply it in this
context. Without such a rule being added to the axioms representing the task,
the transitive relationships between remote pairs simply do not follow deduc¬
tively from the original pairs.
In order to sort out where and when deductive or inductive inference might
occur, we need to consider the task as a whole, from the initial presentations of
the 'adjacent' pairs to the improvement in performance on these pairs, through
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to the choices made on the test pairs. We need to consider what prior knowledge
it would be reasonable to expect the subjects to possess and what individual
subjects might learn from the feedback they receive after making every choice.
In short (having reached the current level of analysis), the traditional view on the
n-term series task, as requiring subjects to make a succession of acts of deductive
inference, is no longer helpful. We will employ the "subject's eye" task analysis
described at the beginning of chapter 4. The training schema is reproduced
below:
A B B c C D D E
0 + 0 + 0 + 0 +
B A C B D C E D
+ 0 + 0 + 0 + 0
7.1.1 The Space of Possible Inductions
Examples of the different kinds of inductions subjects might make were given in
chapter 4, and they are repeated below:
1. left(C) &; right(B) =$> rewarded(C).
2. present(B) & present(C) => rewarded{C).
3. present(E) => rewarded(E)
4. -i rewarded(A)
5. present(D) & absent(E) =>■ rewarded(D).
6. 3x present(x) &;-<rewarded(z)
(At least one of the choice objects in a trial is not rewarded.)
7. The colours form a series, A,B,C,D,E and from any subset of these
colours the item nearest the E end will be rewarded.
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8. present(C) & absent(D) => rewarded(C).
How, and at what points, might such inductions be made? Are some induc¬
tions likely to be made at the exclusion of others or are the best one found by
a process of trial and error? First, we consider the stages at which induction or
deduction might occur in the learning process.
Where could deduction/induction occur?
Given that the animal subjects could not be told, even implicitly, that transitive
inference was required of them, there are a limited number of possibilities for
performing the task:
(a) The subjects possess a transitive inference schema (either innate or learned
independently of the task) which they have a tendency to apply to all
incoming information.
(b) As above, except that subjects somehow infer that the transitive inference
schema is appropriate to this task situation.
(c) The subjects possess some general purpose inductive mechanism (again,
innate or learned independently of the task) the application of which results
in a transitive choice profile in this task situation.
The first possibility has been independently suggested to me by a number
of people to whom I have described this learning problem. It was argued that
this would be a good strategy because transitive relationships may somehow be
'common' in nature. Surely, transitive relationships exist only in the represen¬
tations employed by organisms, not in the world itself. If this is accepted, then
the argument must become that transitive representations are frequently use¬
fully imposed on the world. This may be the case, but is a statement lacking
explanatory power (it is also somewhat circular). For example, it seems unlikely
that subjects could not deal with an analogous task in which they had to learn
non-transitive relationships.
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The second possibility, that subjects infer the existence of transitive rela¬
tionships from the task context, appears more plausible. Unfortunately, it is
equally lacking in explanatory power without some account of how this might
be done. Certainly it does not follow deductively, so subjects would have to
induce, after a number of training examples, that a transitive representation
can be employed. However, the available empirical evidence appears to show an
incremental improvement in performance during acquisition. We do not see a
qualitatively different kind of performance suddenly appearing, which is what
might be expected if a transitive inference schema were suddenly being brought
into play.
Assuming, for the moment, that a transitive schema is employed, how might
it be applied?
1. There could be a two stage process in which subjects first induce that there
are four pairs to deal with, and then apply a transitive rule to produce some
kind of integrated representation. Again, the acquisition profile does not
appear to support this.
>
2. There could be an incremental application of a transitive rule. For example,
the rule could be applied when two pairs have been found which it can
combine. (Breslow's model is constructed along these lines.)
3. Subjects could inductively infer that there are five objects to represent
and proceed to map these onto a (prior) linear representation. The actual
mode of linear representation is not relevant here, except to point out that
it could even take a form like the stack model's. (Trabasso's account can
be viewed along these lines, although he is not clear on when the linear
order representation is brought into play.)
None of these possibilities appears particularly plausible for the five-term
series task, although the mapping hypothesis does seem appropriate for other
forms of transitivity task where subjects have reason to anticipate a linear order,
for example, where subjects are asked to make inferences about the relative
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heights of a set of people. There is no reason why a single dimension of preference
should appear appropriate in this task or what that dimension might be.
If the above line of reasoning is correct, we are left with option (c) above
as the only remaining possibility. It is therefore worth exploring the possibility
that the subjects must apply some general purpose inductive mechanism(s) to the
five-term series task in order to produce a decision procedure for guiding choices.
This decision procedure results in a transitive choice profile. Furthermore, the
production and the deployment of the decision procedure are not distinct pro¬
cesses. The decision procedure improves incrementally and its success or failure
must inform the inductive process.
7.2 Inductive Mechanisms
In the previous section, the induction problem has been characterised as find¬
ing the right abstraction in the space of possible inductions and that a great
deal depends on the language of abstraction. The philosopher John Stuart Mill
described an analogous situation facing any observer of the world:
'We must observe that there is a principle implied in the very state¬
ment of what Induction is; an assumption with regard to the course
of nature and of the order of the universe, namely, that there are
such things in nature as parallel cases; that is what happens once
will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen
again, and not only again, but as often as the same circumstances
occur. This, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of Induc¬
tion. And, if we consult the actual course of nature, we find that the
assumption is warranted. The universe, as far as is known to us, is
so constituted that whatever is true in one case is true in all cases of
a certain description; the only difficulty is to find what description.'
(Gregory, 1981, Quotation from J. S. Mill (1843) Philosophy of Sci¬
entific Method)
For our purposes, however, the 'description' must include the subject's ac¬
tions as well as the subject's representation of the environment. The purpose of
subjects internal representations must be to actively guide behaviour rather than
to passively represent the world. The language of abstraction must therefore be
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constrained by these requirements and the subject's own representation of the
task as discussed previously.
7.2.1 A generic multiple choice task
Let us assume that the generic form of task is to discover a decision procedure
for a set of multiple choice situations and that there is no reason to assume a
priori any particular symbolic relationship between the various choice situations.
The target procedure must bottom out at some level that enables the subject to
reach out and choose a physical stimulus (object). The first phase of induction
must therefore involve discovering a dimension of variation among the stimuli
or some way in which they can be categorised. In this particular task there are
only two obvious candidates (apart from superfluous features cuch as incidental
noises, specks of dirt, or whatever):
1. Objects could be identified by the property location from a set of two (left
and right).
2. Objects could be identified by the property colour from a set of five (A to
E).
Note that these properties are not absolute (context free) and that individual
properties must generally be defined relative to a superset. This is not so obvi¬
ous in the case of colours which we tend to think of as ready made categories.
However, imagine having to perform the task with a set of non-saturated colours
(purple, red-brown etc).
Given a means of identifying objects, the choice action can be guided. There
are two possible primitive tactics:
1. Selection {-\-ve search): If an object can be found with an identifying prop¬
erty which is likely to be rewarded (in the context of the properties of the
alternatives), then choose that object.
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2. Avoidance (—ve search): If an object can be found with an identifying
property which is unlikely to be rewarded (in the context of the properties
of the alternatives), then choose an object without that property.
With binary choices, both tactics are equally effective. Where there are more
than two alternatives, the effectiveness will depend on the nature of the task;
whether it is more important to avoid bad choices or to identify good ones. To
give a naturalistic example; in choosing an item to eat from a number of fruit or
berries, avoidance criteria might be appropriate for poisonous varieties whereas
selection (positive) criteria might be appropriate for identifying ripe ones. From
this example, it can be seen that it might be advantageous to combine both
tactics in a single decision mechanism - negative search tactics for avoiding a
minority of easily identified 'bad' choices and positive search tactics for spotting
obvious 'good' choices.
However, the current task differs from the more general kind of choice situ¬
ation described above in that there are only two qualities of choice - rewarded
and unrewarded or, from the experimenter's point of view, correct and incorrect.
Furthermore, in the triadic tests, only one item is allowed to be selected during
each trial. This changes the emphasis on the task from a symmetrical one, where
avoidance and selection are equally valid to a situation where the onus is on find¬
ing the 'best' item out of three. In this situation there is an advantage in having
rules which positively identify correct choices. This point is returned to later
when the triadic tests are discussed.
Transitivity is not a necessary property of this kind of mechanism. Even if
for every possible (non empty) subset of the superset (all the different fruits or
all the different colours in the task) the decision procedure can specify a 'best'
choice, this does not necessarily imply a total ordering on the superset — each
subset could be treated differently by having complex conditions for the choice
tactics. The mechanism could imply opposing directions of ordering for some
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subsets1. However, if each hypothesis only refers to one object (as in the stack
model), a total ordering will arise.
7.2.2 Hypothesis management
How do the reasoning processes of our imaginary subject continue from here?
So far (in phase one) the subject has identified distinguishing features of the
stimuli from which it must choose, and has two tactics for choice making at
its disposal. Phase two must involve hypothesising relationships between the
features of choice situations and choice tactics. This requires (a) a language
for describing choice situations (trials), (b) a means of generating hypothetical
links between trials and choice tactics and (c) a control strategy for applying
and testing the rules.
A language for describing/identifying trials
All trials have objects in the same locations so this property alone cannot be used
to distinguish trials. Listed below are some possible ways of categorising trials
using colour or a combination of colour and location. Trials could be labeled by:
• No label — the same choice tactic is used on all trials (eg always choose
left).
• The presence or absence of a particular colour.
• A combination of a colour and a particular location.
• A combination of two colours (present or absent).
• A combination of colours and locations.
These possibilities are in increasing order of complexity and I generated them
by simply juggling around with the available properties.
1
eg: Choose A over B, B over C and C over A.
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Evaluating hypotheses
In general, it may be possible to have rules which work for only a subset of choice
situations or to have more than one rule which is applicable to choice. Indeed,
there may be no decision procedure which gives optimum choices, but any that
improves chances of success will be valuable. For these reasons there has to be
some means of evaluating the success of individual hypotheses (assigning credit
or blame to them) according to some kind of metric of predictive value. This
could then be used by a management system in deciding which hypothesis to
apply in any given situation. There are a number of standard AI techniques for
dealing with this kind of situation (see discussion) and the particular method
adopted is not of immediate interest here. However, it should be stated that
there must be some way of dealing with situations where no rule is applicable.
This could either take the form of a default rule which simply makes an arbitrary
(random) choice or a new rule could be hypothesised applicable to that situation.
This brings us on to the question of how rules might be hypothesised.
A fairly obvious point to make is that it makes sense to hypothesise and test
simple rules before complex ones. This is Occam's razor principle in microcosm.
It has been suggested already that rules could be formed by linking trial descrip¬
tors with choice tactics. What kinds of rules might this process generate for the
five-term series task? Some examples are shown in table 7-1, using '0' (empty
set symbol) to indicate 'don't care' (the absence of a condition).
The last two columns indicate the percentage of (training) trials on which a
given rule is applied with correct results and the percentage of trials on which the
rule is applicable, respectively. Together, these figures give an indication of the
predictive value of the rule. These values could be approximated to empirically
by the subject2. The first is an indication of the correctness of the rule - as
this is a two choice situation any figure less than 50% means that application of
2There would need to be an additional quantity indicating the size of the sample,
and hence the reliability of the approximation
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Eg. Rule Correct Applicable
1 0 =>• select(Left) 50% 100%
2 present(C) => avoid(C) 50% 50%
3 present(E) =>■ select(E) 100% 25%
4 present(A) => avoid(A) 100% 25%
5 present(A) => select(A) 0% 25%
6 present(A) & present(B) => select(B) 100% 25%
7 absent(E) &; present(D) =>• select(D) 100% 25%
8 left(A) &: right(B) =>■ select(B) 100% 12.5%
Figure 7—1: Example hypotheses
the rule is negatively correlated with success. The second value is an indicator
of potential usefulness. If a rule was 100% correct and applicable to 100% of
trials then no other rules would be needed until novel situations arose. By
these criteria, it can be seen that rules 3, 4, 6, and 7 have equal predictive
value. However, rules 3 and 4 have simpler preconditions and so, according
to this account, are more likely to be discovered first. Rules which have less
than 50% success rate (example 5) should be discarded (or the choice tactic
converted to its complementary form). Rules with a success rate close to 50%
might be useful if their applicability could be appropriately restricted. This
could be done by ordering the rules or by adding in extra conditions. This idea
of 'uselfulness' is related to the idea of 'minimum entropy' in information theory
(Shannon &; Weaver, 1964) as used in the inductive rule learning program ID3
(Quinlan, 1979) (see discussion). However, this relies on complex calculations,
involving probability theory, over the whole set of examples, and is not really
suited to an incrimental learning process of the type described here.
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Generation of rules
It is conceivable that rules might be generated by juggling with trial descriptors
and various instantiations of the choice tactics. However, this would probably be
hopelessly inefficient in all but the most trivial learning situations. This leaves
two possibilities, both of them involving the use of features of an actual choice
situation for which the existing rules are inadequate. Faced with such a choice,
the subject could hypothesise a rule (relating some description of the trial with
a choice tactic) and then simply follow that rule. This seems unlikely when the
alternative is to simply make an arbitrary choice (randomly, or perhaps using a
weak rule) and to construct a hypothesis on the basis of the outcome. The latter
leads to faster decisions and generates fewer false hypotheses.
For example, suppose that the subject is faced with a choice between red3 on
the left, blue on the right and green in the middle, and has no existing hypotheses
which apply to this situation. If the subject arbitrarily chooses blue on the right,
and this turns out to be correct, then it would make sense to hypothesise one
(or both) of the following; 'its a good idea to select objects on the right' or, 'its
a good idea to select blue objects'. Assume, for the sake of argument, that it
is known that the position factor is irrelevant. The rule generated in this case
would be:
present(Blue) => select(Blue)
If, on the other hand, the same arbitrary decision had turned out to be incorrect,
the easiest hypothesis to make would be to avoid blue objects:
present(Blue) => avoid(Blue)
A less direct way of capturing the same information would be as a disjunction
of hypotheses such as:
3Colours, as opposed to letters, are used in this example to make it clear that the
ordering is unknown.
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• present(Red) => select(Red).
• present (Green) =>■ select(Green).
At first sight, it would appear this reason for preferring avoidance as a choice
tactic only applies when there are more than two objects to choose between.
However, there is another reason. In general, an avoidance rule is a more direct
way of capturing negative information in a rule. To return to the fruits example,
imagine facing a choice between two kinds of berries which you have never tried
before. On your left, there is a bush full of red berries and on you right, a bush
of blue berries. You have no prior experience of berries, other than realising that
they are a kind of fruit but, being a hungry bird, you decide to try a red berry.
It tastes foul. It would make sense to hypothesise a rule on the basis of some
distinguishing feature of the berry (or the bush or whatever), for example, 'avoid
red berries'. It would not make sense to hypothesise that blue berries should be
preferred in future choice situations.
This example is partly given to help point out the peculiar symmetry of
the binary choices in the five-term series (and other psychological tasks). In this
paradigm, absence of reward after a selection implies that, had the subject chosen
the other stimulus, they would have been rewarded. However, we cannot assume
that the subject knows this, especially in the early stages of training. In real life,
we often face choice situations where (unbeknown to us) either course is bad. It
may be misleading therefore, to assume that subjects treat the relationship be¬
tween 'correct' and 'incorrect' responses in the same way as the complementary
relationship between true and false in deductive logic. The example also illus¬
trates how rule order could be determined by early subject behaviour. Suppose
a subject is beginning training on the fived-term series. If the subject chose A
from the set {A, B} then the hypothesis that A should be avoided, would be
generated. This would very likely end up as the first rule in the stack, as it
is always correct. Suppose B were selected (and thus rewarded) however, and
the rule present(B) => select(B) were hypothesised. This hypothesis would be
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disconfirmed as soon as the pair {B, C} arose, and so the final stack order would
depend more on responses to other training pairs.
7.2.3 The control strategy
Assuming that hypothesised rules are generated along the lines described above,
there remains the problem of applying them and managing their evaluation. I
have argued for an empirical evaluation strategy in which rules have an associated
'predictive value', although I have not specified the mechanism for computing
such values. Given such values, one control strategy would be to find all the
rules which are applicable in the given choice context and then to apply the rule
which has the highest value. The value of this rule would then be updated on
the basis of the outcome of the decision. Such a mechanism would not have the
characteristics of the stack model.
Another possible mechanism would be to approximate to the 'predictive
value' system by simply ranking the hypotheses. Although some information
about the rules would be lost, this system is computationally much cheaper;
rather than finding all the potentially relevant hypotheses, the rules can be
searched from the top until a relevant one is found. This, essentially, is what
happens in the stack model. During the learning process, incorrect decisions
would lead to re-orderings of the hypotheses, or removal of bad rules.
A third possibility is to combine the best features of both systems. Each rule
has an associated empirical value but the rules are also ranked for the purposes
of efficient, run of the mill decisions. The ordering of the rules would have to
be periodically checked to make sure it reflected the rule values. This strategy
would combine the cheapness of the stack (in terms of speed and memory load)
as a mechanism for making choices with the sensitivity of the empirical value
system for learning purposes. There could even be two levels of decision making;
an initial, fast solution which could be employed under time pressure and a
slower, more accurate decision which could override the first.
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These ideas could perhaps be furthered by attempting to build a computa¬
tional model of induction in multiple choice situations. It seems sensible to start
with the simplest possible kind of control strategy (the second one proposed
above), employing a ranking of hypotheses. If we are to use the five-term series
task as the modelling domain then there is a second reason for preferring this
approach - we already have a model of the end-product of the hypothesised in¬
ductive process in the form the stack model. Finally, it may well be the case that
evidence from a single kind of experiment (however detailed the analysis) would
not be enough to support the level of complexity implied by a more general
account of induction in choice situations.
7.3 An approximate model of induction in the
five-term series task
In order to create a first-order model of the learning processes that take place
during the acquisition phase of the five-term series task, a number of simplifying
assumptions have been made.
1. The imaginary subject has identified colour as the feature to discriminate
objects with. Only hypotheses of the form:
• present (colour) =>• select(colour).
• present(colour) =>■ avoid(colour).
- are considered. In terms of the general model, hypotheses about other
features have been eliminated as candidates and hypotheses about combi¬
nations of features are not yet considered at this phase. As shorthand for
these two types of rule, select(colour) and avoid(colour) are used respec¬
tively (the preconditions are the same in each case).
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2. The choice tactics are implemented in a particularly simple way, which is
a special case for binary choices. The trial is represented by a set of two
colours and avoidance of one automatically leads to the choice of the other.
3. Hypotheses are ordered in a strict ranking and this ranking determines
the semantics of individual hypotheses. In any given trial, the highest
applicable rule in the stack determines the outcome of the decision. In
other words, the condition of each hypothesis is the conjunction of its own
precondition and the negation of each precondition higher up in the stack.
4. Perfect information is assumed so that if a hypothesis gives rise to a single
incorrect decision then it is assumed to be at fault.
Quantifying the learning problem
It can be seen that these assumptions reduce the problem to generating and
ordering hypotheses until satisfactory performance is achieved on the training
pairs. What magnitude of problem is this in computational terms? One way
to think about the problem is to imagine a dumb trial and error mechanism
which randomly generated a different rule stack each time the existing stack
generated an error. Given five possible colours and two possible hypothesis
forms for each colour, there are ten possible hypotheses from which to build a
stack. Even assuming that repetition of hypotheses is eliminated within stacks
and that each stack contains sufficient rules (four), then this gives us a space
of 10 x 9 x 8 x 7 = 5040 functionally different stacks. As only sixteen of these
perform correctly on all the training pairs (chapter 5), it would typically take
thousands of trials before performance was obtained.
Clearly, rather than throwing away the whole stack when an error is obtained,
the control strategy should be more conservative. The remaining assumptions
deal with the generation of hypotheses (5 & 6) and reordering of rules (7 & 8).
5. If no hypothesis is applicable to a given trial then a guess (random choice)
is made.
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6. New rules are hypothesised after guesses. Following a correct guess of a
colour, x, the rule select(x) is hypothesised.. Following an incorrect guess,
the rule avoid(x) is generated.
7. New hypotheses are added to the bottom of the stack (adding rules higher
in the stack would change the meanings of those below).
8. Faulty hypotheses are simply deleted from the stack (alternative methods
of reordering the rules involve more book-keeping).
With this simple mechanism, the stack order is only changed by the process
of adding new rules at the bottom and removing unsuccessful rules from higher
up. This works fine here because it is so easy to generate rules in this simple
domain that nothing much is lost if a rule is thrown out. A more sophisticated
mechanism could reorder existing rules and only throw out failures if they are
already at the bottom of the stack.
7.3.1 An implementation
These simplifying assumptions are sufficient to specify an algorithm for acquiring
rule stacks. Such an algorithm has been implemented as a Prolog program
(Appendix: C.l). A typical sample run of the program is given in table 7-1.
Each row shows the trial presented, the item chosen, the method by which the
item was chosen, the feedback given to the subject and the resulting modified
stack. The program was started with an empty set of rules and was given training
pairs in random order until one of the correct stack forms was produced. After
this point, further trials would all be responded to correctly.
In order to build up a picture of the performance characteristics of this al¬
gorithm, a program was written to run the algorithm many times over, with
randomly selected trials on each run. This program also added up the num¬
ber of correct answers given by the program (regardless of whether they were




















This is was produced by the program in C.l, with a training schema anal¬
ogous to the one given to monkeys. On each line is shown a randomly
selected training pair, the item chosen, the method of choice, the feedback
obtained and the revised stack. Choices are made on the basis of the stack
shown in the row above, starting with an empty stack. The rules are ab¬
breviated to avd(Item), for present(Item) =>• avoid(Item), or sel(Item) for
present(Item) =>■ select(Item). The stack is displayed horizontally, with the
top rule on the left. The feedback corresponds to reward and non-reward.
A working stack is produced on the penultimate line, and correct choices
are produced thereafter for all pairs (the output has been truncated).
Table 7—1: Sample output from learning algorithm with random trials
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the mean number of trials that the program took to build a correct stack was
30, with a standard deviation of 17. This is obviously much better than a 'blind'
search as described above. It is also much faster than the actual subjects, but it
must be remembered that the problem has been greatly simplified4.
Figure 7-2 shows the acquisition curves generated as a result of running the
program on thousands of trials. Each graph shows the percentage of incorrect
choices (out of the total number of choices) for each of the adjacent pairs. The
number of times the program was run is equivalent to the number of artificial
subjects and the number of trials indicates the point at which the errors were
counted for each artificial subject. The four graphs show the 'group' curve after
the first 3 trials, after the first 5 trials, after the first 15 trials and the first 30
trials, at which point most subjects reached perfect performance.
It can be seen that the performance immediately takes on the characteristic
inverted 'U' shape after only a few trials. The curve starts off almost flat, with
about a quarter of the errors falling to each pair, and becomes more pronounced
as acquisition progresses. These curves can be compared with those for the
monkeys in chapter 3. However, the program does not show a linear serial
position effect, as the subjects did on the first block of trials, but this is almost
certainly due to the fact that the pairs were not given to the subjects in random
order to start with.
7.3.2 Indeterminate training pairs
The program is not restricted to dealing with this particular training set, how¬
ever. Appendix C.2 shows the stacks generated for training pairs implying a
partial order (not implying a total order — the information about the series is
indeterminate). Most of the resulting stacks cause the interpreter to behave as
4Even so, the algorithm is not as efficient as it probably could be because it throws
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Figure 7—2: Simulated acquisition curves (first N runs).
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if the order had been completely linearised (into one of the possible total order-
ings). However, an unanticipated result was that some of the generated stacks
(those with three rules) effectively retain some of the indeterminacy by referring
to one less item. The training instances used in the example can be represented
by the partial order shown below:
The learning mechanism either collapses this into a total order, for example:
A — B — D — E —
or it effectively puts two items in an equivalence class, which can be represented
as follows:
A —♦ B (D & C)-E
This retains the ambiguity between C and D but imposes an ordering between
C and E which is not inferrable from the training set. I have (informally) ob¬
served this kind of partial linearisation in adult's drawings when they are asked
to represent indeterminate spatial layouts on the basis of sets of pairwise re¬
lations such as 'the cup is to the left of the bottle'. McGonigle and Wright
have noted that subjects given indeterminate descriptions will often map the
items onto a linear order if retaining the ambiguities is not a task feature (see
(McGonigle &; Chalmers, 1986)). However, there is currently no evidence avail¬
able on how monkeys would treat indeterminate training pairs.
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7.4 Alternative acquisition mechanisms
The above acquisition algorithm has been presented as a derivation of a philo¬
sophical outlook on induction, a kind of 'thought experiment' involving choice
tactics in multiple choice situations, and the gross phenomena associated with
the acquisition phase of N-term series tasks. However, given the more limited
goal of giving an account of the generation of avoidance and selection rules, there
are other possibilities.
7.4.1 The Generalisation heuristic.
This assumes that production rules are the default mode of storing pairwise
information and that rules which are initially restricted to dealing with one of the
training pairs become 'generalized' to deal with a greater number of situations
without leading to incorrect performance on any of the other training pairs.
The motivation for this process is hypothesised to be efficiency - four specific
(detailed) rules which are each independently correct are effectively converted
to a single procedure where each rule contains less detail but correctness is
preserved overall by imposing an ordering upon the rules. For example, the rule
present(B) =£■ select[C) can be generalised in two ways, by replacing either B
or C with a variable x:
• present(x) =>• select[C)
• present(B) => select(x)
It is implicit here that the variable is to be matched with a different item to the
one referred to in the rule, and this is formalised more rigorously below. However,
the main idea is that a rule relating any training pair of items can be generalised
by making either its precondition or its post-condition less specific. This is
analogous to Generalisation learning in previous production system models. The
second and third equation below can be obtained from the first by replacing one
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of the items with a variable. The left hand side of the equations acts as a task
specification and must be matched against a particular trial and the right hand
side specifies the action. Note that these rules are to be regarded as equivalent




Rules about four training pairs therefore lead to a 'parent' set of eight possible
rules. These are laid out below using the shorthand 'select(C)' for rules of form
7.2 and 'avoid(B)' for rules of form 7.3.
Original rules Generated rules
trial(D, E) —*■ pick[E) select(E) avoid(D)
trial[C, D) —* pick(D) select{D) avoid(C)
trial[B,C) —+ pick{C) select(C) avoid(B)
trial{A,B) —> pick(B) select(B) avoid(A)
The reason that the previous mechanism is preferred to this one is that the
reason for performing the generalisations appears to be weak and that subjects
would have to achieve a near perfect performance before the characteristic 'in¬
verted U' acquisition curve would appear.
7.4.2 Discussion
A mechanism for acquiring rule stacks has been proposed based on a theory
about how organisms deal with multiple choice situations. The stack mechanism,
proposed in chapter 4, is seen as a special case of a decision procedure which
generates an ordered set of hypotheses about a class of multiple choice situations.
The hypotheses are seen as rules when the decision procedure becomes perfected,
before that point, they are a source of error.
trial(B,C) —> pick(C)
Vx : trial(x,C) —> pick(C)
Vx : trial(B,x) —► pick(x)
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A language for describing hypotheses was suggested, based on the production
rule idea of condition-action pairs. On the right hand side of these hypotheses,
there are 'choice tactics'. Two basic tactics, avoidance and selection, are coupled
with object features, giving a space of choice actions. On the left hand side, there
is a description which must be just sufficient in complexity to discriminate the
choice situations which require different choice actions.
Hypotheses are ordered on the basis of their 'predictive value'. In the simple
model of the N-term series task, hypotheses are rejected when they lead to an
unrewarded choice and generated when existing hypotheses fail to cover a new
situation.
The proposed acquisition algorithm is somewhat difficult to relate to existing
AI techniques for rule learning even though, at least superficially, it appears to
be tackling an analogous problem. The algorithm seems to differ in a signifi¬
cant way from classification algorithms such as Quinlan's ID3 (Quinlan, 1979)
in that these require all the examples in advance rather than working incremen¬
tally, and thus they would not allow intermediate levels of performance. The
algorithm is not readily comparable with focusing (Bundy et al, 1985) because
it does not learn unique concepts. Instead, what the program does is to come up
with one of a number of possible representations/strategies which fit the current
task constraints and improve performance. There is no unique 'target' concept
to be learned. Another difference is in the use of guessing to generate useful
information instead of passively accepting examples and counter-examples.
Although concept learning programs appear to be tackling a somewhat dif¬
ferent problem, there are some technical points of comparison. The method of
hypothesis ordering does resemble that employed in AMBER, a concept learn¬
ing program written by (Langley, 1981) which acquires simple English grammar
rules when given examples and counter-examples of grammatical sentences. In
his system, rules are ordered by having an associated priority number, and where
more than one rule is applicable to a given sentence, the priority decides which
one is used. A rule's priority gets reduced every time blame for an incorrect
decision is attributed to it. In concept learning, this solution is generally unsat-
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isfactory (Bundy et al, 1985), because the same fault might be detected several
times before the priority of the relevant rule drops so low that it is never selected,
and this slows learning.
Part of the problem may be that collapsing the value of rules to a single
priority dimension is inappropriate in a complex system. Even in the relatively
simple choice situations dealt with in this chapter, it was suggested that two fac¬
tors needed to be taken into account in assessing predictive value (section 7.2.2).
There is also the related problem of credit/blame assignment in concept learning
programs due to the interaction between rules. These are not problems with the
decision procedure described in this chapter, because the hypotheses are highly
restricted in form and content. The definition of choice tactics means that credit
or blame can always be correctly assigned to a rule when feedback is obtained.





This chapter draws together the conclusions from the modelling work
and suggests further tests and possible extensions of the model. Fi¬
nally, the significance of the modelling work is discussed with respect
to wider issues in development and learning.
8.1 Goal
Chapter 1 introduced the motivation of this research; to identify and model
'basic cognitive skills'. These are skills which cross age and species boundaries,
and which could form the building blocks of more complex skills in biological or
synthetic behaving systems.
8.1.1 The Selected Domain
Transitive inference, as found in the N-term series task, appears to be one such
basic form of reasoning.
1. It is sub-linguistic and cross-species.
2. It is fast, and closed to introspection.
3. It is abstract and thus not domain limited.
Transitive inference is also interesting from the point of view of synthesis (build¬
ing AI programs), as it is ubiquitous in formal systems.
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8.1.2 Previous Approaches to Transitive Inference
In both the N-term series and the SDE paradigm, described in chapter 2, the kind
of data and model generated has tended to depend on whether the researcher
has been thinking in terms of analogical representations or in terms of (linguis¬
tic) comprehension of comparatives. In particular, the N-term series problem
appears to lie at an interesting intersection between two disciplines. On the one
hand there is a set of theories and experimental data which conceptualises the
act of making comparisons as a kind of symbolic extension to perceptual com¬
parisons. On the other hand we have a body of literature treating comparatives
as composite linguistic objects which are matched against similar objects stored
in semantic memory. Neither approach gives a satisfactory account of all the
phenomena. Further lacking, is an explanation of how comparatives are dealt
with in terms of process, and this is where the main contribution of this thesis
lies.
Children and Animals
It appears that the ability of subjects to show a transitive bias on the crucial
BD pair in the five-term series task is a phenomenon which is robust with re¬
spect to species, methodology and stimuli. Furthermore, it seems that 'symbolic'
differences between the stimuli determine the representation and that it is not
crucial to have the presence of a physical metric such as size. Mcgonigle and
Chalmers have explored the relationship between child and monkey data in detail
(McGonigle Sz Chalmers, 1984a) and have found a strong mapping with respect
to all the major phenomena, including the acquisition curves, the binary and
triadic choice patterns and the ordinal distance effect. All researchers now ap¬
pear to agree that subjects do not simply store the training information as four
separate pairs but that some inferential process takes place during training.
Given this strong concordance, and the fact that the monkey studies are
the only ones to have a rich data base for each individual subject, the monkey
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data provides the only viable basis for a microanalysis based on computational
modelling.
The above research leaves an important question inadequately answered:
'What kind of representation do subjects use to integrate the four pairs?' It
is inadequate simply to postulate the existence of some kind of linear order de¬
vice; there are many ways of representing order information, as was discussed in
chapter 6.
8.2 Computational Microanalysis
A new model of transitive inference in the N-term series task was developed based
on a microanalysis of monkey data. The microanalysis breaks down into approxi¬
mately two stages, though the development of the model was inevitably partially
an iterative process. First, a computational mechanism, the stack model, was
proposed as a candidate for modelling subjects' decision processes during the
N-term series task. The mechanism is simple enough to be plausibly employed
by animals and can be justified on the grounds of computational efficiency and
parsimony. Second, the data was analysed according to this model.
8.2.1 Evaluation of the stack model
Overall, the stack model is a remarkably simple and effective approximation of
monkeys' decision procedures during the five-term series task. The data from
seven subjects and a number of experiments has been analysed at several different
levels. With the possible exception of one subject (Blue), all the analyses lend
some support to the model.
In more detail, the stack model appears to be correct in the following aspects:
1. The distinction between alpha and random types of triads appears to have
a great deal of validity, and supports the notion of subjects employing a
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combination of avoidance and selection rules. This is also supported by
the clustering of RTs of pairs which would be discriminated by the same
rule.
2. There appears to be some mechanism by which rules are ordered, but this
may not be a rigid stack as originally supposed. This is supported by the
ability of the model to account for much of the variation in choice patterns
between triads and, to a lesser extent, the overall linear trend in the RT
data for all subjects except Blue. The stack model is able to provide a
much better chunking for individuals' RT data than ordinal separation.
This suggests that the ordinal distance effect is an 'emergent', rather than
a fundamental property of the decision mechanism.
3. The improvement in performance observed across the three triadic testing
phases can be partly accounted for by increasing iteration in the control
strategy for applying the rules. The residual improvement can potentially
be accounted for by the stack becoming more 'rigid' (firmly ordered) with
usage, although there is no formal model for this.
There are a number of problems with the model however, some of which are
summarised below.
1. The model predicts all the choices to go to the a item in alpha type triads,
whereas a proportion get diverted to /?. It seems likely that this is because
the assumption about rule order being fixed is partially wrong.
2. Although for most subjects there exists a linear trend between RT and
depth of rule, there are significant deviations from linearity for three sub¬
jects. It was suggested (chapter 5) that subjects may somehow represent
the logic of rule ordering independently of the procedure for rule applica¬
tion. This point is returned to below.
Although it is clear that the proposed 'depth effect' is not a unitary phe¬
nomenon (but just a trend in the data), the reaction time analysis also shows
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that the ordinal distance effect is similarly artifactual, in that the reaction times
do not chunk naturally into the four ordinal separation categories. However,
there are strong regularities in the data which are incompletely captured by
both models. A reasonable explanation seems to be that the regularity, is due
to the operation of avoidance and selection rules and that the linear trends are
due to to the mechanism which applies these rules.
8.3 The Plausibility of the Stack Representa¬
tion
The stack model is a computationally cheap solution to the problem of comparing
items in a linear order. It is thus plausible that it could be a common biological
solution.
As an account of performance on the N-term series task, the stack model
outperforms existing models. A comparison with the binary sampling model,
which does not make binary reaction time predictions, was made in chapter
5. The main strength of the stack model is being able to account for individual
variation but, in chapter 6, it was additionally shown that the stack model fits the
monkey group reaction time profile better than Trabasso's spatial discrimination
model, Breslow's (basic) sequential contiguity model and Bundy's discrimination
tree model. It has been shown that the stack model subsumes the core part of
Breslow's model (based on traversal times) and that the assumptions Breslow
has to make about the retrieval of end-anchors are unnecessary. Furthermore,
none of the models described in chapter 6 make predictions about McGonigle
and Chalmer's triadic tests, whereas the stack model does.
8.3.1 Information Management
>
The concept of a stack of avoidance and selection rules proved to be a use¬
ful explanatory construct in accounting for performance on the five-term series
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problem. What value might the concept have in explaining reasoning at a more
general level? Why was the construct useful? Perhaps the initial answer lies
not in the organism but in the epistemology of choice situations, as suggested in
chapter 7. There are only two basic ways of narrowing down a choice between a
number of objects or courses of action; selecting a subset of the alternatives by
virtue of some property (or combination of properties) or rejecting a subset. The
avoidance and selection rules employed in the stack model are indeed primitive
instantiations of these strategies. More complex strategies, including mixtures
of avoidance and selection, can be built from the simple ones by combining them
with a simple control strategy.
Despite the fact that the bulk of psychological research involves presenting the
subject with choice situations, this simple point about avoidance and selection
may have often been missed due to the popularity of the standard procedure
of presenting binary choices, where it is difficult to tell which strategy is being
employed. Even with multiple choice situations, ascertaining the strategy is not
trivial, and repeated and multiple measures may be needed. Part of the reason
for investigators' reliance on two choice situations may be that they have tended
to assume that a subject chooses a stimulus for positive reasons, rather than
by avoiding alternatives. If this is the case then a valuable contribution of this
research is in demonstrating that subjects may spontaneously adopt avoidance
strategies in binary choice situations.
In multiple choice situations, avoidance and selection strategies do not have
equivalent status; they are not symmetrical with respect to a task and one is not
necessarily better than another. The monkey subjects had no way of knowing
whether they were being rewarded for the selection of one colour or for avoiding
the other, and only when they had to choose one out of three objects (in the
triadic tests) did the use of selection strategies show an advantage. One can
conceive of giving an equally valid transfer task in which subjects would have
to choose two out of three items, in which case avoidance strategies would have
been more efficient, although this has not been tried yet.
Consider the generality of the architecture of the stack model. Given the
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idea that subjects were using a combination of avoidance and selection rules to
achieve their performance, we initially tested the simplest form of control that
would allow correct performance of the original task (specifically, putting the
rules in a stack and trying them one by one until an applicable one is found).
This architecture can be generalised as consisting of a set of hypotheses about
what aspects of the choice situation are good predictors of reward (including
non-reward), together with a control strategy for hypothesis testing.
This characterisation was used as the basis for a model of the process of
learning to perform the N-term series task. This was implemented as a com¬
puter program, described in chapter 7. For example, if a blue item is chosen
and not rewarded, the algorithm generates a hypothesis that blue should be
avoided, which is then provisionally added to the rule set. Only during correct
performance can the component hypotheses be regarded as rules. The algorithm
acquires the series in an 'end-inwards' fashion, as described in the N-term series
literature, and constructs stacks which depend on the previous history of choices,
thus potentially accounting for the variation amongst subjects. The model has
not been tested in more detail than this, but it does lend some contextual plau¬
sibility to the stack model.
8.4 Extensions and Further Tests
8.4.1 The Acquisition Model
As it has been discussed above, the acquisition model is considered first.
It would be interesting to extend this acquisition model to be able to cope
with the improvement on the triadic tests. This requires additional sophisti¬
cation, as it is the control strategy which must change and not just the rules.
However, this is not incompatible with the general framework proposed above.
On transferring to the triadic tests, the subjects get no feedback on their errors
so there would be no reason for them to reject any of their existing rules. The
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change must therefore be precipitated by internal constraints on the decision
process. This could simply be a drive to reduce indeterminacy in the decision
process; a default preference for decision by rule rather than by a stochastic
process.
Before extending the model in this way, however, it would seem prudent to
test it empirically in its current form. It is not easy to do this from the current
data base. The problem is that, because of the nature of the experiment, no novel
pairs were presented to subjects until they had attained near perfect performance
on the adjacent training pairs. If the acquisition model were correct, however,
the inclusion of remote pairs at an early stage would have no disruptive effect
on the learning pattern; they would vindicate or invalidate existing hypotheses
in exactly the same way as for adjacent pairs.
It would be interesting to conduct a similar experiment with 'probe' remote
pairs being periodically mixed in with the training pairs. The model predicts
limited possibilities for responses on the remote pairs for any given state of
learning. For example, if a subject had recently learned the pair BC, but not
the pair DE, then it would respond consistently to remote pairs containing these
items (AC, BD, BE, and CE) either by avoiding B or by selecting C. If the
subject chose C from AC (selecting C) then it would be expected to (incorrectly)
choose C from CE and to randomly choose between BD and BE. If, instead,
the subject chose D from BD (avoiding B), then a correct response would be
expected to BE, with random choices to AC and CE. However, there are
obvious difficulties in identifying random choices in a learning situation.
There are other variations on the N-term series task which involve alterations
to the subjects' training phase, for example, triads could be introduced at an ear¬
lier stage. A more radical change would be to train subjects on an indeterminate
series, as described in chapter 7.
Finally, there is the question of whether a different mechanism should be
considered in place of the simple control strategy of the stack model. Both the
choice and the reaction time data suggest that the idea of a rigidly interpreted
stack order is incorrect (although a useful approximation). An alternative was
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suggested in chapter 7, which is that rules may in fact be ordered by some kind
of measure of 'predictive value' rather than a strict ranking. If this is the case,
then there may be something more akin to a competition between the rules
(for relevance to a trial) rather than a sequential testing of preconditions . A
connectionist type of model might be more appropriate, but it would need to
explain why there is a strong linear trend between rule value (depth of rule) and
reaction time. This could perhaps be related to the time taken for a connectionist
network to reach a stable state.
8.4.2 The SDE phenomena
In chapter 6, some alternative representations of series were described and formal
links between the various models were pointed out. It was shown how a cross¬
over effect, of the kind produced when question form is varied, can be produced
by a very simple representation, in which question form affects search control.
This simple model is no good for modelling the details of the five-term series
task, however. The connection between the congruity effect found in the SDE
literature and the asymmetries found in the five-term series task remains to be es¬
tablished. One possible avenue to explore is that different question forms might
map on to 'winning' or 'losing' in the monkey task. Suppose the instruction
'choose bigger' is analogous to 'winning' (selecting the item which will be re¬
warded — the tin with a peanut underneath it). Perhaps 'choose smaller' would
be analogous to instructing the subject to 'lose' (avoid the 'reward'). There are
obvious methodological problems in testing this idea because of the difficulty of
motivating the subject to 'lose'. If these problems could be overcome, however,
then we might expect a cross-over effect such that 'winning' would be faster
towards the rewarded end and 'losing' would be faster towards the unrewarded
end of the series. It is not clear whether the stack model could be adapted to
deal with such a finding.
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8.4.3 The Stack Model
A number of suggestions for further evaluation of the basic stack model were
made in section 5.5.1. These are summarised below:
1. There are reaction times on the triadic tests which could be analysed,
although the implications of a semi-iterative control strategy need to be
worked out in more detail.
2. Recently, video recordings have been made of the monkeys performing bi¬
nary and triadic tests, and there is potential for using these to evaluate
the model. Possible measures are 'thinking' times (reaction times with
the physical reaching component removed) head and eye movements (indi¬
cating the focus of attention) and hand movements (these might indicate
indecision).
3. There .is data from children on the binary and triadic tests which could be
analysed, although this is less detailed than the monkey data.
4. Some possible experimental tests were suggested:
(a) 'Neutral' items (without an ordinal position) could be included in
the series and used as probes to test for the use of avoidance and
selection strategies. This presents some technical problems, but these
could probably be overcome.
(b) Subjects could be tested with quadruplets as well as pairs and triads
(triplets) from the series.
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8.5 General Discussion
Investigating basic forms of inference is difficult. It is not initially obvious what
mechanisms to propose or how to apply the usual criteria of computational ef¬
ficiency and parsimony, for the simple reason that these acts of reasoning are
so difficult to isolate. The line of attack which we have adopted is to start
with a simple computational model and a rich empirical database. The model
was initially evaluated against coarse descriptions of the data and, as it with¬
stood statistical tests, evaluated against the fine grain data. At each level of
description, the predictions of the model were worked out, and presented in a
form compatible with the data. This was possible because of the computational
nature of the model.
It is not yet clear what the limitations of computational microanalysis are,
but it seems likely that it could be applied to forms of reasoning other than sim¬
ple linear orders. An experiment with indeterminate (partial) orders has already
been suggested. McGonigle and Chalmers have recently carried out an exper¬
iment simultaneously involving a symbolic order and a perceptual (size) order
on a set of objects, with both monkeys and children. Perhaps an analysis of
this might throw some light on the connection between the SDE and N-term se¬
ries phenomena. Other possibilities stem from the forms of inference mentioned
in chapter 2, such as reasoning about equivalences, eg (Sidman et al, 1982;
D'Amato &; Salmon, 1985), hierarchies (eg class inclusion hierarchies or fam¬
ily trees), sequences (Terrace, 1987) and orders in two or more dimensions, eg
(Foos, 1980; Mani & Johnson-Laird, 1982).
The motivation for this research was described, in chapter 1, to be 'to work
towards discovering the principles of information gain and the control of action
in behaving systems'. How does this thesis contribute towards such a goal (apart
from developing a methodology)?
Firstly, there is the assumption of the existence of 'primitive' cognitive skills
as building blocks for higher order mental operations. It was noted that transitive
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inference as observed in children and animals has some of the right features to
be a candidate for such a primitive. It is fast (and thus low level), has common
(behavioural) properties across species and subjects, and is presumably a useful
mechanism 'in the wild' for facilitating decisions involving food preference, social
order, etc. It was suggested that the same mechanism may be a precursor of more
formal logical skills, in particular, formal transitive inference and seriation. This
concept of 'primitives' perhaps now needs refining in the light of the modelling
attempt. In particular, what is the nature of the 'transitive inference' primitive
that has apparently been modelled?
A key problem in understanding the role of the proposed mechanisms is the
following paradox. No mention of transitive inference per se is made in the task
analysis (chapter 4) or in the stack model or learning models. In other words,
subjects' strategies can be perfectly well described without explicit reference to
transitive inference or, indeed, to any formal logical ability. Is the title of the
thesis therefore inappropriate? Is it the case that that the investigation has been
of some other form of reasoning?
Yet, at the same time, the monkey's (or child's) behaviour clearly is showing
(logical) transitive inference from the higher perspective of the task specification.
That is subjects can show, by their behaviour, that they have inferred relation¬
ships between previously unrelated pairs of objects. They are able to choose
between abstract symbols as if they had performed transitive closure. Do we
discount such a perspective on the grounds that subjects ate not aware of the
experimenter's formal criterion or that the mechanisms 'underneath' employ no
specification of transitivity? I think not. More importantly, both perspectives
can be resolved if we allow the concept of pre-logical1 inference. This is a category
1This is distinct from 'para-logical' (deSoto et al, 1965) which refers to analogue rea¬
soning devices (spatial or temporal). The term pre-logical is, I believe, consistent with
the usage by (McGonigle & Chalmers, 1986), and the ideas described here are an at¬
tempt to give their concept a more formal basis. The term 'non-logical' is also fre-
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of reasoning which is neither 'logical' nor 'non-logical' (irrational, associationist,
stochastic or purely procedural), and has formal properties which are emergent.
Such a category can be justified on developmental grounds. A major philo¬
sophical issue in Developmental Psychology is how to explain the emergence of
formal (abstract) reasoning skills including, ultimately, mathematical and sci¬
entific forms of reasoning. Trying to explain how such development is possible
usually raises a similar kind of paradox to the one described above. Either it is
assumed that logical skills are innate (and thus available all along) or there is the
seeming impossibility of a system trying to pull itself up by its own bootstraps;
how can logical relationships be comprehended without logic? This is a bit like
the chicken and egg problem.
Piaget suggested that children acquire formal skills by 'internalising their
own actions'. That is, they are supposed to abstract logical relationships from
the environment via their actions upon it. This explanation is somewhat unsatis¬
factory to the formalist; what is internalisation — a kind of osmosis? There may
be some truth in Piaget's analysis, however, in that the production of behaviour
is likely to be an important part of the learning process. Faulty reasoning can¬
not be corrected unless behaviour is produced. The question is, what mediates
pre-logical behaviour and gives the reference points (in the mind of the child)
for teaching to be possible. Clearly, what are needed are stepping stones in the
developmental path, and these may take the form of pre-logical skills.
But there is still something missing from our characterisation of pre-logical
reasoning. It is not sufficient merely to say that the logical properties must be
'emergent' and not formally specified in the components of the strategy. Almost
any form of computation can be said to have an emergent logic in that its (input-
output) properties can be described as a formal specification. Furthermore, the
traditional idea of logical reasoning is purely deductive. It should be emphasised
quently employed, eg (Breslow, 1981; McGonigle Chalmers, 1984a) where pre-logical
would perhaps be more appropriate.
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that I am using 'logic' here in a wider sense to include inductive processes such
as conjecture, which are an important part of the five-term series task.
I suggest the following criteria as necessary features of a pre-logical skill.
1. It must be possible to describe a logical relationship between a specification
of the task situation and the behaviour typically generated in the task.
More formally, the relationship will be a theory conjectured with respect
to a logic (for example, a subset of first order predicate calculus). There
are thus two types of inference taking place — deductive, where reasoning
is either true or false with respect to the theory, and inductive, where
relationships and theories are conjectured.
2. The logical relationship must be simple enough to fit the description 'prim¬
itive'. Arbitrarily complex relationships are not allowed.
3. The logical relationship must have utility. That is, the relationship must
arise in other tasks (presumably, this will be true of most simple relation¬
ships) .
4. The task specification must be simple enough not to rule out (too many)
other cases where the same logical relationship would hold.
For example, the five-term task can be (briefly) described as the presentation
of a set of ordered pairs followed by novel (unordered) pairings of the same
items. The behaviour is to order the novel pairs (by choosing one and not the
other). The relationship between task and behaviour can be described by a
simple transitive inference rule in conjunction with a formal logic. This type of
relationship is useful for reasoning about prefences etc, and the task specification
is general enough to fit such cases as may arise. The employment of the transitive
theory must be considered as a conjecture on the part of the subject because the
transitive relations do not follow, from logic alone, from the task specification.
Given the above criteria, it can be seen that although the logic of the skill is
in the mind of the observer (experimenter), there is always the potential of the
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subject recognising, or being taught, some of the logical properties directly. For
example, all that is needed for the skill to be considerably extended is (a) for sub¬
jects to form an abstract representation of the task (for recognising other tasks
of the same form) and (b) to retrieve and apply the appropriate strategy when a
task is 'recognised'. If the representation of the task is truly minimal (contain¬
ing no unnecessary features, such as the particular colours in the five-term series
task) then the subject could be said to have learned the logical relationship, in
some sense. This allows for the possibility of partially formed logical skills where
subjects do not always recognise a new task as being isomorphic to a previous
one (something which occurs frequently in adults with more complex tasks). So,
again, it can be seen that the distinction between 'logical' and 'non-logical' is not
so clear cut as it initially appears. There is the possibility of a system appear¬
ing to behave increasingly 'logically' without itself possessing a formal system
of deductive logic. However, there are some deep philosophical issues at stake
here (about the nature of logic), which are beyond the scope of this research to
unravel.
Returning to transitive inference, it seems reasonable to describe this, as
observed in the five-term series task, as pre-logical primitive. The relationships
which the subjects compute can be described as 'transitive' from the outside,
yet it seems unlikely that have a complete abstract representation of the task
or access (even tacitly) to a formal theory of transitivity. However, they do
transfer from the binary to the triadic tests and so must have a partially abstract
task representation. Perhaps the term proto-transitive inference would be more
appropriate for this kind of behaviour (in which case the title of the thesis would,
after all be inappropriate).
If the analysis in the learning chapter (7) is correct, proto-transitive inference
is the product of a more general purpose mechanism for making choices in certain
kinds ofmultiple choice situation. The mechanism decides what different choices
have in common and hypothesises which features are important. In some partic¬
ular circumstances, perhaps when the range of distinguishing features is small
(colour), this general mechanism produces proto-transitive reasoning by effec-
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tively imposing a linear order on the alternatives. The five-term series task can
be regarded as artificial in that only adjacent terms in the series are presented
dining learning. However, there is a 'natural' equivalent in that information
about choice situations is unlikely to be complete. The 'task' the behaving sys¬
tem faces is to come up with a useful decision strategy given a subset of the
types of choices which may arise.
We have the possibility, therefore, of explaining not only the emergence
of a formal reasoning capability, transitive inference, from a precursor 'proto-
transitive inference', but also the origin of the latter as a special case of reason¬
ing about multiple choices. Although much research would have to be carried
out to evaluate such a hypothesis, the potential rewards are large; if it can be
shown how transitive inference develops, then this itself may form a model for
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Triad 1 2 3 4 5 , 6 7 8 Mean%
7 (3 a P a /? a 0 a P a 0 a 0 a 0 a 0 a: (3 a
ABC 0 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 44.0 56.0
BCD 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 0 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 25.0 75.0
BDE 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 5 5 12.5 87.5
CDE 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 6.0 94.0
BCE 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 5 5 12.5 87.5
ABD 0 10 0 10 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 37.5 62.5
ACD 0 10 0 10 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 37.5 62.5
ADE 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 25.0 75.0
ABE 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 25.0 75.0
ACE 0 10 0 10 0 10 0 10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 25.0 75.0
Projected choices from the eight stacks described in chapter 4 with the naive
interpreter, with 10 trials per triad and assuming 50/50% split for random triads.
The summaries are used in section 5.2.2
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Appendix B
B.l Discrimination tree program
This program was referred to in section 6.3:
Discrimination Net Model of Brendan McGonigle's bigger-than data
Alan Bundy 6.4.82 */
/* top level procedures */
bigger(A, B, Ans) /* to find bigger of A and B */
most(big, small, A, B, Ans). /* find which is closer to big pole */
/* General discrimination net */
most(Polel, Pole2, A, B, Ans) /* to find whether A or B is closer to Pole2
*/
category(Polel, Pole2, A, CatA), /* look up paths of each in tree */
category(Polel, Pole2, B, CatB),
most(Polel, Pole2, A, CatA, B, CatB, Ans). /* and compare these paths */
most(Polel, Pole2, A, [Polel | Ra] , B, [Pole2 | Rb], A).
/* return A if its path diverges to Polel */
most(Polel, Pole2, A, [Pole2 | Ra], B, [Polel | Rb], B).
/* return B if its path diverges to Polel */
most(Polel, Pole2, A, [Pole | Ra], B, [Pole I Rb], Ans) /* if paths start
the same */
most(Polel, Pole2, A, Ra, B, Rb, Ans). /* then recurse on tails */
/* data
Data file for use with mcgon2
Alan Bundy 30.6.82 */
category(big, small, a, [big,big,big]).
category(big, small, b, [big,big,small]).
category(big, small, c, [big,small]).
category(big, small, d, [small,big]).
category(big, small, e, [small,small] ) .
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first(X,Y, [Z I Rest] ,Z) (X=Z ; Y-Z) , !. 7. fl
first(X,Y, [W jRest] ,Z) f irst(X,Y.Rest ,Z) . 7. f2
last (X, Y, [W| Rest] ,Z) : - last (X. Y.Rest ,Z) , !. 7. 11
last(X,Y, [Z I Rest] ,Z) X=Z ; Y=Z. 7. 12





















first(d,e,[a, b, c, d, e] , Ans)
d=b?













C.l A program for inferring rule sets from train¬
ing examples
This the implementation of the program described in 7.3. Adjacent pairs are randomly
selected from the series [a,b,c,d,e] and a stack of hypothesised rules are built up. The
program does not terminate, but at some point all the generated responses become
correct.
7, Program for modelling the way monkeys learn the five-term series.
% Runs on Quintus Prolog version 2.0. No special features are used
7. other than the library program for making random selections.
ensure_loadedClibraryCrandom.pl')).
.go:- loop([],_). Starts loop with an empty stack.
7. loop/2 makes the program cycle through random selection










7. respond/6 is called with Pair instantiated to a two element






'/. apply_stack/4 acts as interpreter for the stack of rules,
7. instantiating the third argument to one of the items in Pair
7, and the fourth argument to the decision method. The rules are
7. abbreviated to avd(Item) (if Item is present then avoid it)










% revise_stack/5 Modifies the Stack on the basis of the outcome of the
7. preceding choice and the method employed to make it. If a rule was
7. used correctly, no change is made; if a rule was used incorrectly,
7. it is removed; if a guess was made a new rule is hypothesised and







hypothesise (Choice .good, sel(Choice)) . 7. Rules hypothesised after
hypothesise (Choice ,-bad, avd(Choice)) . 7. a random choice.
7. Training Schema for Monkey Experiment
7. For simplicity, items within the pairs always appear in the same
% left-right order, although the program above does not assume this.
get_pair(Pair):-
random_member(Pair,[[a,b],[b,c],[c,d],[d,e]]).


























7. There are only two categories of feedback:
7. 'good' is where the response is rewarded;
7. '-bad' is where there is no reward. Other
X training shemes are possible.
X The minus sign is just to make '-bad' 4 characters long
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% which makes the printout easier to read.
% Utilities
% random.member is a library predicate which








C.2 Stacks generated from indeterminate train¬
ing pairs
The following stacks were generated by the above program with a different training
schema in which the training pairs were not all adjacent in a series:
The training pairs:
if [a.b] rewarded b
if [b,c] rewarded c
if [b, d] * rewarded d
if [d, e] rewarded e
[avd(a ,avd(b ,sel(c ,avd(d ]
[avd(a ,avd(b , sel(c , sel(e ]
[avd(a ,avd(b ,avd(c ,avd(d ]
[avd(a ,avd(b ,avd(c ,sel(e ]
[avdCa ,avd(b ,avd(d ]
[avd(a ,avd(b , sel(e ]
[avd(a ,sel(c ,avd(b ,avd(d ]
[avd(a , sel(c ,avd(b , sel(e ]
[avd(a ,sel(c , sel(e ,avd(b ]
[avd(a ,sel(c ,sel(e ,sel(d ]
[avd(a .sel(e ,avd(b
[avd(a ,sel(e ,sel(c ,avd(b ]
[avd(a ,sel(e , sel(c , sel(d ]
[avd(a ,sel(e , sel(d ,avd(b ]
[avd(a ,sel(e , sel(d ,sel(c 3
[sel(c ,avd(a ,avd(b ,avd(d 3
[sel(c ,avd(a ,avd(b ,sel(e 3
[sel(c ,avd(a , sel(e ,avd(b 3
[sel(c ,avd(a ,sel(e ,sel(d 3
[sel(c ,sel(e ,avd(a ,avd(b 3
[sel(c ,sel(e ,avd(a ,sel(d 3
[sel(c ,sel(e ,sel(d ,avd(a 3
[sel(c ,sel(e , sel(d ,sel(b 3
[sel(e ,avd(a ,avd(b
[sel(e ,avd(a ,sel(c ,avd(b 3
[sel(e ,avd(a , sel(c ,sel(d 3
[sel(e ,avd(a ,sel(d ,avd(b 3
[sel(e ,avd(a , sel(d ,sel(c 3
[sel(e ,sel(c ,avd(a ,avd(b 3
[sel(e ,sel(c ,avd(a ,sel(d 3
[sel(e ,sel(c ,sel(d ,avd(a 3
[sel(e ,sel(c ,sel(d ,sel(b 3
[sel(e ,sel(d ,avd(a ,avd(b 3
[sel(e ,sel(d ,avd(a ,sel(c 3
[sel(e ,sel(d ,sel(c ,avd(a 3
[sel(e ,sel(d ,sel(c ,sel(b 3
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